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In this dissertation I argue that medical humanities education for students 
considering careers in healthcare should begin at the general undergraduate level and 
should have two primary objectives, (1) providing tools that will help students foster 
therapeutic, compassionate relationships with their patients, and (2) providing strategies 
that will help students maintain healthy habits of mind that afford resilience against 
compassion fatigue.  I assert that in order for students to practice compassion for 
themselves and others three core objectives must be met.  (1) Students must be exposed 
to the fundamentals of bioethics in order to understand the virtue of compassion itself,  
(2) they must develop expertise in the tenets of narrative medicine in order to fully 
comprehend the causes of suffering in their patients, and (3) they must be introduced to 
the practice of mindfulness as a means of self-care.  The following chapters suggest that 
literature and the visual arts offer the most effective means of teaching these concepts and 
vi	
present a pedagogy that incorporates traditional academic theory as well as practical 
application of knowledge. 
Chapter one introduces the tenets of narrative medicine through the study of Frida 
Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford Hospital.  This chapter considers the formal, 
contextual, and expressive elements of Kahlo’s painting as they are related to Rita 
Charon’s concepts of narrative competence and narrative practice.  Chapter two explores 
the concept of empathy, a prerequisite to compassion, using short stories by Eudora 
Welty and Richard Selzer.  This chapter addresses the problems of alterity and the 
presence of unconscious biases that create obstacles to empathy.  Chapter three uses 
ancient and modern dramatic literature to introduce the fundamentals of bioethics.  This 
chapter argues that virtue, as well as principles, can be taught in the classroom and 
suggests a process for moral reflection.  Chapter four introduces the concepts of 
mindfulness and creative “flow” and suggests that engagement with and creation of fully 
abstract visual art helps students experience and practice the healthy states of mind that 
provide resilience against compassion fatigue.  Chapter five presents a case study that 
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Medical Humanities is a relatively new academic field that seeks ways of 
integrating the humanities into a medical education curriculum that is, of necessity, 
increasingly scientific and technological.  The perceived benefits of a more inclusive 
education for healthcare practitioners are myriad, but there is little agreement among 
scholars about specific goals and objectives of medical humanities pedagogy.1  Originally 
developed for medical students, the scope of medical humanities education has expanded 
to include practitioners in all aspects of healthcare.  For this reason the terms Medical 
Humanities, Humanities and Healthcare, and Health Humanities are often used 
interchangeably.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the traditional and more familiar 
nomenclature of Medical Humanities will be employed even though the suggestions for 
pedagogy are intended for students interested in any type of caregiving profession.  This 
dissertation affirms that Medical Humanities education should, in fact, begin at the 
general undergraduate level and be available to any student considering a career in 
healthcare.   
																																																								1Robert	Martensen,	“Thought	Styles	among	the	Medical	Humanities:	Past,	Present,	and	Near-Term	
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The field of Medical Humanities is, by definition, a multidisciplinary domain.  
For this reason, there is little in the way of cohesive ideology or suggested pedagogy, 
especially at the general undergraduate level.  In my own work I have come to regard 
providing students with the tools to develop and maintain a sense of compassion for their 
patients and themselves as the most important objective for undergraduate medical 
humanities education.  In this regard it is important to understand compassion as 
something more than a vague, ill-defined feeling, and instead consider it a skill that must 
be practiced and carefully maintained by all who choose to enter the field of healthcare.   
 Understanding and maintaining the virtue of compassion is imperative for the 
formation of therapeutic caregiving relationships and also for preventing caregiver 
burnout.  This dissertation asserts that in order for students to practice compassion for 
themselves and others three core objectives must be met.  (1) Students must be exposed 
to the fundamentals of bioethics in order to understand the virtue of compassion itself,  
(2) they must develop an expertise in the tenets of narrative medicine in order to fully 
comprehend the causes of suffering in their patients, and (3) they must be introduced to 
the practice of mindfulness as a means of self-care.  The following chapters suggest that 
literature and the visual arts offer the most effective means of teaching these concepts and 
present a pedagogy that incorporates traditional academic theory as well as practical 
application of knowledge.  
The primary sources explored in this dissertation have been selected for their 
effectiveness in demonstrating various elements of narrative, bioethics, and mindfulness, 
while simultaneously addressing many areas of healthcare in which there is 
dissatisfaction among both consumers and practitioners. This selection does not represent 
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the entire reading and viewing list for an introductory medical humanities course, which 
would certainly include factual, evidence-based texts in addition to the sources discussed 
here.  Many of the literary and artistic works discussed in this dissertation are familiar to 
scholars of medical humanities and are included because the current discourse contains 
lacunae or misinformation that warrant further study and clarification. 
There is much debate among scholars of medical humanities about the difficulties 
in evaluating the effectiveness of programs designed to teach behaviors and virtues 
generally considered unquantifiable.  Some scholars and clinicians believe demonstrating 
positive outcomes in a quantitative empirical manner is the only way to make medical 
humanities fully acceptable to clinicians,2 while others find such attempts to measure 
outcomes reductive and not particularly informative.3 Because most undergraduate 
students are not yet practicing caregivers, we must assess their understanding of the 
concepts presented and their ability to relate those concepts to lived experience.  In this 
regard, I concur with the conclusions of Shapiro et al., who posit, “students’ increasing 
emotional awareness, self-reflection, and capacity to grasp ambiguity might be 
considered as proxy outcomes for actual patient interaction skills.”4  
The formation of therapeutic relationships between caregivers and their patients is 
likely the single most important aspect of healthcare, not only in terms of making sound 
clinical decisions that truly benefit the patient,5 but also in preventing malpractice 																																																								2	Catherine	Belling,	“Sharper	Instruments:	On	Defending	the	Humanities	in	Undergraduate	Medical	Education,”	Academic	Medicine	June	2010	85,	no.	6	(2010):	938.	3	Ayelet	Kuper,	“Literature	and	Medicine:	A	Problem	of	Assessment,”	Academic	Medicine	Academic	
Medicine	81,	no.	Suppl	(2006):	S133.	4	Johanna	Shapiro	et	al.,	“Medical	Professionalism:	What	the	Study	of	Literature	Can	Contribute	to	the	Conversation,”	Philosophy,	Ethics	&	Humanities	in	Medicine	10,	no.	1	(June	2015):	6,	doi:10.1186/s13010-015-0030-0.	5	Samantha	A.	Batt-Rawden	et	al.,	“Teaching	Empathy	to	Medical	Students,”	Academic	Medicine	88,	no.	8	(2013):	1171.	
		 4	
lawsuits and caregiver burnout.6  At the core of such relationships is the virtue of 
compassion, defined by researchers at Stanford University as: 
A complex multidimensional construct that is comprised of four 
key components:  (1) an awareness of suffering (cognitive 
component), (2) sympathetic concern related to being 
emotionally moved by suffering (affective component), (3) a 
wish to see the relief of that suffering (intentional component), 
and (4) a responsiveness or readiness to help relieve that 
suffering (motivational component).7 
 
 
This definition is useful to the pedagogy of medical humanities because each 
component of compassion presents a unique educational opportunity and objective.  The 
cognitive and intentional components, an awareness of suffering and a wish to see it 
relieved, ask that the caregiver go beyond what is initially apparent and seek to 
understand the causes of suffering that may not be evident in the physical exam (PE) or 
history of present illness (HPI).  This type of attention requires an expertise in the 
elements of narrative.  The affective component is predicated upon an emotional response 
that has traditionally been discouraged in medical caregivers.8  Genuine emotional 
connection is crucial to the creation of therapeutic relationships, however, and part of 
medical humanities pedagogy must consist of helping students explore and understand 
their own capacities for emotional response.  (I will argue that an empathetic concern is 
preferable to a sympathetic concern, and the subtle differences between these terms will 
be explored later in this introduction.)  The motivational component of compassion, 																																																								6	Mark	Crane,	“Why	Burned-out	Doctors	Get	Sued	More	Often,”	Medical	Economics	75,	no.	10	(May	26,	1998):	210–18.	7	Hooria	Jazaieri	et	al.,	“A	Randomized	Controlled	Trial	of	Compassion	Cultivation	Training:	Effects	on	Mindfulness,	Affect,	and	Emotion	Regulation,”	Motivation	and	Emotion	38,	no.	1	(February	1,	2014):	23.	Italics	original.	8	Jodi	Halpern,	From	Detached	Concern	to	Empathy:	Humanizing	Medical	Practice	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	17;	Rita	Charon,	Narrative	Medicine:	Honoring	the	Stories	of	Illness	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	6.	
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responsiveness and readiness to relieve suffering, requires caregivers to have confidence 
in their ability to mitigate a patient’s suffering.  This confidence should extend beyond 
technical or scientific expertise and include a caregiver’s willingness and ability to 
remain emotionally present without sacrificing his or her own well-being.       
The dictionary definitions of empathy, sympathy, and compassion are all 
remarkably similar, but for the purposes of this dissertation, and for medical humanities 
in general, it is important to clarify the terms.  Compassion has previously been defined, 
but empathy and sympathy need further specification.  As Dr. Jodi Halpern has noted, 
physicians have been attempting to differentiate these terms since the 1950’s, at which 
time sympathy was considered a misguided impulse to “conflate self and other,” whereas 
empathy was seen as intellectual concern without emotional involvement.9  This 
distinction persists in modern healthcare where conventional wisdom encourages “an 
intellectual rather than emotional form of knowing”.10  Halpern disagrees with that 
precept, however, and states, “[T]he function of empathy is not merely to label emotional 
states, but to recognize what it feels like to experience something.”11  Halpern refers to 
the practice of clinical empathy as “emotional attunement” and stresses that this is not 
simply a vicarious experiencing of the patient’s emotions, but rather an imaginative 
reconstruction of the patient’s situation that allows and encourages emotional resonance 
between caregiver and patient.12  Sympathy, on the other hand, has been described as 
“feeling ‘for’ another person rather than feeling ‘with’ another person,” which places 
emphasis on the feelings of the observer (or caregiver) rather than those of the other (or 																																																								9	Halpern,	From	Detached	Concern	to	Empathy:	Humanizing	Medical	Practice,	18.	10	Jodi	Halpern,	“What	Is	Clinical	Empathy?,”	JGI	Journal	of	General	Internal	Medicine	18,	no.	8	(2003):	670.	11	Ibid.,	671.	12	Ibid.	
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patient).13  In these terms, sympathy emphasizes the difference between self and other 
rather than attempting to form a mutual understanding.  In the pedagogy suggested by 
this dissertation, empathy will be understood as a prerequisite to compassion.   
Pellegrino and Thomasma consider compassion “a virtue of special importance in 
the medical relationship,” and define it as “the capacity of physicians to feel something of 
the unique predicament of the patient, to enter into the patient’s experience of illness and, 
as a result, to suffer vicariously the patient’s anxiety, pain, fear (and so on).”14 This 
definition primarily addresses the affective, or empathetic, component of compassion, but 
is illuminating because it confirms that Pellegrino and others consider this aspect 
critically important.15  Unfortunately, this aspect of compassion is also the one most often 
avoided and least often taught.   
The idea of suffering as the patient is suffering is frightening to many caregivers 
who worry that such an emotional response will compromise objective decision-making.  
Pellegrino argues, however, that “objective medical good” is “the lowest order of patient 
good,” and that only decisions made with compassion will be truly beneficial to the 
patient.16 Caregivers may also fear that such deep emotional engagement with patients 
will lead to compassion fatigue and emotional exhaustion on the part of the caregiver.  
This dissertation suggests that cultivating a practice of present moment awareness helps 




The skilled practice of narrative medicine, the tenets of which have been 
developed primarily by Rita Charon, is the cornerstone to compassionate caregiving.  
Caregivers who are able to elicit a patient’s narrative, empathize with the patient in a 
healthy and productive manner, and verify their understanding of the patient’s story are 
able to ascertain causes of suffering that may not be readily apparent.  While the precepts 
of narrative competence have traditionally been explicated using literary texts, chapter 
one of this dissertation offers Frida Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford Hospital, as a 
means of exploring both the intellectual and affective elements of narrative engagement.  
This chapter considers the formal, contextual, and expressive elements of Kahlo’s 
work as they are related to Charon’s concepts of narrative competence and narrative 
practice.  The ideas of David Freedberg, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, and Alain de 
Botton provide theoretical frameworks that explore the power of visual art to elicit an 
emotional response in the viewer, and this emotional response is discussed as a means of 
allowing students to reflect on the process of empathic engagement.   
Chapter two continues the discussion of empathetic engagement, but considers the 
concept of alterity and the presence of unconscious biases that create obstacles to 
empathy and subsequently affect the quality of healthcare in the United States.  This 
chapter acknowledges issues of healthcare disparity, specifically the presence of a “status 
syndrome”17 affecting the overall health of certain segments of the population, and the 




propose that education of individual caregivers should provide tools for recognizing 
unconscious biases and countering attitudes that perpetuate status syndrome.   
The critical theories of Hans Georg Gadamer and Louise M. Rosenblatt offer 
useful insights for literary exploration and are presented in chapter two as justification for 
a pedagogy that encourages close reading and self-reflection rather than structural 
analysis of a text.  In addition, Peggy McIntosh’s ideas regarding white privilege and 
willful ignorance19 are used to consider the ethical implications of this type of narrative 
engagement. 
The primary sources examined in this chapter are two short stories, Eudora 
Welty’s 1941, “A Worn Path,” and Richard Selzer’s, “Imelda,” first published in 1982. 
“A Worn Path” is explored as a metanarrative exemplifying the practical differences 
between sympathy and empathy, and an unconventional interpretation of “Imelda” is 
suggested, one in which allegory and myth are used to illuminate the presence of hubris 
in otherwise altruistic caregivers.  Both works allow readers to reconsider initial 
interpretations in which unconscious biases and paternalism may be present.   
Chapter three uses two works of dramatic literature, one ancient and the other 
modern, to introduce the fundamentals of bioethics.  The study and practice of bioethics 
utilizes the tenets of philosophical inquiry to address the myriad dilemmas induced by 
extraordinary developments in modern medical treatment and research.  There are 
multiple theoretical approaches to bioethics, and this chapter considers four in particular.  
Virtue ethics places premium importance on the moral character of medical practitioners, 
arguing that caregivers should possess specific virtues such as compassion, discernment, 																																																								19	Peggy	McIntosh,	“White	Privilege:	Unpacking	the	Invisible	Knapsack,”	Independent	School	49,	no.	2	(Winter	1990):	31.	
		 9	
trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientiousness, in order to provide competent, ethical 
care.20  Principlism, arguably the theory most often taught and applied,21 proposes four 
principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice – that should guide 
ethical decision making in healthcare.22  Casuistry rejects the idea that a single unified 
theory can be applied to all ethical dilemmas, and suggests a case-by-case approach that 
relies on precedents and previously established paradigms.23 Narrative Ethics argues that 
proficient use of any ethical theory requires narrative competence, best learned from the 
study of literature.24  
This chapter affirms, “To teach ethics is not to teach the difference between right 
and wrong, but to make students feel more comfortable facing complex moral 
decisions,”25 and argues that virtue, as well as principles can be taught in the classroom.  
Sophocles’ Greek tragedy, Philoctetes, first performed in 409 BCE,26 provides an 
excellent vehicle for exploring the concept of duty, and the presence of conflicting moral 
obligations.  This play also introduces students to the concept of a moral exemplar, and 
allows them to consider the attributes they will seek in caregiver role models.  Margaret 
Edson’s 1999 Pulitzer Prize winning drama, W;t, provides a stunning example of non-
ethical behavior, and asks students to consider the consequences of the absence of 




in its portrayal of modern healthcare, but that it nevertheless contains important lessons 
for caregivers.  Both dramas provide consummate opportunities for students to practice 
moral reflection and to consider what might constitute a personal reflective equilibrium in 
the presence of a complex moral dilemma. 
Chapter four addresses the high rate of burnout and compassion fatigue in 
healthcare workers by first distinguishing between burnout and compassion fatigue and 
then suggesting methods for teaching healthy habits of mind that have been shown to 
mitigate compassion fatigue.   I argue that simple stress reduction is not sufficient to 
combat the emotional and psychological effects of compassion fatigue and that attention 
must be paid to healthy mental processes that can prevent maladaptive coping 
mechanisms.  This chapter introduces key concepts of mindfulness – present moment 
awareness, non-judgment, and sustained attention – using Dr. Ronald Epstein’s “8-fold 
teaching method to improve the capabilities of health professionals by fostering four key 
habits of mind.”27  Epstein’s methodology is adapted for the classroom and used to elicit 
contemplation of Wassily Kandinsky’s 1924 Blue Painting.  Attention to Kandinsky’s 
use of color and form allow a type of metacognition in which students consider their own 
thought processes and emotional reactions to the work.   
Psychology professor Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has described a beneficial state of 
mind called “flow,” in which a person becomes so deeply engaged in an activity that time 
is distorted, attention is fully focused, and “there is order in consciousness.”28 The 




of flow.  Once the characteristics of this state are experientially understood and its 
therapeutic value realized, students might feel encouraged to find activities that allow 
them to access this state on a regular basis.  Specific practices that maintain a healthy 
state of mind are crucial for caregivers hoping to remain compassionate throughout their 
careers and this chapter suggests ways of allowing students to personally experience the 
beneficial practices of mindfulness and flow. 
Chapter five presents the artwork and healthcare narrative of Andrew Marsh, a 
gifted artist who suffers chronic pain as a result of damaged discs in the cervical, 
thoracic, and lumbar regions of his spine.  His experience with the healthcare community 
demonstrates the profound necessity for healthcare practiced with narrative competence 
and compassion, particularly in the case of chronic pain and other conditions for which 
traditional medicine still has surprisingly little to offer.  The treatment of chronic pain 
relies heavily on opioid (narcotic) medications, which raises ethical concerns about the 
relationship between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.   
Marsh’s case also represents a situation in which caregivers are faced with the 
challenge of developing a beneficial relationship with a patient whose thoughts on his 
own well-being are often in conflict with the recommendations of the medical 
community.  A scenario in which medical options for the relief of suffering are limited 
and the patient’s lifestyle choices seem risky is one that many caregivers would find 
frustrating.  Developing healthy habits of mind allows caregivers to remain emotionally 
present in a therapeutic way while simultaneously preventing compassion fatigue. 
Finally, Marsh’s artwork offers the viewer a brilliant visual representation of 
physical pain, thereby providing caregivers with some means of understanding an 
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experience that “does not simply resist language, but actively destroys it.”29 This chapter 
suggests the use of standardized pain assessment forms constrain patient narratives and 
may therefore subvert the practice of narrative medicine. 
The overall goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the ways in which literature 
and the visual arts can be used to teach the fundamentals of narrative medicine, bioethics, 
and mindful self-care to general undergraduate students considering careers in the 
demanding field of healthcare. It seeks to provide tools that help future caregivers form 
therapeutic relationships with their patients and care for themselves in ways that prevent 
compassion fatigue.  The field of healthcare changes moment by moment with new 
advances in technology and pharmacology, exponentially increasing the vast amount of 
knowledge healthcare providers must absorb and retain.  If we begin by teaching future 
caregivers to place equal value on knowledge that promotes healthy relationships and 
mindful self care, we stand a much greater chance of imbuing the healthcare community 
with compassionate, resilient practitioners who enjoy their work and make a positive 















THE PEDAGOGY OF NARRATIVE COMPETENCE AND MINDFUL EMPATHY 
 
“Along with their growing scientific expertise, doctors need the expertise to listen to their 
patients, to understand as best they can the ordeals of illness, to honor the meanings of 
their patients’ narratives of illness, and to be moved by what they behold so that they can 
act on their patients’ behalf.”30 
        Rita Charon, MD, PhD 
 
In the above quotation, Rita Charon describes a particular kind of expertise, one 
that encompasses each of the four components of compassion – cognitive, affective, 
intentional, and motivational.  It is an imperative of medical humanities education to help 
students develop the kind of expertise she describes.  Narrative medicine, “medicine 
practiced with the narrative competence to recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by 
the stories of illness,”31 is a prerequisite for healthcare practiced with compassion 
because it is through the patient’s narrative that the caregiver comes to understand the 
true nature of the patient’s suffering. The compassionate caregiver must be skilled at 
eliciting and interpreting such narratives, but must also experience an empathetic 
response to that narrative.  As mentioned in the introduction, it is an empathetic, rather 
																																																								30	Charon,	Narrative	Medicine:	Honoring	the	Stories	of	Illness,	3.	31	Ibid.,	vii.	
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than sympathetic concern that should comprise the affective component of compassion.  
Like compassion, empathy can be seen as having more than a single component.  
Roughly speaking, the cognitive component of empathy involves understanding another’s 
perspective and being aware of his or her feelings, and the affective component involves 
sharing in those feelings.32  In a study of the practice and efficacy of teaching empathy to 
medical students, Batt-Rawden et al., have noted that most attempts focus on the 
cognitive component of empathy, viewing it as a skill that can be developed and 
measured.33 This chapter argues that the affective component of empathy is equally 
important and can also be taught.  Without the affective component, empathy is nothing 
more than “detached concern,”34 which is the traditional, and poorly functioning, model 
for patient-caregiver relationships.35  The affective component of empathy is often a 
spontaneous response, but it can also be intentionally cultivated.  Either way, the 
emotional aspect of empathy requires mindful awareness and attention on the part of the 
caregiver if it is to be used on the patient’s behalf.   
This chapter offers suggestions for teaching the elements of narrative competence 
and the cultivation of mindful empathy using Frida Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford 
Hospital [Figure 1].  It begins with a brief synopsis of the origins of narrative medicine, 
and then explores the work of David Freedberg and other theorists who have studied the 
power of visual art to evoke an empathetic response.  It examines key theories of 
narrative in general, and finally considers Rita Charon’s elements of narrative medicine 
																																																								32	Mohammadreza	Hojat	et	al.,	“Physician	Empathy:	Definition,	Components,	Measurement,	and	Relationship	to	Gender	and	Specialty,”	American	Journal	of	Psychiatry	159,	no.	9	(September	1,	2002):	1563,	doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.159.9.1563.	33	Batt-Rawden	et	al.,	“Teaching	Empathy	to	Medical	Students,”	1173.	34	Ibid.,	1171.	35	Halpern,	From	Detached	Concern	to	Empathy:	Humanizing	Medical	Practice,	15.	
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as they are represented in Kahlo’s painting.   Close engagement with this work of art 
allows students to examine the nature of their own empathetic response and to understand 
the elements of narrative as universal in nature while simultaneously unique to every 
patient. 
The genesis of narrative medicine can be dated to 1972, when Joanne Trautmann 
Banks was appointed professor of Literature and Medicine at the Hershey Medical Center 
of Pennsylvania State University.36 Banks was a literature professor and Virginia Woolf 
scholar who believed the study of literature had “life enhancing” benefits.  Perhaps 
because she was the mother of a disabled son who spent a great deal of time in the varied 
environments of healthcare, Banks wished to share these benefits with students of 
medicine.37 The purpose of Banks’s course, and of similar courses later instituted at 
medical schools throughout the country, was to provide future doctors with some means 
of understanding pain and suffering from the patients’ perspective.38   
Rita Charon expanded upon Bank’s original intentions for the study of literature, 
and in 2000 founded the Narrative Medicine program at Columbia University.  Charon is 
a professor of clinical medicine at Columbia, and also holds a PhD in English Literature. 
What began as a way of allowing young medical students some means of understanding 
the patient’s experience of illness and suffering, now includes the development of 
“narrative competence . . . a sophisticated knowledge of how stories work” that enables a 
caregiver to “follow the patient’s narrative thread, identify the metaphors or images used 																																																								36	Jones,	Anne	Hudson,	“Reflections,	Projections,	and	the	Future	of	Literature-and-Medicine,”	in	
Literature	and	Medicine:	A	Claim	for	a	Discipline,	eds.	Delese	Wear,	Martin	Kohn,	and	Susan	Stocker	(McLean,	VA:	Society	for	Health	and	Human	Values,	1987).29.			37	Oransky,	Ivan	“Joanne	Trautmann	Banks,”	The	Lancet	,	vol.	370	no.	9584	(2007).		http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(07)61148-9/fulltext	38	Charon,	Rita.	“Literature	and	Medicine:	Origins	and	Destinies,”	Academic	Medicine	vol.	75,	no.	1	(2000).	23.	
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in the telling, tolerate ambiguity and understand the story in light of others told by this 
teller.”39 
Like Rita Charon, Howard Brody holds both an MD and PhD.  He is a professor 
of philosophy and family practice medicine at Michigan State University and has also 
made significant contributions to the theory and praxis of narrative medicine.  Brody has 
noted that the relationship between caregiver and patient is inherently narrative in nature, 
often beginning with a “chief complaint” or “chief concern” (CC) as related by the 
patient,40 and culminating in a case history, which is the story of disease as seen from the 
caregiver’s perspective.41  Narrative medicine is a means of practice that mandates 
attention to the narratives of both patient and caregiver, and considers these narratives the 
primary means through which diagnoses are made and treatment is offered.  This type of 
practice does not, in any way, exclude the scientific and technological aspects of 
medicine that continue to create enormous strides in the reduction of disease and 
promotion of health, but simply asserts that unless a healthcare practitioner understands 
what a specific illness or injury actually means to the patient, it is almost impossible to 
deliver care that promotes the well-being of the patient and, consequently, of the 
caregiver.   
Frida Kahlo lived within a physical body that betrayed her at every turn, and 
images of her own body figure prominently in many of her paintings. Sidonie Smith has 
suggested, “Life writing about the body has also enabled people to confront the destiny of 
																																																								39	Ibid.,	4.		40	Charlie	Goldberg,	“History	of	Present	Illness,”	A	Practical	Guide	to	Clinical	Medicine,	August	16,	2008,	https://meded.ucsd.edu/clinicalmed/history.htm.	41	Brody,	Stories	of	Sickness,	8.	
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the ill or impaired body, their own or someone else’s,”42 and it seems evident that Kahlo 
created her autobiographical paintings as a means of confronting her own failing body 
and of expressing the ways in which being embodied in an unreliable and pain-riddled 
physical self complicates the quest for identity and wholeness.   
When she was six years old, Kahlo contracted polio, and although she recovered, 
her right leg atrophied and she walked with a limp for the rest of her life.43 When she was 
eighteen, Kahlo was badly injured in a bus accident.  A medical report from 1926 lists the 
following injuries and complications resulting from the accident, “fracture of the third 
and fourth lumbar vertebrae, triple fracture to pelvis, approximately eleven fractures to 
right leg, dislocation of left shoulder, stomach wound due to metal rod entering left side 
and exiting by the vagina, causing damage to the left lip of vulva. Acute peritonitis.  
Cystitis. . . . Three months in Red Cross Hospital. . . . [immobilized] for nine months in a 
plaster corset.”44  
The medical record, an impersonal catalog of injuries and illnesses, does not 
begin to express the emotional suffering that accompanied Kahlo’s physical trauma.  
Kahlo spoke of the accident as the moment she lost her virginity.45 It is unlikely Kahlo 
was simply referring to a physical change caused by the horrific injury; she is certainly 
lamenting the loss of innocence, and loss of the future she had planned.  After spending 
one month in the hospital, Kahlo spent three additional months on bed rest at her home.  
Kahlo had hoped to become a doctor, but began painting during this period of 
																																																								42	Sidonie	Smith	and	Julia	Watson,	Reading	Autobiography:	A	Guide	for	Interpreting	Life	Narratives,	2nd	ed.	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010),	53.	43	Christina	Burrus,	Frida	Kahlo:	Painting	Her	Own	Reality	(New	York:	Abrams,	2008),	16.	44	Ibid.,	122.	45	Martha	Zamora,	Frida	Kahlo:	The	Brush	of	Anguish,	trans.	Marilyn	Sode	Smith	(San	Francisco:	Chronicle	Books,	1990),	26.	
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convalescence.  Her bed was affixed with a canopy that held a mirror as well as an easel, 
and some of her earliest paintings were self-portraits.46 
In 1931, after years of chronic pain, Kahlo’s doctors recorded evidence of a 
previously undiagnosed congenital spinal malformation such as scoliosis, or perhaps 
spina bifida occulta.47 Kahlo wore spinal corsets, both plaster and metal, off and on in an 
effort to ease the pain and also underwent a series of lumbar punctures with injections of 
Lipidol, a contrast agent injected into the spinal fluid in order to make it visible on x-ray.  
Evidently these procedures were done in an effort to obtain some sort of concrete 
diagnosis.  In 1946 four lumbar vertebrae were fused using bone from her pelvis and a 
metal rod.48  
Kahlo married the artist Diego Rivera on August 21st, 1929.49 Later that year she 
underwent an abortion due to the “unfavorable position” of her pelvis, which doctors 
believed made it impossible for her to carry an infant to term.50 In spite of her tumultuous 
relationship with Rivera, or perhaps because of it, Kahlo eventually wished to have a 
child with her husband.51 By the time she became pregnant again in 1932, Kahlo had 
worked through some of the ambivalence she had long felt regarding motherhood and 
later told her doctor, “At that time I was enthusiastic about having the child after having 
thought of all the difficulties that it would cause me.”52 Kahlo was placed on strict bed 
rest in an effort to maintain the pregnancy, but she miscarried after four months.53 
																																																								46	Andrea	Kettenmann,	Frida	Kahlo:	Pain	and	Passion	(Los	Angeles:	Taschen,	1992),	18.	47	Burrus,	Frida	Kahlo:	Painting	Her	Own	Reality,	122.	48	Ibid.,	124.	49	Ibid.,	36.	50	Ibid.,	122.	51	Zamora,	Frida	Kahlo:	The	Brush	of	Anguish,	40.	52	Kettenmann,	Frida	Kahlo:	Pain	and	Passion,	32.	53	Burrus,	Frida	Kahlo:	Painting	Her	Own	Reality,	122.	
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While still hospitalized after the miscarriage, Kahlo began preliminary sketches 
for Henry Ford Hospital.  The artist depicts herself lying in a hospital bed incongruously 
placed in a desolate landscape.   In the distant background she has rendered the Ford 
Motor Company plant where her husband was working on sketches for the murals he 
would later paint for the Detroit Institute of Arts.54  The focal point of the painting is the 
hospital bed, isolated in the midst of a barren landscape and giving visual form to the 
loneliness and isolation often experienced in times of illness.  Kahlo lies naked and 
completely exposed on the bed; her physical frame is very small in relation to the bed 
frame and the surrounding environment.  Her nakedness and her smallness present the 
viewer with a portrait of complete vulnerability; Kahlo seems at the mercy of the 
elements both within and outside the hospital.  The bed is tilted at an odd angle and 
Kahlo lies very close to the near edge.  This distortion of the picture plane places the 
patient in a precarious position and conveys the fear of being at the edge of a precipice 
both physically and emotionally.  It is a visual rendering of disorientation, fear, and grief. 
An empathetic understanding of the emotions conveyed in Kahlo’s painting 
requires students to become deliberately and intentionally engaged with the work, 
accepting it as a means of gaining insight into the patient experience.  Some familiarity 
with the details of Kahlo’s life, both medical and personal, may be helpful in forming an 
empathetic connection to the painting, but are probably not necessary for all students 
because the work alone is visually captivating. 
																																																								54	Hayden	Herrera,	Frida:	A	Biography	of	Frida	Kahlo	(New	York:	Harper	Perennial,	2002),	70.	
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In The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response, David 
Freedberg considers the “psychological and behavioral” responses to art,55 and provides a 
strong theoretical framework for understanding the emotional power of Kahlo’s painting.  
Throughout the text Freedberg explores three factors he sees as essential to the affective 
power of an image: familiarity, particularity, and vividness.56  
In his discussion of familiarity, Freedberg examines the use of art in the middle 
ages to influence the attitudes and behavior of young children, an effect he attributes to 
the children’s ability to identify with, or see themselves “mirrored” in the works of art.57 
He continues this discussion by analyzing the use of images to connect earthly and divine 
realms, and notes that when such images take human form, “worshipers may as a 
consequence venerate the object and confuse it with what it stands for . . . what is 
familiarly known cannot be invested with powers that are proper to the sphere of 
transcendence.”58 In such cases a strong empathetic connection to an image may become 
idolatrous, but human forms are nevertheless used to “shape the divine” because the 
human form is “most intimately known to us.”59 Freedberg cites Freud’s concept of 
transference in explaining the human tendency to feel an emotional connection to both 
objects and beings in which we perceive qualities with which we are familiar.60  The 
simple presence of the human form in a work of art might engender only the barest sense 
of empathy, but Kahlo’s rendition may evoke an immediate and much stronger response 
in students who have undergone similar experiences of fear or grief in the face of illness 																																																								55	David	Freedberg,	The	Power	of	Images:	Studies	in	the	History	and	Theory	of	Response	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1991),	xix.	56	Ibid.,	196.	57	Ibid.,	5.	58	Ibid.,	65.	59	Ibid.,	190.	60	Ibid.,	191.	
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or injury.  For those who have not, a closer exploration of the painting offers much to 
consider.  
Kahlo invites familiarity by painting a single, large tear near her left eye.  As with 
all of her self-portraits, Kahlo’s facial expression is rather stoic and enigmatic. Kahlo 
removes whatever questions might arise about her emotional state, however, with the 
presence of a universal symbol of sadness.  The tear is familiar to any viewer who has 
ever cried, and thus it elicits immediate comprehension.  It is also stylized, however, 
larger and whiter than would be realistic.  This draws the viewer’s attention to its 
importance in the painting and to the fact that we are being asked to pay particular 
attention to Kahlo’s grief.  
Freedberg describes particularity as those elements of a work of art that remove it 
from the realm of the general, and make it utterly unique and distinctive.61  In 
considering the influence of particularity, Freedberg discusses the art form of ex votos, 
works created as expressions of gratitude for divine intervention.  He notes, “In every 
case, manufacture and figuration is predicated on a strict concept of distinctiveness and 
accuracy.”62 Victims of severe illness or injury offer votive works as visual 
representations of the gratitude they feel toward divine forces or beings that intervened 
and enabled the victim to survive.  These works are meant as gifts of thanks to the 
intercessor, and also as reminders that gratitude is owed and should be continuously felt.  
In order to generate this emotion of thankfulness, the votive must represent the “event 
from which the devotee was saved” as accurately as possible.63  
																																																								61	Ibid.,	117.	62	Ibid.,	155.	63	Ibid.	
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Henry Ford Hospital is not an ex voto, but it bears many similarities to the 
form.64  It is small and painted on a metal plate, and while Kahlo is certainly not 
expressing gratitude for surviving the miscarriage, or for any other evident reason, she 
nevertheless seeks to share her experience as accurately as possible.  Though we can and 
should draw inductive conclusions from her work about the trauma of miscarriage in 
general, she clearly wants the viewer to understand her very particular experience.  She 
makes this evident with the inclusion of the incongruous industrial backdrop and the 
objects she paints tethered to her body.   These objects will be more closely examined as 
elements of Kahlo’s narrative, but here we must acknowledge the stylized image of an 
oversized male fetus, one that bears a resemblance to Kahlo’s husband.  This figure 
reminds the viewer that Kahlo is not grieving the loss of some unknown entity to which 
there was no deep attachment, but rather the loss of a child, already recognized with 
particular traits of form and character.  This is, arguably, the deepest sort of grief.   
As Walter Benjamin notes in his famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction, “The manner in which human sense perception is organized, 
the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by 
historical circumstances as well.”65  Here we must note that society at large no longer 
responds to visual art the way it did in the past.  Freedberg puts this more specifically, 
“We may no longer have much leisure to contemplate the images before us, but people 
once did; and they turned contemplation into something useful, therapeutic, elevating, 
consoling, and terrifying.  They did so in order to attain a state of empathy; and when we 																																																								64Andrea	Kettenmann	has	also	observed	the	similarities	between	this	painting	and	Mexican	votive	art.		She	notes	that	Kahlo	“owned	a	large	collection	of	ex-voto	panels.”	Kettenmann,	Frida	Kahlo:	Pain	
and	Passion,	35.	65	Walter	Benjamin,	Illuminations,	ed.	Hannah	Arendt,	trans.	Harry	Zohn	(New	York:	Schocken	Books,	1969),	222.	
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examine how they did so, a brilliant light is cast not only on the function of images but on 
a potential that for many of us remains to be activated.”66 Freedberg is here referring to 
the medieval practice of using images to bring to mind the lives of saints and Biblical 
figures in order to inspire faith and righteous living in the worshiper.67  Although we 
seldom use images in this way today, their power to inspire and to engender strong 
affective responses has not been lost; it simply requires a specific type of attention.  In 
this age of instant access to all manner of information and the attendant impulse to 
engage in multiple tasks simultaneously, the desire to devote undivided attention to a 
single image is perhaps uncommon, but this type of sustained, focused attention is a 
necessary component of empathetic engagement, whether with a work of art or a fellow 
human being.  Classroom contemplation of Kahlo’s painting provides an opportunity to 
encourage students in this process. 
W. J. T. Mitchell has noted that, although true contemplation of images may be 
rare in today’s society, we are still a visual culture.  “The idea that images have a kind of 
social or psychological power of their own is, in fact, the reigning cliché of contemporary 
visual culture. . . . There is no difficulty, then, in demonstrating that the idea of the 
personhood of pictures is just as alive in the modern world as it was in traditional 
societies.”68  Borrowing a term from post-colonial theorists, Mitchell proposes a 
“subaltern model” for examining the power of images and suggests  “that we not confuse 
the desire of the picture with the desires of the artist, the beholder, or even the figures in 
the picture.”69  What Mitchell seems to be suggesting is a personification of the picture 
																																																								66	Freedberg,	The	Power	of	Images:	Studies	in	the	History	and	Theory	of	Response,	161.	67	Ibid.,	162.	68	W.	J.	T	Mitchell,	“What	Do	Pictures	‘Really’	Want?,”	October,	no.	77	(1996):	73.	69	Ibid.,	81.	
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itself that would return certain rights that have been usurped in our tendency to consider 
only the desires of the artist and viewer.  This type of esoteric theorizing is of limited 
value in the pedagogy of medical humanities, which seeks the immediate and practical 
benefits of study, but it nevertheless underscores the notion that it is possible to be moved 
by images even when we know nothing about the artist or the subjects in the painting.  In 
the case of Henry Ford Hospital, the potential for empathetic engagement is strengthened 
because we have some familiarity with its context and therefore a more directed approach 
to the interpretation of its symbols. 
When assisting students toward empathetic engagement with Kahlo’s painting, it 
might be useful to explore Roland Barthes’ notion of studium and punctum, conceived as 
he was attempting to understand the peculiar power of certain photographs, and recorded 
in Camera Lucida.  Barthes describes the studium as a cultural or human quality of a 
photograph that allows the viewer to “participate” in, or at least feel a general connection 
with or interest in the picture.  The viewer actively seeks this element in the photograph 
being considered.70  The punctum, on the other hand, is the “element which rises from 
the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me . . . A photograph’s punctum is 
that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).”71 What elements 
of the painting are easily “relatable,” (to use a term often employed by students), and 
what elements are piercing, or more difficult to hold in our thoughts? 
In Art as Therapy, Alain de Botton and John Armstrong attempt to address the 
question of what art should do for its viewers.  They describe seven ways in which art “is 
a therapeutic medium that can help guide, exhort and console its viewers, enabling them 																																																								70	Roland	Barthes,	Camera	Lucida:	Refelctions	on	Photography,	trans.	Richard	Howard	(New	York:	Hill	and	Wang,	1981),	26.	71	Ibid.,	27.	
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to become better versions of themselves.72 In discussing the function of “Sorrow,” the 
authors note that art may encourage “a profound engagement with sadness . . . It tells us 
that sorrow is written into the contract of life.”73 And yet, few people would seek a 
deliberate engagement with sadness.  As Freedberg reminds us, the affective power of art 
is often rejected or repressed because of its power to disturb.74  In her 2003 study of war 
photography, Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag writes, “The photographs are a 
means of making ‘real’ (or ‘more real’) matters that the privileged and the merely safe 
might prefer to ignore.”75  
At some point, when considering Henry Ford Hospital, the viewer may be forced 
to decide whether to stay with the work and feel the sorrow expressed within it, or to 
disengage.  Obviously, this is a choice made many times every day in the world of 
healthcare.  Compassionate care requires empathetic engagement, and future chapters of 
this dissertation will discuss healthy ways of accomplishing this, but here, the goal is 
simply to encourage students to commit to a close encounter with Kahlo’s work and to 
pay attention to the experience of emotional engagement.   
Traditional medical wisdom prescribed an emotional detachment from patients, 
which was believed to foster rational decision-making.  Recently however, practitioners 
and scholars have begun to argue that, “by allowing patients to move them, physicians 
gain access to a source of understanding illness and suffering that can make them more 
effective healers.  Learning to skillfully empathize with patients is therefore not an 
ornamental aspect of medical training, but is as critical as learning to perform technical 
																																																								72	Alain	de	Botton	and	John	Armstrong,	Art	as	Therapy	(London:	Phaidon,	2013),	5.	73	Ibid.,	26.	74	Freedberg,	The	Power	of	Images:	Studies	in	the	History	and	Theory	of	Response,	1.	75	Susan	Sontag,	Regarding	the	Pain	of	Others	(New	York:	Picador,	2003),	7.	
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procedures.”76 In her discussion of trauma art, Jill Bennett differentiates between “crude 
empathy,” which is grounded in affinity and involves “feeling for another insofar as we 
can imagine being that other” and empathy based upon “feeling for another . . . that is 
characterized by a distinctive combination of affective and intellectual operations.”77 
This type of empathy requires an engagement that is more intellectual than emotional.  
Even if there is nothing in Kahlo’s work that stimulates an emotional response, for 
example, it is still possible to make a cognitive choice to consider the represented 
experience of being alone and vulnerable.  This type of cultivated rather than spontaneous 
empathy is required of caregivers in cases where it is difficult or impossible to form an 
emotional connection with a patient; it allows the caregiver an alternative to emotional 
detachment or withdrawal.  In addition, this type of empathy is nonjudgmental; it is not 
about becoming emotionally attached to a patient and thus perhaps making inappropriate 
decisions, it is rather a form of engagement that attempts to understand, respect, and take 
emotional part in the patient’s journey through illness. 
In his essay, “What is Empathy and Can it Be Taught?” Howard M. Spiro 
concludes, “If empathy depends on experience, then that is the area in which novels, 
fiction, stories, and paintings can enlarge empathy.  Clinical tales, as Oliver Sacks calls 
them, are the most important; to look at a painting is, however, sometimes to be 
fooled.”78  Henry Ford Hospital is both a clinical tale and a painting.  As a clinical tale, 
the story of one patient’s hospital experience, it offers the seasoned clinician an 
enlightening story of miscarriage, one that might never have been previously considered.  																																																								76	Halpern,	From	Detached	Concern	to	Empathy:	Humanizing	Medical	Practice,	xix.	77	Jill	Bennett,	Empathic	Vision:	Affect,	Trauma,	and	Contemporary	Art	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2005),	10.		Italics	original.	78	Howard	M	Spiro,	“What	Is	Empathy	and	Can	It	Be	Taught?,”	in	Empathy	and	the	Practice	of	
Medicine,	ed.	Howard	Spiro	et	al.	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1993),	11.	
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As a painting, it offers the uninitiated a vicarious experience that could serve as a means 
of understanding suffering.  
Eric Larson and Xin Yao have studied the concept of “emotional labor” as it was 
developed and explained by Arlie Russell Hochschild in The Managed Heart: The 
Commercialization of Human Feeling in 1983.  The techniques presented in the book 
were designed to help people working in the service industry increase profits by behaving 
sympathetically and hospitably in all situations.79  In adapting the concepts for 
physicians, Larson and Yao define emotional labor as “the process of regulating 
experienced and displayed emotions to present a professionally desired image during 
interpersonal transactions . . . For a physician, emotional labor uses psychological 
resources to engender personal cognitive and affective changes to project an empathic 
image for the patient.”80  Using the techniques of emotional labor to express empathy 
requires acting; “Individuals can either fake their emotional display by forging facial 
expressions, voice, or posture or they can try to alter their internal experience and act on 
emotions they actually experience.  The former is called surface acting and the latter deep 
acting.”81  Deep acting is similar to method acting in that it involves using memories and 
imagination to generate emotions that might be comparable to the emotions the patient is 
experiencing.82  
Larson and Yao make it clear that their suggestions are not designed to enable 
unfeeling caregivers to dupe their patients, but instead are intended to be of assistance in 
times when a true emotional connection with a patient is difficult.  They also point out 																																																								79	Eric	B.	Larson	and	Xin	Yao,	“Clinical	Empathy	as	Emotional	Labor	in	the	Patient-Physician	Relationship,”	JAMA	293,	no.	9	(March	2005):	1100.	80	Ibid.,	1103.	81	Ibid.,	1104.	82	Ibid.,	1100.	
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that with practice over time, empathetic engagement comes more naturally and requires 
less acting.83  Even so, there remains something distasteful about suggesting that 
caregivers use acting techniques to fake empathy.  It seems manipulative and dishonest; a 
deliberate undermining of the trust patients must be able to place in their caregivers.  
Caregivers who are unable to feel a genuine, unmanufactured connection to their patients 
will not be able to provide compassionate care and must seek to understand the 
underlying reasons for this disconnect.  Compassion fatigue is a serious concern in 
modern healthcare and is dealt with more fully in chapter four of this dissertation. 
When using art and literature to explore the emotional nature of empathy, we are 
not asking students to manufacture emotion, but simply to pay attention to their own 
responses as they work to understand the experience being portrayed.  Caregivers who 
seek to engage empathetically with their patients are doing so in an effort to practice the 
affective component of compassion.  It is important for caregivers who have never 
experienced serious illness to have some means of understanding what their patients are 
going through and for seasoned caregivers to be reminded of the non-scientific side of 
caregiving.  Using art and literature to practice empathetic engagement allows caregivers 
a means of responding with sincerity to patients whose experiences are completely 
unfamiliar. 
Thus far this chapter has considered empathetic engagement between caregiver 
and patient as a crucial aspect of medicine practiced with narrative competence and has 
examined Henry Ford Hospital as a tool for investigating and practicing such 
engagement.  I will now turn to the place of narrative in narrative medicine, and will 
																																																								83	Ibid.,	1105.	
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consider the painting from the viewpoint of narrative theory and as an expression of 
Charon’s narrative features of medicine.    
The development of narrative competence requires practice in recognizing the 
elements of narrative and also an understanding that illness narratives are rarely 
straightforward.  Some theorists emphasize the narrative element of plot, “a teleological 
sequence of events linked by some principle of causation: that is, the events are bound 
together in a trajectory that typically leads to some form of resolution or convergence,” 
but this emphasis ignores the fact that, “many narratives resist, elude, or reject this model 
of plot and its explicit assumption of narrative unity, cohesion and teleology.”84  Illness 
narratives in particular are resistant to emplotment precisely because the elements that 
provide cohesion and purpose to daily living have been disrupted.  “The universal desire, 
or need, for a story with temporality, causality, and some limited predictability for the 
future is thwarted by an impending illness, and part of the suffering that characterizes 
sickness is the result of living with a broken story.”85  If, as Jerome Bruner argues, 
humans utilize narrative not only to represent reality but also to construct it,86 the 
patient’s story of illness must be seen as an attempt to reconstruct a reality into which the 
experience of illness can be incorporated.  Holmgren et al., see the ultimate goal of the 




explicate the symptom or sign, provide a plausible causal chain, and begin to demystify 
the future.”87 
It is a fair point to assert that Henry Ford Hospital is not a narrative painting. 
Unlike Masaccio’s Tribute Money, for example, which presents three distinct and 
progressive events in time, Kahlo gives us only one moment, so, conventionally 
speaking, there can be no plot.  I would argue that Henry Ford Hospital does in fact tell a 
story, and does contain a plot with causal relationships, but that it follows a pattern 
common to illness narratives in that the plot is not readily apparent.  It is, in the way of 
postmodern narration, fractured and disjointed, with elements that appear to be unrelated.  
If Kahlo were to describe the meaning of each of the symbols she has chosen to paint, the 
plot might become clear, but she is, of course, not available to share her insight with us.  
We can, however, take the information evident in the work itself and construct a 
provisional understanding of the narrative Kahlo created about her experience.   
In explicating his theory of narrative construction of self, Paul Ricoeur uses 
Aristotle’s concept of mimesis to describe the process of emplotment.  Ricoeur divides 
mimesis into three phases:  mimesis1 is prefigured time, the period when the events of 
everyday life are experienced, but not yet been formed into narrative, mimesis2 is 
configured time, during which we structure the events of our life into a story with cause 
and effect, and mimesis3 is refigured time, during which we have assigned meaning to 
our story, which in turn, shapes the way we view and interpret the world around us.88  
This concept of narrative construction is particularly useful when considering illness 
narratives, where mimesis1 might be thought of as the period before the illness or injury, 																																																								87	Holmgren	et	al.,	“Terminology	and	Praxis:	Clarifying	the	Scope	of	Narrative	in	Medicine,”	254.	88	Paul	Ricoeur,	Time	and	Narrative,	trans.	Kathleen	McLaughlin	and	David	Pellauer,	vol.	1	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1983),	54–77.	
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when daily life was perhaps comprehensible and predictable.  The attempt to make sense 
of the situation in terms of causality and consequence occurs during Ricoeur’s mimesis2, 
and mimesis3 is the period of time in which a patient seeks to find meaning in her altered 
state, perhaps reorders her priorities, and reconsiders her thoughts on the future.  This is 
an extreme simplification of both Ricoeur’s theories and the process of coming to grips 
with a life altering illness or injury.  In reality, the different periods co-exist, overlap, and 
may not be linear, but like Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and her stages of grief, Ricoeur 
provides a useful frame of reference for deciphering a narrative that may initially appear 
incoherent. 
In acknowledging both the potential benefits and the difficulties of practicing 
narrative medicine, Charon considers the issues that separate the sick and the well, 
caregiver and patient.  She identifies four types of division:89 1) The relation to mortality 
2) The contexts of illness 3) Beliefs about disease causality and 4) The emotions of 
shame, blame, and fear.90  Charon posits that these divisions often prevent the kind of 
trusting, transparent, nurturing relationships that would allow caregiving to function at its 
best and notes, “For the sick patient to accept the care of well strangers, those strangers 
have to form a link, a passage between the sick and the healthy who tender care.  We 
need to see the chasms clearly if we want to bridge them.”91   
																																																								89	Charon,	Narrative	Medicine:	Honoring	the	Stories	of	Illness,	20–21.		In	her	discussion	Charon	deals	exclusively	with	the	relationship	between	physician	and	patient,	stating,	“I	believe	that	the	relationships	patients	have	with	nurses,	social	workers,	and	therapists	are	less	troubled	than	the	relationships	they	have	with	doctors,	due	in	part	to	issues	of	power,	gender,	class,	clinical	training,	and	patients’	expectations	of	the	different	professions.”		I	do	not	disagree	with	this	statement,	but	because	these	divisions	are	present	between	sick	people	and	well	people	in	general,	their	implications	are	relevant	to	all	types	of	caregivers.	90	Ibid.,	22.	91	Ibid.,	21.	
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Charon also identifies five narrative features of medicine that must be recognized 
and understood by caregivers hoping to engage meaningfully with their patients: 1) 
Temporality – having to do with time, and the passage of time as experienced by the 
patient 2) Singularity – the unique and un-reproducible nature of every narrative 3) 
Causality/contingency – the desire to find a causal relationship for illness or injury 4) 
Intersubjectivity – the self in relationship to others, and 5) Ethicality – the responsibilities 









In an effort to comprehend and recover from a severe and debilitating illness of 
his own, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan studied autobiographical illness narratives in order to 
understand “continuity, its disruption, and the various ways of coping with the latter.”99  
He notes, “Motivated by a conscious or unconscious desire to (re)establish continuity 
between present and past, these narrators tend to emphasize elements of their past history 
that they did not stress before the illness, to create new connections among events, to 
change the balance between foreground and background, etc.”100 In Kahlo’s visual 
narrative, she grapples with current and future complications that have been caused by 
past events.  Rimmon-Kenan also explores the difficulty in crafting a story of illness that 
respects traditional narrative conventions of coherence and continuity.  He believes the 
postmodern exploration of the fragmented nature of reality and identity offers a far better 
framework for the construction of illness narratives.101 His insights support the 




Floating directly above the bed is the male fetus that Kahlo painted 
disproportionately large in relation to herself.  There is tendency in the medical world, 
and in society at large, to treat miscarriage as a less devastating loss than the loss of a 
child that has already been born.  Kahlo forbids this attitude when she depicts her fetus as 
a fully formed infant with recognizable features who floats away from the mother that 																																																								102	Hilde	Lindemann	Nelson,	Stories	and	Their	Limits:	Narrative	Approaches	to	Bioethics	(New	York:	Routledge,	1997),	193.	103	Eric	J.	Cassell,	The	Nature	of	Suffering	and	the	Goals	of	Medicine,	2nd	ed.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004),	32.	
		 38	
lies grieving for him.  From the perspective of narrative medicine, Kahlo reminds her 
viewers of the ethical responsibilities incurred as a result of learning her story, of the 
imperative to remain open-minded and free of assumption.   
In this painting Kahlo has rendered all the aspects of suffering that accompany the 
unwanted termination of a deeply desired pregnancy.  She has given visual form to the 
emotional trauma of physical failings, to the fear and frustration engendered by an 
unfamiliar and often threatening medical environment, and most importantly, to the 
feelings of loneliness and isolation that almost always accompany unspeakable grief.   
In her examination of the techniques authors of fiction use to create empathy in 
their readers, Suzanne Keen differentiates between empathy for particular characters and 
“situational empathy.”  “Situational empathy, which responds primarily to aspects of plot 
and circumstance, involves less self-extension in imaginative role taking and more 
recognition of prior (or current) experience.”104 When asking students to attempt some 
type of empathetic engagement with Henry Ford Hospital, it is obvious that few of the 
women and none of the men will be able to access a personal experience of miscarriage.  
Even though Kahlo’s work provides invaluable insight into that particular kind of grief, it 
is nevertheless important to remember that any experience of illness or injury has the 
potential to cause great sorrow.  Keen suggests that fiction writers emphasize “common 
vulnerabilities and hopes through universalizing representations” in order to create 
empathy for characters with whom the reader has nothing in common. 105  Kahlo’s 
depiction of blood, indicating a physical wound, the tear, and her rendition of herself in a 
vulnerable and precarious physical state are all universalizing elements in the work. 																																																								104	Suzanne	Keen,	“A	Theory	of	Narrative	Empathy,”	Narrative	14,	no.	3	(October	2006):	215.	105	Ibid.	
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It is important to remember that any attempt to interpret Frida Kahlo’s thoughts or 
experience purely on the basis of her painting is entirely speculative.  Any interpretation 
made by the viewer will not necessarily be an accurate interpretation of what Kahlo 
intended to express.  The work is extraordinarily useful in the pedagogy of medical 
humanities, however, because of its ability to stimulate an empathetic reaction in the 
viewer and because it allows such a thorough exploration of the elements of narrative.  
When interacting with living patients, the caregiver must continually verify his or her 
interpretations with the patient.  In discussing the narrative elements of Kahlo’s work, it 
might be helpful to have students consider questions they would like to ask the artist if 
she were available and willing to discuss her experience.   
Frida Kahlo’s experience of miscarriage represents a traumatic life event in which 
the science of medicine had very little to offer.  There was no way to fully repair her 
reproductive organs or the skeletal cradle that held them.  There was no way to save her 
unborn child.  In recounting a personal experience of feeling medically powerless, Rita 
Charon writes, “We had little clinically to offer this man.  I did not know, then, that there 
is no limit to what one can give as a doctor.  I did not know that I was allowed, as a 
doctor, to donate my presence, my attention, my regard.”106 This is the essence of 













THE PEDAGOGY OF SELF-AWARENESS:  USING LITERATURE TO EXPLORE 
ALTERITY AND ADDRESS HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES 
 
 
“[M]ost of the variability in health status we find in the United States and other 
developed countries has little to do with health care and everything to do with one’s 
position in the social hierarchy.”107    Donald A. Barr, MD, PhD 
 
In Health Disparities in the United States, Donald Barr presents evidence of 
inequalities in disease and death rates that exist along racial and socioeconomic lines in 
the United States. He cites extensive evidence documenting poorer health in people of 
lower socioeconomic categories,108 but also notes that even when income levels are the 
same, black people in the US continue to have much shorter life expectancies than 
whites.109  Barr references the work of Michael Marmot, who has described a “status 
syndrome” showing a correlation between social status and health regardless of 
income.110  Marmot writes, “Conventional explanations for noncommunicable disease – 
																																																								107	Donald	A.	Barr,	Health	Disparities	in	the	United	States:	Social	Class,	Race,	Ethnicity,	and	Health	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2008),	1.	108	Ibid.,	71.	109	Ibid.,	52.	110	Marmot,	“Status	Syndrome,”	1304.	
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lack of access to medical care, unhealthy lifestyles – at best only partially explain the 
status syndrome.  Rather, the lower individuals are in the social hierarchy, the less likely 
it is that the fundamental human needs for autonomy and to be integrated into society will 
be met.  Failure to meet these needs leads to metabolic and endocrine changes that in turn 
lead to increased risk of disease.”111  In other words, the psychological effects of one’s 
social status are an important determinant of physical health regardless of lifestyle or 
access to healthcare.  Although societal factors play a key, and often unrecognized, role 
in health and longevity, Barr also reports, “blacks and other minority racial/ethnic groups 
continue to receive less care and care that is of lower quality than whites.”112 Barr cites 
the presence of unconscious individual racial biases as the primary reason for this 
disparity.113   
Miller and Garran have noted that racism remains pervasive in the United States 
and often takes the form of unintentional aversion and racial microaggression.114  This 
aversion and microaggression “occurs when white people hold implicit attitudes about 
people of color – often at odds with a white person’s conscious beliefs or intentions – that 
lead to negative interactions with people of color.”115 Barr points out that in more than 
twenty years of medical practice he has “never seen a case of conscious racism on the 
part of my physician colleagues.”116  
This chapter addresses three key findings noted in the previously mentioned 
research: (1) Persons living at the lower levels of societal hierarchies have a lower life 
																																																								111	Ibid.	112	Barr,	Health	Disparities	in	the	United	States:	Social	Class,	Race,	Ethnicity,	and	Health,	200.	113	Ibid.,	224.	114	Miller	and	Garran,	Racism	in	the	United	States:	Implications	for	the	Helping	Professions,	Chapter	2.	115	Ibid.,	96.		Italics	mine.	116	Barr,	Health	Disparities	in	the	United	States:	Social	Class,	Race,	Ethnicity,	and	Health,	xi.	
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expectancy and increased risk of disease,  (2) minority groups in the US receive lower 
quality healthcare than whites, and (3) the quality of healthcare is often affected by 
caregiver prejudice and biases that exist at an unconscious level even in persons with 
altruistic desires.  How do we educate future caregivers so they are cognitively aware of 
hierarchical discrepancies in healthcare, and also affectively engaged in a manner that 
facilitates positive action to counteract these discrepancies?  How do we help students 
acknowledge and mitigate their own unconscious prejudices and biases? This chapter 
suggests the study of literature offers an effective means of responding to these questions 
and presents a critical examination of two works of short fiction selected for their insight 
into the perils of status syndrome and their exploration of conscious and unconscious 
biases.    
In their discussion of literature and the pedagogy of medical humanities, Shapiro 
et al., note the twenty-first century discourse in medical education revolving around 
virtue-based “professionalism” in medical caregivers.117  In this very recent article the 
authors note both the practical benefits of studying literature and the difficulties of 
quantitatively measuring the results of such study.  They explain how close reading 
generates discussion and questions that subsequently inform the practice of caregiving:  
“Such an approach, translated into the clinical encounter, is likely to result in a critical 
professionalism through respect, engaged attention, and critical thinking within a very 
specific context.”118   These observations describe the ways in which close engagement 
with literature allows students to explore the world from an unfamiliar perspective by 
providing access to cultures and experiences that are not their own.  In the words of 																																																								117	Shapiro	et	al.,	“Medical	Professionalism,”	2–3.	118	Ibid.,	3.	
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Arthur Frank, “stories work on people, affecting what people are able to see as real, as 
possible, and as worth doing or best avoided.”119  
Eudora Welty’s “A Worn Path,” first published in 1941, presents an unlikely and 
unassuming heroine who engenders deep respect and admiration from readers who come 
to know her narrative, and Richard Selzer’s “Imelda,” first published in 1982, introduces 
a young physician who discovers the humanity of his mentor, but fails to recognize his 
own hubris.  Scholars of medical humanities have written about both stories, but the 
stories are useful in ways that have not yet been discussed.  Welty’s work has been 
praised for its power to elicit an empathetic response in the reader,120 but its importance 
as a metanarrative exemplifying the concept and quandary of alterity has not been 
explored.  Selzer’s work, perhaps because its themes are more specifically related to the 
practice of medicine, has not been subjected to the type of critical analysis that exposes 
its depiction of subtle and unconscious prejudices.  In addition, while “A Worn Path” has 
been examined as an allegorical tale,121 “Imelda” has not been interpreted through this 
hermeneutical lens even though Selzer’s comments and the story itself give clues to the 
usefulness of such an approach.   Each story has tremendous potential for enlightening 
students in ways that will enable them to address racial and societal disparities in 
healthcare and to become more aware of their own biases. 
Phoenix Jackson, the protagonist of “A Worn Path,” is an elderly black woman 
who must travel a great distance on foot to obtain “soothing medicine” for her grandson 
																																																								119	Arthur	W.	Frank,	Letting	Stories	Breathe:	A	Socionarratology	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2012),	3.	120	Regina	Dilgen,	“Addressing	Ageism	through	Eudora	Welty’s	‘A	Worn	Path,’”	Radical	Teacher,	no.	98	(Winter	2014):	63,	doi:10.5195/rt.2014.52.	121	Elaine	Orr,	“Unsettling	Every	Definition	of	Otherness:	Another	Reading	of	Eudora	Welty’s	‘A	Worn	Path,’”	South	Atlantic	Modern	Language	Association	57,	no.	2	(May	1992):	64–5.	
		 45	
whose throat, Phoenix tells the nurse, “begin to close up again, and he not able to 
swallow.  He not get his breath.  He not able to help himself.”122  Phoenix encounters 
many obstacles along her way, which anchors the story firmly within the genre of “road 
literature,” a figurative exploration of the journey of life.123  
Phoenix’s journey begins in December, on “a bright frozen day in the early 
morning.”124  We are told that Phoenix is very old and small, and that her eyes are “blue 
with age.”125 Phoenix struggles to climb a hill, and then is caught in a thicket of briars on 
the way down.  At one point, she must cross a creek by means of a fallen log.  Phoenix 
walks the log and crosses the water with her eyes closed, relying on memory and intuition 
while dispelling fear and apprehension.  She crawls through a barbed wire fence, and is 
knocked to the ground by a large black dog – “Over she went in the ditch, like a little puff 
of milkweed.”126 A hunter who laughs at her and presumes to know the nature of her 
journey helps her to her feet; “I know you old colored people!  Wouldn’t miss going to 
town to see Santa Claus!”127  He later points his gun at Phoenix and then grudgingly 
admires her composure; “’Well Granny,’ he said, ‘you must be a hundred years old, and 
scared of nothing . . . But you take my advice and stay home, and nothing will happen to 
you.’”128  When she finally reaches Natchez, Phoenix must climb “a tower of steps, 
where she walked up and around and around until her feet knew to stop.”129   
																																																								122	Eudora	Welty,	“A	Worn	Path,”	in	The	Collected	Stories	of	Eudora	Welty	(New	York:	Harcort,	1980),	148.	123	Neil	D.	Isaacs,	“Life	for	Phoenix,”	in	The	Critical	Response	to	Eudora	Welty’s	Fiction,	ed.	Laurie	Champion,	Critical	Responses	in	Arts	and	Letters	12	(Westport,	CT:	Greenwood	Press,	1994),	38.	124	Welty,	“A	Worn	Path,”	142.	125	Ibid.	126	Ibid.,	145.	127	Ibid.	128	Ibid.,	146.	129	Ibid.,	147.	
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In addition to threats against her physical wellbeing, Phoenix must also contend 
with psychological obstacles.  She experiences hallucinations brought on by fatigue and 
is fearful of large objects such as a scarecrow, which she initially believes to be a ghost, 
because her failing vision does not enable her to correctly identify them.  The reader, who 
has made the journey along with Phoenix, comes to regard her as unfailingly courageous 
and intelligent.  We admire her determination and find ourselves feeling deep respect for 
her dignity and fortitude in the face of difficult and often demeaning obstructions. 
When Phoenix finally reaches the clinic, however, the attendant’s first words are, 
“A charity case, I suppose,”130 a supposition based entirely upon Phoenix’s appearance – 
her age, skin color, and clothing – because Phoenix has not yet spoken a word.  A nurse 
enters and informs the attendant, “Oh, that’s just old Aunt Phoenix.  She doesn’t come for 
herself – she has a little grandson.  She makes these trips just as regular as clockwork.  
She lives away back off the Old Natchez Trace.”131  When questioned about her 
grandson, Phoenix, in a response that could be interpreted either as confusion or subtle 
defiance, remains silent for a few moments.  The nurse responds, “You mustn’t take up 
our time this way, Aunt Phoenix.  Tell us quickly about your grandson, and get it over.  
He isn’t dead, is he?”132  The nurse and the attendant have no time to consider the details 
of Phoenix’s journey; they are uninterested in her narrative and therefore have no 
knowledge of her fortitude and no respect for her tremendous strength and wisdom.    
“A Worn Path is a metanarrative in which Phoenix’s personal narrative is 
available to the reader, but not to the other characters within the tale.  The white people 
Phoenix encounters throughout the story draw immediate conclusions based upon her 																																																								130	Ibid.	131	Ibid.	132	Ibid.,	148.	
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appearance and refer to her as “granny,”  “grandma,” and “old Aunt Phoenix,” assuming 
a derogatory familiarity they believe is justified because Phoenix is aged, poor, and not 
white.  The other characters assume Phoenix is simpleminded and incapable and they 
render her mute, both literally and figuratively.  Readers, on the other hand, are aware of 
Phoenix’s poetic intelligence, her strength, and her dignity.  Phoenix requires assistance 
from both the hunter and the healthcare workers, and in both cases the response is first to 
infer, and then to insist upon, Phoenix’s absolute powerlessness; the hunter achieves this 
with his gun and the caregivers with their words.  
Literary scholars have variously interpreted “A Worn Path” as an allegorical 
representation of the Christian faith,133 a mythological tale of rebirth,134 an appeal for 
liberation theology,135 and an allegory of the African-American struggle for equality 
following the Civil War.136 As a source of enlightenment regarding persistent healthcare 
disparities in the United States, however, it becomes important to interpret the story less 
figuratively and to carefully consider the characters of Phoenix and her grandson.    
In a 2005 interview for Sooner Magazine, published by the University of 
Oklahoma, Dr. Jerry Vannatta recalled a time when he had difficulty establishing an 
emotional connection with one of his patients.  Vannatta is a white male and his patient, 
like Phoenix Jackson, was an elderly African American woman.  As the patient described 
a situation from her life, Vannatta recalled a passage from the novel Beloved, by Toni 
Morrison; “the emotions I felt when I read that scene, came back to me in a flood and 																																																								133	Marilyn	Keys,	“‘A	Worn	Path’:	The	Way	of	Dispossession,”	Studies	in	Short	Fiction	16,	no.	4	(Fall	1979):	354.	134	Dan	Donlan,	“‘A	Worn	Path’:	Immortality	of	Stereotype,”	The	English	Journal	62,	no.	4	(1973):	549–50;	Jim	Owen,	“Phoenix	Jackson,	William	Wallace,	and	King	MacLain:	Welty’s	Mythic	Travelers,”	
Southern	Literary	Journal	34,	no.	1	(Fall	2001):	29.	135	Dean	Bethea,	“Phoenix	Has	No	Coat:	Historicity,	Eschatology,	and	Sins	of	Omission	in	Eudora	Welty’s	‘A	Worn	Path,’”	International	Fiction	Review	28	(2001):	32–41.	136	Dennis	J.	Sykes,	“Welty’s	The	Worn	Path.,”	Explicator	56,	no.	3	(1998).	
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were available to me so I could connect with my patient.  She was telling me a story 
about her economic enslavement; the two stories joined.  From that point on, we began to 
make a more meaningful bond and rapidly solved her problem about her ability to buy 
her medications.”137  So long as one remains cognizant of human singularity, recalling an 
empathic connection to a literary character in order to address a real life problem can 
become a useful means of bridging the chasm of alterity.  Vannatta describes an 
emotional response to Morrison’s work, and it is this affective engagement that makes 
literature so valuable to healthcare workers.   
In his discussion of literary hermeneutics Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, “The 
important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all 
its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings . . . 
Methodologically conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form 
anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire 
right understanding from the things themselves.”138 If part of the reason we utilize 
literature in the pedagogy of medical humanities is to increase awareness of our own 
unconscious biases, we must first consider the biases we hold quite consciously.  A 
typical student response (and reader response in general, I suspect) to “A Worn Path” is 
the formation of a strong sympathetic engagement with the character of Phoenix.  
Students express their desire to help Phoenix, to provide her transportation to the clinic or 
perhaps arrange home visits.  These responses are altruistic and well-meaning, but they 
also exemplify the paternalism inherent in the practice of healthcare and help clarify the 
difference between sympathy and empathy.  Engagement with the story and 																																																								137	Debra	Levy	Martinelli,	“Medicine	and	Literature,”	Sooner	Magazine,	Fall	2005.	138	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	trans.	Joel	Weinsheimer	and	Donald	G.	Marshall,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Continuum,	1998),	269.	
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conscientious attention to its effects on the reader sheds light the social exchanges that 
render Phoenix powerless.   
One might argue that a story from 1941, a period in time when overt racism was 
routinely practiced and tolerated, has little relevance to modern healthcare, but today’s 
more subtle forms of racism and ageism are no less harmful.  As recently as 1992, in fact, 
one scholar wrote that the character of the hunter demonstrates genuine concern and 
admiration for Phoenix, that the white woman in Natchez ties Phoenix’s shoes out of 
respect, and that the nurse shows Phoenix compassion!139  That a late twentieth century 
reader of this story could so completely misread the blatant condescension and disrespect 
these characters demonstrate is clear evidence that we often fail to acknowledge those 
parts of ourselves and our society that are most deeply troublesome.  In healthcare there 
will always exist a power imbalance between the sick person and the caregiver simply 
because the ill person requires information and services that healthcare workers have the 
power to provide or withhold.  In spite of corporatization of healthcare, the manner, 
timing, and efficiency with which these things are provided continues to lie primarily 
with individual caregivers.  It is therefore imperative that caregivers recognize attitudes 
that disempower patients even when the caregiver means to be helpful. 
In 1997 Anne Fadiman authored a groundbreaking non-fictional work titled The 
Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and the 
Collision of Two Cultures.  A primary theme of the book is the existence of healthcare 




simple ignorance on the part of both caregivers and their patients.140  This text changed 
the way healthcare is practiced at Mercy Medical Center in Merced, California and made 
a significant contribution to the discourse on cultural sensitivity in healthcare throughout 
the country.141  In the 2012 afterward to the second edition of the book, Fadiman notes 
that terms like “cultural humility” and “cultural responsiveness” are replacing the 
ubiquitous “cultural competence,” and are being used to promote some sense of parity 
between caregivers and their patients as they seek mutual understanding.142   
In “A Worn Path,” it is Phoenix Jackson’s place within the cultural and social 
hierarchy that influences the response of her caregivers.  Her age and appearance 
determine her status and affect the treatment she receives.  These facts must guide any 
interpretation of the story if it is to be meaningful to students of medical humanities.  In 
discussing the effects of status syndrome, Marmot notes that ordinary life occurrences 
become detrimental to health and wellbeing “when there is low control and little 
predictability.”143 Caregivers hoping to benefit from reading “A Worn Path” must resist 
the urge to rescue Phoenix.   We must avoid sympathetic observation and instead attempt 
to mitigate any alterity by allowing ourselves to imaginatively become the character of 
Phoenix.  One of the most important, and overlooked, aspects of this story is the fact that 
caregivers never once ask Phoenix what she wants or needs.    
This issue of alterity becomes important when asking students to attempt an 





multiple studies have shown, humans are more likely to empathize with others whom 
they believe to be most like themselves.144  This effect can be mitigated, however, 
through the practice of “role taking”:  “A number of investigations have found that 
observers will experience parallel affective responses when they step outside their usual 
perspective on events and entertain the perspective of the target.”145  In other words, 
participants who are acting as observers in various psychological experiments, are more 
likely to experience emotions similar to those of the target participants when they 
consciously and deliberately imagine themselves as the target participant rather than the 
observer. 
My observation in teaching “A Worn Path” is that students identify most readily 
with the caregivers at the clinic, and sometimes with the hunter.  They then begin to 
describe ways in which their own behavior would be different from that of those 
characters if they were faced with a similar situation.  This is quite a useful exercise, of 
course, but what becomes even more useful is to have the students imaginatively assume 
the character of Phoenix, and then closely read the portion of the story in which Phoenix 
becomes silent as the nurse is questioning her: 
“Now, how is the boy?” asked the nurse. 
Old Phoenix did not speak 
“I said, how is the boy?” 
But Phoenix only waited and stared straight ahead, 
her face very solemn and withdrawn into rigidity. 
“Is his throat any better?” asked the nurse.  “Aunt 
Phoenix, don’t you hear me?  Is your grandson’s throat any 
better since last time you came for the medicine?” 
With her hands on her knees, the old woman waited, 
silent, erect and motionless, just as if she were in armor. 																																																								144	Mark	C.	Davis,	Empathy:	A	Social	Psychological	Approach,	Social	Psychology	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	1996),	97.	145	Ibid.,	114.	
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“You mustn’t take up our time this way, Aunt 
Phoenix,” the nurse said.  “Tell us quickly about your 
grandson, and get it over.  He isn’t dead, is he?” 
At last there came a flicker and then a flame of 
comprehension across her face, and she spoke. 
“My grandson.  It was my memory had left me.  
There I sat and forgot why I made my long trip.” 
 
Phoenix’s actions in this passage have been interpreted as the onset of senility,146 
and even as an indication that Phoenix’s grandson is, in fact, already dead,147 but the 
most plausible explanation comes from Elaine Orr, who notes, “Here [Phoenix] employs 
silence rather than narrative invention to rebel against white and male ‘author-izations’ of 
her journey as (m)other.”148  In understanding Phoenix’s silence as an act of quiet 
defiance against the caregivers’ condescension, we can begin to understand the absence 
of autonomy that is such a crucial element of this story, and the ways in which reflexive 
responses often perpetuate rather than relieve that absence.   
Near the end of “A Worn Path” it is revealed that Phoenix needs medicine for her 
grandson’s throat because he had swallowed lye two or three years prior to Phoenix’s 
most recent journey.149 In a revelatory article exploring the conditions of lye poisoning, 
Melissa Stang demonstrates how expertly Welty has indeed rendered the implications of 
status syndrome; “One 1939 study in the Southern Medical Journal, just a year before 
Welty wrote her story reported that although esophageal burns from lye were very 
common throughout the southern region, sixty percent of patients seen by doctors were 
black, and almost all of the remaining white patients were children of tenant farmers . . . 
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They surmised that these cases occurred as a result of poverty, a lack of both education 
and information on the dangers of lye poisoning.”150  Including Stang’s article as 
required reading for students studying “A Worn Path” provides important contextual 
information about the ways in which social hierarchies and isolation contribute to status 
syndrome.151 Phoenix tells the nurse, “My little grandson, he sit up there in the house all 
wrapped up, waiting by himself.  We is the only two left in the world.  He suffer and it 
don’t seem to put him back at all.  He got a sweet look.  He going to last.”152  The nurse 
responds to Phoenix with impatience, “trying to hush her now.”153  Attention to 
Phoenix’s dialog reveals that she is her grandson’s only caregiver and that she is aware 
he will outlive her.  The medical community’s disregard for Phoenix’s narrative is a 
brilliant example of the willful ignorance Peggy McIntosh describes in her seminal 
discussion of white privilege, “Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.”154 The nurse hears 
Phoenix’s words, but ignores their implications.  The practice of narrative medicine 
demands attention to the ethical responsibilities that come with hearing a patient’s 
story,155 and there are also ethical implications that come with knowing Phoenix 
Jackson’s story even though it is fictional.   
In 1965 Louise M. Rosenblatt, professor of comparative literature and literary 
theory at New York University, wrote Literature as Exploration, in which she developed 
a “transactional” theory of literature that advocates close reading and emphasizes “the 
essentiality of both reader and text, in contrast to other theories that make one or the other 																																																								150	Melissa	Deakins	Stang,	“Parting	the	Curtain	on	Lye	Poisoning	in	‘A	Worn	Path,’”	Eudora	Welty	
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determinate.”156  The book has been reprinted five times and Rosenblatt’s ideas continue 
to influence literary scholars and theorists.157 Her theories on pedagogy have recently 
been criticized for placing more emphasis on exploring the emotional response of the 
reader than on teaching about literature,158 but this approach is precisely what makes 
Rosenblatt’s ideas particularly useful to scholars of medical humanities.  In our work, the 
primary objective of studying literature is not to perform a detailed analysis of the text 
itself, but to connect the text and reader in such a way that the reader’s clinical practice is 
improved through engagement with the literature.  
Rosenblatt breaks the experience of reading into efferent and aesthetic modes, 
where efferent reading involves the practical purpose of garnering information from the 
text, and aesthetic reading concerns the affective experience of “sensations, feelings, 
images, and ideas.”159  She writes that these ways of reading are always in flux, and that 
the “shift of attention” from efferent to aesthetic is often ignored or taken for granted.160  
In the case of Welty’s story, the efferent implication is the knowledge that we all carry 
inherent biases that affect the ways in which we respond to our patients.   Recognizing 
our tendency to identify with literary characters that are most like us and instead 
attempting to identify with the “other” allows the reader a small understanding of an 
unfamiliar perspective.  The reader thus becomes aware of a tendency to make 
assumptions and perhaps to patronize.  Critical assessment of our affective response to 
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literature allows us to determine whether we are genuinely empathizing with a character 
or instead feeling a disempowering form of sympathy.   
Similar techniques of close reading and transactional awareness can also be used 
to discern the deeper themes in Richard Selzer’s “Imelda.”161  Dr. Selzer was formerly a 
practicing surgeon and member of the faculty at Yale School of Medicine, and is the 
author of several works of fiction and non-fiction.  In the preface to Letters to a Young 
Doctor, the collection in which “Imelda” appears, Selzer writes, “These pieces are not, 
strictly speaking, factual in the way that a medical textbook is factual.  Nor are they 
journalism or reportage.  They are literary renditions of medicine meant to strike 
resonating chords in the reader’s mind.”162    
The unnamed narrator of “Imelda” is a young surgeon who writes about a medical 
mission trip he had been part of during his third year of medical school.  The organizer of 
the mission and his former teacher is a brilliant plastic surgeon named Hugh Franciscus.  
At a remote village in Honduras the medical team encounters a young woman, Imelda, 
who has been brought in by her mother so the girl’s complete cleft lip and palate can be 
repaired.  Before the surgery begins, Imelda experiences malignant hyperthermia, a rare 
type of allergic reaction to anesthesia that causes uncontrollable increases in blood 
pressure and body temperature.  With no ice available to lower her temperature, Imelda 
dies on the operating table.  When Dr. Franciscus explains this outcome to the girl’s 
mother, the mother believes that Franciscus has managed to repair the cleft palate prior to 
the girl’s death; “she was happy now that the harelip had been fixed so that her daughter 
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might go to Heaven without it.”163 Franciscus does not correct the mother’s mistaken 
assumption and instead steals into the morgue late at night to repair the cleft palate and 
lip. 
As Daniel Burr has noted, students studying “Imelda” seem initially most 
interested in discussing the ethicality of performing surgery on a corpse,164 and this same 
dilemma seems paramount to the story’s narrator, who at first sees the older surgeon’s 
actions as those “of someone demented, or at least insanely arrogant.”165  The medical 
student never speaks of the surgery and later even alters Franciscus’s slide presentation of 
the trip in order to prevent anyone else from discovering what the surgeon has done.   
Years later, when the younger surgeon learns that Dr. Franciscus has died, he remembers 
Imelda and realizes the “unrealistic act was one of goodness.”166 
To the best of my knowledge, “Imelda” has been published only twice outside the 
realm of medical literature.  The story appeared in the Touchstone Anthology of 
Contemporary Creative Nonfiction: Work from 1970 to the Present (2007) and in Themes 
(2005), a Prentice-Hall textbook designed to accompany freshman composition courses.  
Critical commentary on the story has thus been restricted primarily to writers within the 
disciplines of healthcare and medical humanities.  Johanna Shapiro addresses the story in 
her discussion of the clinical gaze,167 and Ed Stieve suggests the story provides useful 




story as a means of engagement with literary studies, however, Stieve conflates the 
narrator and the author and appears to assume the literal truth of the story.    
In the preface to the collection in which “Imelda” appears Selzer writes, “Each of 
these chapters is rooted in an event that I have experienced or witnessed.  ‘Imelda’ took 
place while on a surgical expedition to the Third World,” but he also notes, “I have 
roamed the imagination for metaphor, myth, and memory.”169  Much is lost, therefore, if 
“Imelda” is read as a literal first-person narrative, and much can be gained from 
understanding the mythological nature of the story, considering the young narrator and 
the elder Dr. Franciscus as archetypal characters. 
In a paper discussing the usefulness of using myths as interpretive metaphors, 
Antonio Fernández-Cano et al., write, “Myths are used to tell a story or talk about a 
certain event or relevant person in the form of a metaphor.  As such, they can be used to 
embody, examine and explain certain phenomena and characters.  The myth is one of the 
enlightening phenomena with the greatest direct influence on the way in which humans 
think about their conscience, their history, and the exegesis and hermeneutics of their 
seminal texts.”170  There is textual evidence to suggest Selzer has turned to mythology 
and metaphor in his rendition of the events in “Imelda.” 
In the opening paragraph Selzer writes, “Dr. Franciscus was the archetype of the 
professor of surgery,”171 and his use of the word archetype must be considered 
deliberate.  Carl Jung postulated that the recurring motifs in myths and folklore proved 
the existence of biological archetypes present in the psyches of all humans throughout 
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time.172 Although the Jungian concept of archetypes as biological has been upended by 
genetic research, the notion of archetypes as “universal patterns producing meaning and 
guiding development” persists.173  That Dr. Franciscus is indeed a mythological 
archetype rather than a stereotypical professor of surgery or the epitome of such a man is 
evidenced by the descriptors Selzer’s narrator employs.  According to the nameless 
young surgeon, Franciscus interprets the human body so skillfully he has “the appearance 
of a prophet.”174  To the medical students Franciscus was “someone heroic, someone 
made up of several gods . . . if he had grown accustomed to his miracles, we had not.”175  
The narrator also tells us Franciscus is an avid deer hunter,176 a piece of information that 
seems incongruous and unnecessary except that it aligns Franciscus even more closely 
with ancient warrior gods and heroes.   
Tragic heroes of Greek mythology often possess a fatal flaw, usually hubris, 
which leads to their downfall.  Franciscus tells the young narrator, “I’m taking a surgical 
team to Honduras next week to operate on the natives down there.  I do it every year for 
three weeks, somewhere.  This year, Honduras.”177  Though Franciscus never explains 
why he makes these trips, the reader assumes some sort of humanitarian impulse.  Yet 
Franciscus’s words, “to operate on the natives,” make his hubris clear.  These are not 
people with whom Franciscus shares a common humanity; they are natives, a designation 
clearly demonstrating Said’s theories of alterity as put forth in Orientalism; “they were 
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The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental [or “native”] involved an 
already pronounced evaluative judgment.”178  That Franciscus intends to “operate on” 
these “natives” confirms his objectification of the people.  Their bodies are things he will 
invade, acting upon them as he sees fit.   
Franciscus dictates the following plan of care for one of the “natives” suffering 
from a carcinoma of the eye and eye socket:  “Operative plan:  wide excision with 
enucleation of the eye.  Later, bone and skin grafting.”179  To the nonmedical reader it 
might not be clear that enucleation means removal of the eyeball, causing a permanent 
and intractable disfigurement and loss of vision.  If the nonmedical reader lacks important 
information about this plan, how much more oblivious would the patient have been?  
While the procedure may have been medically necessary, there is no indication the 
patient was informed, consulted, or asked for consent.  The text simply notes, “The next 
morning we would be in the operating room where the procedure would be carried 
out.”180  Franciscus’s hubris lies in his assumption that whatever action he chooses to 
take will be beneficial for the less fortunate “natives”.   
When Imelda appears at the clinic, she initially refuses to show her face to the 
doctors, but is quickly forced to submit to their examination.  “Just then, Franciscus 
reached up and, taking the hand that held the rag, pulled it away with a hard jerk . . . the 
defect was utterly hideous . . . ‘Take her picture,’ he said . . . Through the eye of the 
camera she seemed more pitiful than ever, her humiliation more complete . . . There was 
the click of the camera.  The girl winced.  ‘Take three more, just in case.’”181  The 
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narrator notices Franciscus seems “awed by the sight of this girl,” and reasons, “Had she 
brought her mouth to him willingly, without shame, she would have been for him neither 
more nor less than any other patient.”182  What are we to make of this passage?  Close 
reading suggests a cruelty that has been unremarked by critics who tend to paint 
Franciscus as “a brilliant and dedicated physician so driven to achieve perfection he 
defies death,”183 or “at once highly competent and arrogant, and as we discover later, a 
compassionate practitioner.”184  Yet Franciscus, noticing the girl’s discomfort with being 
photographed, demands three more photos.  As the narrator makes clear, the sense of 
“awe” Franciscus feels for the girl is not due to the unusual nature of her deformity, but 
to the fact that she is humiliated before him.  In actuality, Franciscus is less a dedicated 
and compassionate surgeon than a capricious hero, before whom the less fortunate should 
bow.  His hubris lies in his absolute certainty that he can improve Imelda’s life by 
creating beauty out of chaos.  When Imelda dies, Franciscus’s veil of omnipotence is 
lifted and we are told he never again undertakes a medical mission trip.185   
Franciscus’s encounter with Imelda’s mother after Imelda’s death is genuinely 
moving.  He accepts the mother’s hand on his arm, and even appears to cry with her over 
the loss of her child.186  We come to believe that perhaps the post-mortem surgery is, in 
fact, an act of goodness, undertaken to provide Imelda’s mother with the comfort she 
needs.  And yet, it is also possible that Franciscus was merely preserving his own sense 
of importance.  In repairing Imelda’s face after her death he ensures that her mother will 
continue to be in awe of his power.  In fact, one of the most important phrases within the 																																																								182	Ibid.,	27.	183	Burr,	“Commentary,”	1403.	184	Stieve,	“The	Medical	Essay	as	an	Invitation	for	Interdisciplinary	Exploration.”	185	Selzer,	“Imelda,”	36.	186	Ibid.,	31.	
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description of Franciscus’s encounter with Imelda’s mother reads, “All that hope of love . 
. . gone.”187  This sentence makes it clear to the reader that at least part of what drives the 
surgeon’s behavior is a desire to preserve his position as hero.  There is a tendency to 
read “Imelda” sentimentally, as a tale of two physicians who find their humanity through 
failure and the realization that all humans suffer.  Close reading prevents a superficial 
interpretation, however, and allows for more nuanced questioning of the moral of this 
story.  
If we turn our attention to the young narrator, who tends to present himself as the 
innocent pupil, unjaded and still kind, in awe of his master and eager to soak up his 
knowledge, we can see that the student, although bilingual and altruistic, also 
demonstrates prejudice and biases that affect his ability to be a compassionate caregiver.  
Burr notes, “Selzer never reveals the gender of his narrator, but I have found that 
male readers assume the narrator is a man, and female readers, a woman.”188 I would 
argue that strong evidence of a male gaze makes a female narrator unlikely.  Laura 
Mulvey first introduced the concept of a male gaze in her 1975 essay “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema.”  The essay uses psychoanalytic theory to offer a critique of “the 
way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form.”189  While 
psychoanalytic theory and the idea of a patriarchal unconscious may not be tenable to 
modern healthcare practitioners, the universal presence of unconscious biases must be 
acknowledged if we are to overcome them.  Mulvey writes, “In a world ordered by sexual 




The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled 
accordingly.”190   In “Imelda,” Selzer creates this exact scenario.  Franciscus seems 
drawn to Imelda because she is humiliated before him, and the narrator is drawn to her 
objective beauty.  Both characters view Imelda as a potentially perfect sexual object and 
set about creating their fantasy, styling her accordingly.   
Superficial assessment of the young narrator as an innocent apprentice who 
attempts to mitigate Franciscus’s coldness overlooks the narrator’s own tendency to 
objectify and sexualize the Honduran patients.  In coming to see that even well-meaning 
caregivers fall victim to the shadow side of human nature enables students to become 
more conscious of their own potential frailties.   
Early in the story we learn that the young narrator has been asked to join the 
medical mission team because he is fluent in Spanish.191  In spite of the fact that he is 
able to communicate with the Honduran people, the student accentuates the alterity 
between himself and the Hondurans by relying solely upon his visual assessment of them, 
and further complicates this approach by responding judgmentally to what he sees:  
“They had flat, broad, dumb museum feet.  At first they seemed to me indistinguishable 
the one from the other, without animation.  All the vitality, the hidden sexuality, was in 
their black hair.  Soon I was to know them by the fissures with which each face was 
graven.  But, even so, compared to us, they were masked, shut away.”192  
The tendency of medical caregivers to rely upon visual information for diagnosis 
was well discussed by Michel Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic, where Foucault traces 
an epistemological history of medicine.  Foucault discusses the power of the gaze in 																																																								190	Ibid.,	2088.	191	Selzer,	“Imelda,”	23.	192	Ibid.,	25.	
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diagnosis, but also emphasizes the importance of non-judgment; “The gaze will be 
fulfilled in its own truth and will have access to the truth of things if it rests on them in 
silence, if everything keeps silent around what it sees.”193  In describing the Honduran’s 
feet as “dumb museum feet,” the narrator appears to compare the living humans he 
encounters with museum displays of inanimate figures incapable of thought or speech.  
This could be seen as an initial reaction to being immersed in a wholly unfamiliar 
environment, perhaps for the first time in his life, but the narrator persists in his 
dehumanization of the Hondurans, remarking that when he did come to “know” them, it 
was only through the fissures of their individual faces.  When the narrator compares the 
Hondurans to himself and declares them “masked, shut away,” he places the failure of 
connection entirely with the Hondurans.   
Repeated references to the sexuality and sensuality of the Honduran’s black hair 
almost certainly indicates a heterosexual male narrator unaware of his objectification of 
the Hondurans and, in particular, of Imelda.  The narrator makes use of poetic metaphor 
to describe Imelda, “A thin, dark Indian girl about fourteen years old.  A figurine, orange-
brown, terra-cotta, and still attached to the unshaped clay from which she had been 
carved,” but reverts to decidedly un-poetic prose when describing Imelda’s mother; “The 
mother was short and dumpy.”194   Later descriptions of Imelda follow the same pattern:  
“The girl had long, loose black hair. . . Even with her in it, the dress was empty, 
something hanging on the back of a door.  Her breasts made only the smallest imprint in 
the cloth, her hips none at all.”195  And, “She seemed to me then like an animal that looks 
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outward at the infinite, at death, without fear, with recognition only.”196 Also, “Above the 
thing [cleft lip and palate], clear almond eyes and long black hair reflected the light . . . 
She was a beautiful bird with a crushed beak.”197  Each description of Imelda is 
dehumanizing.  She is either an object or an animal.  Commentary on her breasts and hips 
is invasive and demeaning.  Repeated references to her long dark hair draw the reader 
back to the narrator’s initial observation that all “the hidden sexuality, was in their black 
hair,”198 and make it clear that Imelda is eroticized.  Again, it is important to remember 
the narrator is capable of communicating with Imelda, but never does.  Selzer, the author, 
seems aware of his construction of a dehumanizing male gaze when he writes these lines 
for his narrator, “Under our gaze the girl’s eyes fell to her lap where her hands lay palms 
upward, half open.”199  
Both Eudora Welty and Richard Selzer present fictional accounts of healthcare 
workers’ interactions with patients whose alterity presents an obstacle to compassionate 
care.  In both stories, people in positions of power behave in ways that disempower and 
dehumanize the Other.  In the case of Welty’s caregivers, their assumption of superiority 
is obvious; Welty make plain her character’s condescension, but Selzer’s characters’ 
dehumanization of their patient is far subtler because it lies below the conscious desires 
of seemingly altruistic characters.  
In her seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” first published in 1985, Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak poses, “the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the 
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persistent constitution of the Other as the Self’s shadow.”200 Spivak critiques post-
colonial attempts to construct a homogenous subaltern Other and also notes, “If, in the 
contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the 
subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow. . . we meditate upon an elusive 
female figure called into the service of colonialism.”201  Spivak critiques not only the 
colonial muting of the subaltern female, but also anti-colonial revisionist attempts to 
provide the Other’s voice.202 Imelda utters only one word in Selzer’s story, her name, and 
the narrator’s description of the sound adds an additional sensory element to the visual 
imagery of her appearance; “the syllables leaked through the hole with a slosh and a 
whistle,”203 Imelda’s voice is as grotesque as her wound.  Imelda, as subaltern female, is 
called into the service of God-like surgeons who would “operate on” her, fix her, and 
thus provide her a voice.  Spivak acknowledges the paradox that colonization often 
provided great benefits to the subaltern even in the face of subjugation.204  It is unrealistic 
to think that Imelda would not have welcomed the chance to have her defect repaired 
considering the embarrassment it seems to cause her or the difficulties she must have had 
with eating and speaking, but the fact remains; Imelda’s voice is absent. Selzer’s story 
gives the reader no indication of Imelda’s response to Franciscus’s assertion that, 




Other is absent or negated, one explanation and narrative of reality [is] established as the 
normative one.206   
From the perspective of the medical caregivers they encountered, both Phoenix 
Jackson and Imelda Valdez exist as voiceless alterities.  How can consideration of the 
ways in which these characters were disempowered improve the practices of today’s 
medical caregivers?  Although they acknowledge, “psychological research on feeling and 
emotion has been far from decisive,” David S. Miall and Don Kuiken nevertheless posit 
“aesthetic and narrative feelings evoked during reading interact to modify the reader.”207 
The researchers suggest:  
In literary response, such feelings can roughly be sorted into 
four domains: (1) evaluative feelings toward the text, such as the 
overall enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfaction of reading a short 
story; (2) narrative feelings toward specific aspects of the 
fictional event sequence, such as empathy with a character or 
resonance with the mood of a setting; (3) aesthetic feelings in 
response to the formal (generic, narrative, or stylistic) 
components of a text, such as being struck by an apt metaphor; 
and (4) self-modifying feelings that restructure the reader’s 
understanding of the textual narrative and, simultaneously, the 
reader’s sense of self.208 
 
The final two categories of feeling, aesthetic and self-modifying, become most 
important when literature is used to provide alternative perspectives or to increase self-
awareness.  The authors state that aesthetic feelings are stimulated when certain passages 
of text captivate the reader and cause him or her to read more slowly and to question the 
meaning of a text.209 The young medical student’s descriptions of Imelda incorporate 
poetic metaphors that create exactly this type of response in the reader.  Miall and Kuiken 																																																								206	Spivak,	“Can	the	Subaltern	Speak,”	2115.		Italics	original.	207	David	S.	Miall	and	Don	Kuiken,	“A	Feeling	for	Fiction:	Becoming	What	We	Behold,”	Poetics	30,	no.	4	(2002):	221–2.	208	Ibid.,	223.	209	Ibid.,	224–5.	
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go on to say that aesthetic feelings, those that demand closer attention to the text and a 
reimagining of previously held ideas, encourage readers to evaluate and perhaps modify 
their traditional ways of seeing.210 What does it mean to view another person as a 
figurine made of clay?  How would it feel to be thought of as a figurine?  An animal?  A 
bird with a crushed beak?   As Miall and Kuiken have noted, not all readers respond 
aesthetically to any given work of literature,211 but even those who do not can be 
encouraged to think critically about the deeper implications of the figurative language 
used in this text. 
If we set aside Selzer’s comments regarding his work and view Franciscus and the 
narrator as actual people with human characteristics, we may see them in a more 
forgiving light and agree with traditional interpretations of Franciscus as a justifiably 
confident surgeon whose heart is opened when he grieves the death of a patient.  His 
response to Imelda’s shame can be seen as one of compassion; the wound itself did not 
move him, for he had seen many such wounds, but he was compelled to remove the 
embarrassment that caused Imelda’s suffering. Franciscus repairs Imelda’s face after her 
death because he shares the grief of Imelda’s mother and wishes to provide her some 
comfort.  We may view the narrator as a young man searching for a way to describe the 
haunting beauty of Imelda and her people, caught up in an experience he had no frame of 
reference for communicating.  For the typical reader, the story is poignant and thought 
provoking.  
Stanley Fish is generally considered a founder of reader-response theory, and his 
ideas regarding “interpretive communities” are especially useful in considering the lens 																																																								210	Ibid.,	236.	211	Ibid.,	238.	
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through which scholars of medical humanities must view “Imelda.”  Even if we 
understand Franciscus and the narrator’s sentiments as guileless, we must not accept 
them as moral or just, for to do so mutes the didactic power of the story.  Fish contends 
that interpretive communities share interpretive strategies “that exist prior to the act of 
reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read.”212 The classroom of students 
considering careers in healthcare forms an interpretive community.  If one goal of this 
community is to understand the form of unconscious biases and the prejudices they 
engender, we must recognize their presence even in otherwise admirable literary 
characters and thus become better able to recognize them in ourselves.   
As previously mentioned, Shapiro et al., recently discussed the value of literature 
in the development of “professionalism” in medical caregivers.  They describe this 
professionalism as “virtue-based attributes such as altruism, trust, honesty, patient 
empowerment, and commitment to social justice,”213 and assert, “Close reading requires 
a wariness of superficial and facile interpretations, a clinical position that helps the 
clinician avoid bias, assumptions and judgmentalness.”214 In an astute observation that 
beautifully illuminates the value of a more critical reading of “Imelda” the authors note, 
“Studying literature and reading stories reveal that even such enshrined professionalism 
values as compassion do not necessarily always serve moral ends; and point out ways in 




If we return to the original problems set forth in this chapter – healthcare 
disparities that result from social hierarchies that impair individual autonomy, and 
unconscious biases that lead to unintended acts of prejudice – we can see how close 
reading and discerning interpretations of “Imelda” and “A Worn Path” illuminate the 
mindsets and inclinations that perpetuate both the hierarchies and the biases.  Students 
must, of course, be made aware of existing healthcare discrepancies, and the work of both 
Barr and Marmot are important sources of factual information.  Literature is far more 
useful, however, in fostering the kind of self-exploration that allows individual caregivers 
to become aware of, and work to mitigate, their own constructions of alterity, 
subconscious and otherwise.  Deep engagement with literature helps reveal our 
tendencies to judge, objectify, and patronize.  We can only work to counteract these 
















THE PEDAGOGY OF BIOETHICS: USING DRAMATIC LITERATURE TO 
INTRODUCE VIRTUES AND PRINCIPLES 
 
 
“Great dramatic art addresses itself to our love of learning; it can overcome 
prejudices and preconceptions, and teach us to see the world and ourselves in a new 
way.”216 
        Martha Nussbaum 
 
The field of bioethics seeks to apply the principles and processes of philosophical 
inquiry to dilemmas brought about by extraordinary developments in modern medical 
treatment and research.  This chapter briefly introduces the major theories of bioethics 
and asserts that, because most general undergraduate students have not yet been exposed 
to clinical dilemmas, bioethics, or perhaps even general philosophy, literature and the 
visual arts once again offer an important means of instilling key concepts.  In addition, 
this chapter considers the question of what it means to be a virtuous person.  Medical 
caregivers, because of their training and expertise, hold an inherent position of power in 
relation to their patients who are, because of illness or injury, often at their most 																																																								216	Martha	Nussbaum,	“Consequences	and	Character	in	Sophocles’	Philoctetes,”	Philosophy	and	
Literature	1,	no.	1	(1976):	26,	doi:10.1353/phl.1976.0004.	
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vulnerable. In this position of power, character matters.  I believe the majority of students 
who choose careers in healthcare do so because they are genuinely altruistic and wish to 
be of service, however evidence demonstrates that the ability to feel and express 
compassion may be subverted by a for-profit healthcare industry and a medical culture 
that seems to value scientific knowledge over human kindness.217  It is therefore 
important for students to understand the concept of virtue and, through a process of self-
exploration that can be guided by the study of literature and art, develop a frame of 
reference for maintaining their own virtue as they pursue a very demanding profession. 
Two works of dramatic literature, one ancient and the other modern, will be used 
to immerse students in the questions and concerns of contemporary bioethics, thereby 
encouraging reflection, discussion, and the formation of individual interpretations of 
complex philosophical theories.  As with other chapters in this dissertation, the literature 
is but one piece of a pedagogy that begins with the introduction of key vocabulary and 
concepts and continues with the exploration of these ideas through the study of literature 
and art.   
Students who continue a course of study related to some aspect of healthcare will 
likely encounter an introductory bioethics course in which theories are presented and 
subsequently applied to case studies taken from actual clinical experience.  For general 
undergraduates, most of whom are as yet unfamiliar with the world of clinical practice, 
exploring the important tenets of bioethics through literature rather than case studies has 




universality and timelessness of ethical quandaries.  In addition, fictional characters and 
situations demonstrate the importance of narrative in determining what each individual 
values most highly in times when difficult choices must be made.  Readers are privy to 
the innermost desires and fears of literary characters in a way that does not often happen 
in real life but that can nevertheless provide insight into human nature and motivation.  
Finally, I would argue that discussion of the ethical dilemmas of fictional characters 
allows students greater freedom to explore their own reactions and responses than do case 
studies involving actual people.  While it is important for readers to form an empathetic 
connection to fictional characters (most would say this what makes a work moving and 
meaningful) the absence of real life consequences and time constraints allows the 
exploration of multiple possibilities and the formation of alternate scenarios and 
outcomes. 
Multiple theoretical constructs come into play within the larger discipline of 
bioethics, and although the developers and proponents of each seem to believe their own 
theory is completely sufficient for resolving ethical dilemmas, the fact is that each 
approach has attributes and shortcomings.  Virtue ethics places premium importance on 
the moral character of medical practitioners, arguing that caregivers should possess 
specific virtues such as compassion, discernment, trustworthiness, integrity, and 
conscientiousness, in order to provide competent, ethical care.218  Principlism, arguably 
the theory most often taught and applied,219 proposes four principles – autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice – that should guide ethical decision making in 
																																																								218	Beauchamp	and	Childress,	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics,	40.	219	Gert,	Culver,	and	Clouser,	Bioethics:	A	Systematic	Approach,	17.	
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healthcare.220  Principlism is a deontological approach to ethics, arguing for the 
importance of rules of conduct and proper action over aspects of character.  Casuistry 
rejects the idea that a single unified theory can be applied to all ethical dilemmas, and 
suggests a case-by-case approach that relies on precedents and previously established 
paradigms.221 Narrative Ethics argues that proficient use of any ethical theory requires 
narrative competence,222 i.e., the ability to “recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by 
the stories of illness,”223 and posits that such attention to narrative is not only beneficial, 
but ethically mandated.   
Difficult and binding decisions must often be made in the practice of healthcare, 
and it is human nature to hope there will be one right answer to complex ethical 
dilemmas and that this answer can be found if one asks the right questions or knows the 
right theories.  The fact is, however, some disagreements are not perfectly resolvable, and 
there are often cases where more than one solution is morally acceptable.224  It is better, 
then, to provide students with suitable guides for inquiry and examination than to portray 
bioethics as a means of finding certainty in the face of moral quandaries.  Philoctetes, an 
ancient Greek drama and W;t, a Pulitzer Prize winning medical drama, each present 
ethical dilemmas with solutions that perhaps seem obvious, but upon closer evaluation, 
prove complex and confounding.  Encouraging students to work through any initial 
certainty as they apply the precepts of bioethical theories to the quandaries presented in 
the dramas, allows expanded awareness, the practice of critical thinking, and the 
																																																								220	Beauchamp	and	Childress,	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics,	12–3.	221	DeGrazia,	Mappes,	and	Brand-Ballard,	Biomedical	Ethics,	33.	222	Brody,	Stories	of	Sickness,	175,	179.	223	Rita	Charon,	“Narrative	and	Medicine,”	New	England	Journal	of	Medicine	350,	no.	9	(February	26,	2004):	vii.	224	Gert,	Culver,	and	Clouser,	Bioethics:	A	Systematic	Approach,	5.	
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development of intellectual conscientiousness.  But how does consideration of this 
literature aid in the development of virtuous character? 
Examining the goals of ethics education, William Frey discusses the ways in 
which such education may be used not only to teach the characteristics of virtue, but also 
the “skills and competencies of moral expertise.”225  In other words, he suggests a 
pedagogy that goes beyond teaching what it means to be virtuous, and includes the 
expectation that such knowledge will be internalized, thereby fostering virtuous behavior.  
But perhaps a more salient question in the debate about whether or not virtue can be 
taught is; can we make students want to be virtuous?  Practically speaking, students who 
care about developing and maintaining a virtuous character will make use of what this 
type of pedagogy has to offer while those whose interests lie elsewhere may not.  As Ann 
Marie Begley notes, however, that should not keep us from making an effort to mold 
virtuous character in those who care for the sick.226  
In discussing the “pedagogical implications of moral psychology,” Frey lists four 
goals and objectives for teaching virtue: 
1. Stimulate the moral imagination of students. 
2. Help students recognize moral issues. 
3. Help students analyze key moral concepts and    
principles. 
4. Help students to accept the likelihood of ambiguity and 
disagreement on moral matters, while at the same time 
attempting to strive for clarity and agreement insofar as 





This pedagogical model recognizes the importance of practicing virtue.  It affirms 
that desiring a virtuous character, while important, is not enough to ensure its presence, 
especially in the face of conflicting interests and objectives.  Developing and maintaining 
essential virtues requires deliberate attention and intention, skills that can be modeled in 
the classroom.  According to Frey, “Moral skill sets can be taught successfully but 
require extensive practice accompanied by expert feedback.”228  Frey describes moral 
imagination as, “the ability to project into the standpoint of others.”229  This skill is not 
unlike empathy, and it, along with the other three objectives, can be practiced in the 
classroom using close reading of literature along with written and verbal reflection, as 
will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter.  
Sophocles’ Philoctetes was first performed in Athens in 409 BCE and won first 
prize at the festival of Dionysus.230  It tells the story of Philoctetes, a hero of the Trojan 
War made famous in Homer’s Iliad.  Philoctetes commanded seven ships for the Greeks, 
but before he ever reached Troy he was bitten by a snake at the temple of the goddess 
Chryse.  His wound was so foul-smelling and his cries of pain so distracting, that 
Odysseus, commander of the Greek forces, abandoned Philoctetes on the deserted island 
of Lemnos.231  
During the tenth year of the Trojan War Odysseus received a prophecy that the 
Greeks could not win without the invincible bow of Heracles, whose arrows never miss 
																																																								228	Ibid.,	618.	229	Ibid.	230	Carlevale,	“Education,	Phusis,	and	Freedom	in	Sophocles’	Philoctetes,”	28.	231	Judith	Affleck,	“Commentary,”	in	Philoctetes,	Cambridge	Translations	from	Greek	Drama	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	v.	
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their target.232  Upon his death and apotheosis, Heracles had bequeathed his bow to 
Philoctetes, the only person brave and compassionate enough to light Heracles’ funeral 
pyre thus ending the suffering Heracles’ endured after unknowingly donning a poisoned 
cloak.233 The bow remained with Philoctetes on the island of Lemnos for the ten years of 
his isolation.  As the play opens, Odysseus has returned to Lemnos for the bow, but he 
knows Philoctetes now despises him, and has thus implored Neoptolemus, son of 
Achilles, to trick Philoctetes and seize the bow.234   
Although Philoctetes is perhaps lesser known to general audiences than other 
Greek tragedies, it might be familiar to journal-reading physicians because of occasional 
attempts to diagnose the hero’s wound.  In 1989, Stefano suggested Philoctetes suffered 
from a venous ulcer.235  Grassi, Farina, and Cervini later argued for acute gouty arthritis, 
and suggested Sophocles was describing his own pain.236 In 2000, Bryceson, noted that 
Grassi et al., “ignore at least five essential points in the case history,” and suggested a 
diagnosis of mycetoma, a fungal infection.237 Bryceson goes on to say, “Philoctetes’ case 
illustrates nicely the need to take a careful travel history, and to pay attention to all the 
patient’s complaints.”238  More recently, Horton Johnson diagnosed an infection with 
staph aureus,239 and Mark Powlson countered (perhaps tongue-in-cheek), “Dr. Horton 
Johnson, in his appraisal of Philoctetes’ foot perhaps does not take sufficient account of 																																																								232	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	trans.	Judith	Affleck,	Cambridge	Translations	from	Greek	Drama	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	line	113.	233	Ibid.,	l.	649;	Affleck,	“Commentary,”	106.	234	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	l.	63–75.	235	C	Stefano,	“Philoctetes	by	Sophocles:	A	Case	for	Diagnosis,”	Journal	of	the	Royal	College	of	
Physicians	of	London	23	(1989):	176.	236	Grassi	W,	Farina	A,	and	Cervini	C,	“The	Foot	of	Philoctetes.,”	Lancet	(London,	England)	354,	no.	9196	(1999):	2156–7.	237	Bryceson	A,	“Philoctetes’	Foot.,”	Lancet	(London,	England)	355,	no.	9206	(2000):	850.	238	Ibid.	239	Horton	A.	Johnson,	“The	Foot	That	Stalled	a	Thousand	Ships:	A	Controversial	Case	from	the	13th	Century	BCE,”	Journal	of	the	Royal	Society	of	Medicine	96,	no.	10	(October	1,	2003):	508.	
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the malevolence of centaurs . . . the underlying cause of the condition was quite probably 
Burkholderia mallei,” 240 a bacterium that can cause infection in both horses and humans.  
Urso and Farella note, “Every myth contains an unalterable core, representing its point of 
contact with reality . . . The core of Philoctetes’s myth is a disease, which, in the 
Sophoclean tragedy, is presented in the foreground . . . allowing the opportunity to 
analyze all available elements and to attempt a clinicopathologic investigation, in the 
hopes of identifying his affliction.”241  In an effort to account for all Philoctetes’ 
symptoms, Urso and Farella conclude that he suffered both fungal and bacterial 
infections as sequelae of the snakebite.242   
These interpretations of Philoctetes as a case history exemplify a medical 
tendency to focus on corporeal phenomena at the expense of the many other insights 
offered by the drama.  Approaching physical maladies as puzzles to be solved should not 
necessarily be discouraged since any sick person hopes for a physician skilled in 
diagnosis, but much is lost when physical diagnosis is stripped from its narrative context.  
It is important to remember, however, that these diagnostic approaches to Philoctetes also 
demonstrate the medical community’s desire for practical benefits to the academic study 
of literature.   
A review of the philosophical scholarship related to Philoctetes yields more 
theoretical observations and has important implications for learning to see beyond the 
mechanics of illness.  Philosophers tend to focus on the moral characteristics of Odysseus 
and Neoptolemus, or on the wider implications for society as a whole.  Two primary 																																																								240	Mark	Powlson,	“Philoctetes,”	Journal	of	the	Royal	Society	of	Medicine	97,	no.	2	(February	1,	2004):	100.	241	Carmelo	Urso	and	Vittoria	Farella,	“An	Inquiry	on	Philoctetes’s	Disease,”	The	AMerican	Journal	of	
Dermatopathology	18,	no.	3	(1996):	327.	242	Ibid.,	329.	
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ethical dilemmas are presented in Philoctetes.  A conflict exists because the Greek army 
will suffer defeat at the hands of the Trojans unless Philoctetes, with his invincible bow, 
can be persuaded to join the fight,243 but Philoctetes has refused to do so on the grounds 
that, because Odysseus abandoned him, he owes no debt of loyalty to the Greeks.244 The 
second conflict lies within the character of Neoptolemus, who must choose whether to 
honor his personal sense of integrity245 or his commitment to the Greek army.246  
Martha Nussbaum has written extensively on the moral implications of Greek 
tragedy, and views Philoctetes as a man “undeserving of his misfortune, and who tells us 
explicitly that similar misfortunes might befall any human being.”247 Nussbaum asserts 
that Odysseus seeks to use Philoctetes as a means to an end and considers this a 
consequence of living “in a world of moral blindness.”248 She finds in Philoctetes a 
victim worthy of sympathy because he has retained his agency in the face of horrendous 
circumstances noting, “Philoctetes retains the capacity for friendship that eventually wins 
him his cure.”249 
In a closer examination of the character of Odysseus, Nussbaum writes,  
I would like to argue that Sophocles portrays Odysseus as a man 
who accords ultimate value to states of affairs, and, specifically, to 
the state of affairs which seems to represent the greatest possible 
good of all citizens.  He gives his approval to any action which he 
believes will best promote the general welfare, and resists the 
argument that there are certain actions which should not be done 
by an agent because of his character and principles, decrying this 
view as a form of squeamishness.250 																																																								243	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	66.	244	Ibid.,	1245–50.	245	Ibid.,	1048–9.	246	Ibid.,	109–115.	247	Martha	Craven	Nussbaum,	“Invisibility	and	Recognition:	Sophocles’	Philoctetes	and	Ellison’s	Invisible	Man,”	Philosophy	and	Literature	23,	no.	2	(1999):	259.	248	Ibid.,	261.	249	Ibid.,	262.	250	Nussbaum,	“Consequences	and	Character	in	Sophocles’	Philoctetes,”	30.	
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Although Nussbaum recognizes Odysseus’ concern for the general welfare of others, she 
also notes, “The social system administered by an Odyssean is characterized by great 
emphasis on secrecy and plotting, together with a demand for blind obedience from the 
non-rulers.”251 One could also make the case, however, that this is what we expect from a 
good leader – a strong grasp of the intricacies of human nature, and a willingness to stay 
focused on the larger picture, in this case, the welfare of the Greek army and 
consequently, of all the Greeks.  G. J. Warnock explains the utilitarian philosophy of 
morality as follows; “An action is morally right if, and only if, it produces at least as 
great a balance of value over disvalue as any available alternative action.”252 Seen in this 
light, Odysseus’s concern for the welfare of the Greeks over that of Philoctetes is a 
morally right action. 
In combing the play for insights into political justice, Aristide Tessitore notes the 
conflict between justice that seeks the common good and justice that provides 
retribution.253  Philoctetes’ own sense of justice underlies his motivation for refusing to 
accompany Neoptolemus and seek treatment for his wound.254  According to Tessitore, 
because Philoctetes sees the system of reward and punishment as the duty of the gods, his 
refusal to accompany Odysseus becomes a religious objection.255 Odysseus, on the other 




must be sought by any means possible.256  The character of Neoptolemus has yet another 
view of justice. 
In his state of disability and disease we can, as the previously mentioned medical 
writers have done, consider Philoctetes a patient.  Neoptolemus, the only character to 
acknowledge Philoctetes’ needs in addition to those of the Greeks, becomes his potential 
caregiver.  In addition, Neoptolemus pledges his assistance to Philoctetes when 
Philoctetes is at his most vulnerable, promising to stay with Philoctetes and guard his 
bow while Philoctetes is incapacitated by a spasm of pain: 
PHILOCTETES:  Oh, child!  Take courage.  Its attacks are 
   sharp, but they are quickly over.   
   Please, I beg you, don’t leave me on my own. 
NEOPTOLEMUS:  Don’t worry, we’ll wait. 
PHILOCTETES:  You will? 
NEOPTOLEMUS:  Be sure of it. 
PHILOCTETES:  I feel it’s not right to place you under oath, 
   child. 
NEOPTOLEMUS:  Just as it would be wrong for me to go 
   without you. 
PHILOCTETES:  Give me your hand on it. 
NEOPTOLEMUS:  My hand says I will wait.257 
 
This verbal contract signifies Neoptolemus’ intention to care for Philoctetes and 
affirms that he considers his obligation binding.  While the term ‘justice’ defies a singular 
definition, the principle of justice as outlined by proponents of principlism refers more 
specifically to distributive justice, defined by Beauchamp and Childress as, “fair, 
equitable, and appropriate distribution determined by justified norms that structure the 
terms of social cooperation.”258  Yet, even if we confine our consideration of justice to 
the distributive realm, there are still multiple theories that “attempt to connect properties 																																																								256	Ibid.,	66.	257	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	811–21.	258	Beauchamp	and	Childress,	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics,	241.	
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of persons with morally justifiable distributions of benefits and burdens.259   Marooning 
Philoctetes on an uninhabited island reduces the burden of his illness to a single person, 
which may be considered a just action, but it also subverts the principle of autonomy, or 
Philoctetes’ ability to act “freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan,”260  
In addition, we must concede that what Philoctetes deems beneficent, to be 
returned to his homeland without ever again visiting Troy,261 Neoptolemus knows to be a 
most unhelpful course of action.262 Beauchamp and Childress define the principle of 
beneficence as “the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others,”263 and further state, 
“Promoting the welfare of patients – not merely avoiding harm – embodies medicine’s 
goal, rationale, and justification.”264  Recognizing his own frustration with Philoctetes’ 
adamant refusal to accept the help being offered, Neoptolemus initially considers whether 
his agreement with Philoctetes remains binding, and tells Philoctetes, “People who cling 
to self-inflicted injuries, like you, have no right to anyone’s sympathy or pity.”265  
Neoptolemus is not referring to the wound as self-inflicted, but to the unnecessary 
continuation of Philoctetes’ suffering.  Neoptolemus reminds Philoctetes that it is 
possible to maintain his autonomy and still provide help to the Greeks,  
You will never find rest from this sickening affliction as 
long as the sun continues to rise and set where it does, 
unless you go of your own free will to the plain of Troy, 
meet with the sons of Asclepius who are with us there, and 
find relief from this disease; you, together with these 
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weapons and my help, will be known as the one who sacked 
the citadel.266   
 
Philoctetes acknowledges Neoptolemus’ good intentions, but continues to believe 
it would be wrong to fight on behalf of those who have shown him such tremendous 
dishonor.  He entreats Neoptolemus, “When you took my right hand, you vowed you 
would take me home.  Do that for me, child.”267 After being reminded of his duty, 
Neoptolemus agrees and in return Philoctetes promises to use his invincible bow to 
protect Neoptolemus and his homeland from the wrath of the Greeks.268 Although 
Neoptolemus has honored both his commitment to Philoctetes and Philoctetes’ 
autonomy, his actions have placed the entire Greek army, as well as himself and the 
people of his homeland, in grave danger.  Many would argue against the wisdom of this 
decision, and they would not be wrong.  Neoptolemus’ actions toward Philoctetes display 
beneficence and respect Philoctetes’ autonomy, but they nevertheless place a great many 
others at risk, thereby subverting the principle of justice. 
At first glance, a reader might agree completely with Neoptolemus’ assertion that 
Philoctetes’ behavior is utterly selfish and does not warrant the devotion of his potential 
caregiver.  In fact, Philoctetes has been discussed as a non-compliant patient with an 
attachment to misery whose attitudes sabotage his own healing.269 But his unwavering 
refusal to accompany Neoptolemus to Troy does contain a small grain of altruism. As 
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Philoctetes makes clear, his animosity toward Odysseus goes beyond the personal, and 
includes a wish never to see such a man in charge of the wellbeing of others.270 
Considering Philoctetes through the lens of principlism might lead us to side with 
Odysseus and deem as most worthy the actions that benefit the greatest number of 
people.  We might conclude that the principle of justice overrides the principle of 
autonomy in this case, especially since it appears that Philoctetes’ desires come, at least 
in part, from a place of prideful arrogance.  The principle of autonomy is the driving 
force behind the rules of informed consent and is often considered a safeguard against 
medical paternalism, but it “is not excessively individualistic (thereby neglecting the 
social nature of individuals and the impact of individual choices and actions on 
others)”271   
Encouraging students to consider Odysseus’s actions through the lens of 
principlism allows them to reflect upon the concept of duty as it relates to ethical 
decision-making.  Odysseus was bound by his duty to the Greek army and this influenced 
both his decision to abandon Philoctetes and his decision to retrieve the bow through 
subterfuge.   Neoptolemus is unable to accept this course of action, however, because it 
conflicts with his perception of personal virtue.272 
Describing the characteristics of virtue ethics, Pellegrino writes, 
Virtue theories focus on the agent; on his or her intentions, 
dispositions, and motives; and on the kind of person the moral agent 
becomes, wishes to become, or ought to become as a result of his or 
her habitual disposition to act in certain ways. . . In a purely virtue-
based ethic, the normative standard is the good person, the person 
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upon whom one can rely habitually to be good and to do the good 
under all circumstances.273 
 
Acknowledging the problem of what one defines as good in a general sense, 
Pellegrino nevertheless argues that it is possible to determine what is good within the 
discipline of healthcare,274 and also observes that the application of any kind of bioethical 
theory will continue to “depend on the kind of persons carrying out the moral acts and 
their analyses.”275 Pellegrino believes it is reasonable to expect healthcare providers to be 
virtuous because of the unique nature of the caregiver-patient relationship; “The promise 
made to the dependent patient directs the knowledge, techniques, and personal 
commitment of the physician or nurse to the telos of the relationship – helping and 
healing.”276  He lists seven essential virtues for healthcare providers: fidelity to trust and 
promise, benevolence, effacement of self-interest, compassion and caring, intellectual 
honesty, justice, (which he describes as a covenant between caregiver and patient rather 
than a commitment to distributive justice) and prudence.277 Pellegrino does not suggest 
virtuous character as the single determinant of ethical behavior, and points out that every 
“moral event” will involve “the agent, the act, the circumstance, and the consequence,” 
but nevertheless argues for attention to and cultivation of virtue in healthcare 
providers.278 
Returning to Philoctetes, we may consider the actions of Odysseus and 




this relationship as a means of realizing Frey’s pedagogical objectives.  As commander of 
the army, Odysseus is not obligated to care for Philoctetes; his duty lies with his army.  
While his treatment of Philoctetes is not ideal, Odysseus sees it as necessary because 
Philoctetes’ wound and cries of pain demoralized his soldiers and made it impossible for 
them to carry out the religious rituals that were required for victory.279  Neoptolemus, on 
the other hand, accepts a different form of duty when he agrees to care for Philoctetes 
during his incapacitating spasm.   
Philoctetes entrusts his bow to Neoptolemus during this crisis in his illness, and 
Odysseus insists that Neoptolemus keep the bow and return to the Greek ships.  This will 
be a death sentence for Philoctetes, who will now be unable to hunt for food.280 After 
numerous failed attempts to convince Philoctetes to rejoin the army, Neoptolemus 
reluctantly takes the bow and leaves with Odysseus.  He turns back almost immediately, 
however:   
     ODYSSEUS:  Tell me why you’ve turned back?  Where are you going 
 in such a rush? 
     NEOPTOLEMUS:  I am going to undo a mistake I made earlier. 
     ODYSSEUS:  Your words alarm me.  What mistake is this? 
     NEOPTOLEMUS:  One I made in obedience to you and the whole 
 army. 
     ODYSSEUS:  What have you done that you shouldn’t have? 
     NEOPTOLEMUS:  I used shameful deception and trickery in catching 
 him.281 
 
Odysseus threatens to come after Neoptolemus with “every man in Greece,” and 
proclaims Neoptolemus’ words and actions most unwise,282 to which Neoptolemus 
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replies, “Perhaps not wise, but they are just – and that matters more than wisdom.”283  
This exchange perfectly exemplifies the concept of virtue according to Pellegrino.  
Neoptolemus considered his relationship with Philoctetes and the preservation of his own 
virtuous character of greater importance than his duty to Odysseus and the Greeks.  In his 
actions, Neoptolemus displays each of the seven essential virtues outlined by Pellegrino, 
and thus can be said to have behaved virtuously within the context of his relationship, but 
this does not negate the negative consequences of his actions for everyone except 
Philoctetes.  Our evaluation of Neoptolemus’ decision will change depending upon 
whether we consider him a soldier of the Greek army or a friend to Philoctetes – in this 
case it seems he cannot behave virtuously in both roles simultaneously.  Neoptolemus 
declares his intention in line 1472 and following when he agrees to return Philoctetes to 
his homeland even as he becomes fearful of the danger this will create for him and his 
countrymen.   
Encouraging students to consider the contrast between Odysseus’ duty-based 
approach to decision making and Neoptolemus’ adherence to a more personal code of 
morality meets Frey’s pedagogical objectives of helping students recognize moral issues 
and analyze moral concepts and principles.  The presence of ambiguity and disagreement 
also becomes clear, but the exercise of moral imagination allows students to contemplate 
their own construct of virtue.  What aspects of character would they be unwilling to 
compromise even if duty required it? 
Proponents of virtue ethics have considered the conduct of “moral exemplars,” 
“individuals who reach and sustain outstanding moral conduct throughout their 
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professional or occupational careers,”284 as a possible source of insight for the 
development of virtue.  As Edmund L. Erde has noted, “Persons concerned with medical 
education sometimes argued that medical students need no formal education in ethics.  
They contended that if admissions were restricted to persons of good character and those 
students were exposed to good role models, the ethics of medicine would take care of 
itself.”285  As with any profession, however, it is difficult to judge the character of every 
person seeking to enter and not all practitioners can be considered good role models.  
Students who consider virtuous character an important aspect of their practice may 
nevertheless hope to find a moral exemplar to consult and emulate.  It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider the attributes of such a person.  Discussion of the ways 
Neoptolemus displays (or does not display) Pellegrino’s seven essential virtues allows 
students to reflect upon the qualities they consider essential in a role model.  Students 
should be cautioned against hoping to find a moral exemplar that never makes mistakes, 
and should be encouraged instead to consider how an exemplar handles the inevitable 
human failings.   
The moral dilemmas of Philoctetes are resolved with a deus-ex-machina; Heracles 
himself appears just as Neoptolemus and Philoctetes are preparing to leave the island and 
return to Philoctetes’ homeland.  Heracles promises to send Asclepius, Greek god of 
medicine and healing, to treat Philoctetes’ wound and vows that only Philoctetes and 
Neoptolemus, working together, will bring about the downfall of Troy.  He promises 
victory and glory to both of them so long as they look out for each other and show proper 
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reverence to the gods.  Neoptolemus and Philoctetes agree to this course of action and 
depart the island together.286  
Gill interprets the appearance of Heracles as a reward for Neoptolemus’ virtuous 
behavior,287 but Parham sees in Heracles a moral exemplar whose edicts both Philoctetes 
and Neoptolemus are willing to follow; “While Heracles has divine authority, he does not 
persuade by argument but by example.  His fame, his divinity, come from his suffering.  
As the inheritor of his bow Philoctetes too must suffer and triumph.”288  As a moral 
exemplar, Heracles requires three things of Philoctetes:  that he humble himself enough 
to accept the healing of Asclepius,289 that he protect Neoptolemus as Neoptolemus has 
protected him,290 and that he show due reverence to the gods for his victory.291 This 
attention to self-effacement, to relationship, and to respect may be seen as traits to seek 
out and emulate in a moral exemplar.  
However we interpret the deus ex machina, it remains true that no completely 
satisfactory solution was achievable without it and we must accept the fact that this is the 
case with virtually all bioethical dilemmas, otherwise they would not be dilemmas.  
Students should be encouraged to find some means of empathetic engagement with all 
three characters of Philoctetes and to carefully consider what each deems most important.  
My observation in teaching Philoctetes is that some students admire Neoptolemus’ 
decision while others find it quite troubling.  Many students admire Odysseus’ devotion 
to those under his command, and some find Philoctetes’ self absorption difficult to 																																																								286	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	l.	1485–1517.	287	Christopher	Gill,	“Bow,	Oracle,	and	Epiphany	in	Sophocles’	Philoctetes,”	Greece	and	Rome	27,	no.	02	(1980):	144.	288	Parham	SF,	“Philoctetes’	Wound.,”	Literature	and	Medicine	9	(1990):	18.	289	Sophocles,	Philoctetes,	l.	1498–9.	290	Ibid.,	l.	1511–2.	291	Ibid.,	l.	1514–6.	
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tolerate.  The objective in studying this drama is self-reflection, inquiry, and some level 
of comfort with uncertainty and imperfect outcomes as well as a basic understanding of 
virtue and principles.   
Turning our attention to W;t, a more contemporary medical drama, we perhaps 
find the opposite of a moral exemplar, as the play includes several characters who clearly 
demonstrate how not to behave. W;t, reflects every single negative stereotype of 
healthcare in the United States:  institutions in which no thought is given to human 
comfort, doctors who are callous and arrogant, and nurses who are kind but not terribly 
intelligent.  Yet it won the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1999, suggesting a resonance with 
the non-medical jury of theater critics who must have seen its “dealing with American 
life” as accurate.292 In 2002, HBO produced a film version directed by Mike Nichols that 
utilized a near word-for-word adaptation of the script and starred prestigious actors 
Emma Thompson, Christopher Lloyd, and Audra McDonald.293 Roger Ebert referred to it 
as one of the best films of 2002 and noted, “The movie is merciless in showing how 
hospital routine robs [Bearing] of her dignity.”294 The play continues to be staged 
frequently and was part of the 2015 season at the Boston Center for American 
Performance.295 
In spite of its obvious popularity with critics and the general public, the play’s 
depiction of healthcare and healthcare providers is problematic for reasons that go 
beyond negative stereotypes.  As noted by bioethicist Dr. Osborne Wiggins, any 
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Institutional Review Board would have prohibited the research being conducted by the 
play’s physicians, which renders the medical premise of the play erroneous.296 In 
addition, medical ethics (and common courtesy) would prohibit a physician from 
performing a pelvic exam on a woman with whom he was socially acquainted.  Finally, 
the nurse, Susie, appears to work all shifts in all areas of the hospital, which is completely 
illogical.   
Edson drew the inspiration for W;t from her work as a unit clerk on an oncology 
floor of a large research and teaching hospital,297 and her depiction of physicians has 
come under scrutiny. Writing for The Annals of Internal Medicine, Faith McLellan, PhD 
(but not MD) notes, “Doctors come in for a deserved hit, as they treat their patient as an 
object, a research subject held at arm’s length,”298 but, many physicians feel 
undeservedly singled out for ridicule.  Writing for the New York Times, Abigail Zuger, 
MD, recalls feeling depressed after “watching yet another scathing indictment of modern 
medicine and the dubious habits by which some of us are either fortunate or unfortunate 
enough – take your pick – to earn our keep.”299  In the article, Zuger offers quotations 
from other physicians.  Sherwin B. Nuland, professor of surgery at Yale University 
states, “The doctor roles are stick figures, straw men, caricatures of the worst, completely 
unrealistic,”300 and Larry Norton, head of medical oncology at Sloan-Kettering insists, 
“People think clinical research is removed from the patient, but it’s the absolute opposite.  																																																								296	Osborne	Wiggins,	October	13,	2015.	297	Charles	McGrath,	“Margaret	Edson,	Author	of	‘Wit,’	Loves	Teaching,”	The	New	York	Times,	February	16,	2012,	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/theater/margaret-edson-author-of-wit-loves-teaching.html.	298	Faith	McLellan,	“W;	T,”	Annals	of	Internal	Medicine	131,	no.	9	(November	2,	1999):	718,	doi:10.7326/0003-4819-131-9-199911020-00030.	299	Abigail	Zuger,	“When	the	Patient,	Not	the	Doctor,	Becomes	the	Hero.,”	New	York	Times	148,	no.	51372	(December	15,	1998):	F4.	300	Ibid.	
		 91	
Our goal is to make sure that every patient in the study gets the best possible care. . . I’m 
saddened by the fact that the doctor is never well-represented.  What we do and what we 
are and what we have to deal with has never been captured by art.  It’s a shame.”301  As a 
member of the healthcare community myself, I am inclined to agree that the physician 
characters in W;t are not accurate representations. I feel it is important to tell students 
that, in all my years as a nurse, I never saw a physician behave with such complete 
disregard for patient well-being as those depicted in in this play.  I believe Edson has 
created composite characters in Kelekian and Posner, and that they represent the worst 
possible combination of moral failures.  I contend, however, that despite its 
inconsistencies and medical inaccuracies, this play has something to offer scholars and 
students of medical humanities.   
Rita Charon acknowledges, “I hated the play the several times I saw it.  I felt 
attacked by what I considered to be a crude and one-dimensional caricature of doctors 
and nurses.  I felt defensive in the face of the wholesale blaming of medicine as a cruel 
enterprise.”302 But Charon could not ignore the overwhelmingly positive public response 
to the play and conceded, “Patients and their families seeing performances of Wit felt 
recognized or even vindicated by the play’s savage portrayal of contemporary health care 
because, I suspect, such inhumane and therefore ineffective care is enacted every day in 
hospitals everywhere.”303 I disagree with Charon’s generalization – acknowledging the 
appeal of the play does not mean we have to accept its portrayal of healthcare as accurate 
– but we must accept that Edson has captured the experience of being a patient in a way 
that resonates as authentic and we must consider what this should mean to healthcare 																																																								301	Ibid.	302	Charon,	Narrative	Medicine:	Honoring	the	Stories	of	Illness,	18.	303	Ibid.,	19.	
		 92	
providers.  If we become defensive and disregard the play because of its inaccuracies, we 
miss an opportunity for growth and enlightenment. 
W;t is, at its core, about power and powerlessness.  Vivian Bearing, the cancer 
stricken protagonist, is a brilliant woman, the foremost scholar in her field of study, yet 
her knowledge and expertise are useless in a world where her very life is at stake.  This 
explains the appeal of the play to general audiences who have already felt, or fear a time 
when they will feel, at the mercy of a medical world in which their own knowledge and 
wisdom are useless, or worse, discounted.  Roger Ebert writes of reviewing the movie 
positively prior to his own cancer diagnosis, but of being unable to watch it after, “I 
remembered it too clearly, perhaps, and dreaded re-living it . . . I have had cancer, and 
had all too many hours, days and weeks of hospital routine robbing me of my dignity.”304 
Ebert was not confirming the veracity of the conduct and situations depicted in the play, 
but rather the truth of the experience of powerlessness and loss of dignity experienced by 
patients.  This is what caregivers must seek to understand and to prevent.   
The protagonist of the script is Vivian Bearing, a university professor and 
preeminent scholar of the metaphysical poet John Donne.305 Vivian is diagnosed with 
stage four metastatic ovarian cancer and the primary setting of the play is “the University 
Hospital Comprehensive Cancer Center” where she receives treatment.306  The title, with 
semicolon, comes from an observation by Vivian’s mentor, renowned Donne scholar E. 
M. Ashford, and references an “inauthentically punctuated translation” of Holy Sonnet 
Six in which the deeper meaning of the sonnet is lost when a semicolon replaces a 
																																																								304	Ebert,	“When	a	Movie	Hurts	Too	Much	|	Roger	Ebert’s	Journal	|	Roger	Ebert.”	305	Edson,	W;t,	17.	306	Ibid.,	4.	
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comma in the final stanza of the poem.307 According to Ashford, the semicolon 
represents an “insuperable barrier” between life and death, when in fact, “Nothing but a 
breath – a comma – separates life from life everlasting.”308 In W;t, this semicolon may be 
seen as representing the insuperable barriers between the sick and the healthy, caregivers 
and their patients.  
Vivian has devoted her entire life to the study of Donne’s poetry and recalls 
herself as a cold and uncompromising professor who only now, at the end of her life, 
recognizes the importance of compassion and human connection.  As the play begins 
Vivian discloses, “Now, I suppose we shall see, through a series of flashbacks, how the 
senior scholar ruthlessly denied her simpering students the touch of human kindness she 
now seeks.”309  Vivian draws parallels between her own interactions with students and 
the similarly impersonal relationships she has with her doctors, Harvey Kelekian, 
attending physician and chief of medical oncology, and Jason Posner, Vivian’s former 
student, and the young medical resident working with Kelekian.310 Vivian’s primary 
nurse is Susie Monahan, RN, BSN.311  Susie is the only caregiver that attempts to 
understand something of Vivian beyond her disease. 
Late in Vivian’s treatment cycle, when her digestive system has been virtually 
destroyed by chemotherapy, Susie brings Vivian a Popsicle and broaches the topic of 
Vivian’s code status.  After their conversation Vivian muses, “That certainly was a 
maudlin display.  Popsicles?  “Sweetheart”?  I can’t believe my life has become so . . . 
corny. . . we are discussing my life and my death, and my brain is dulling, and poor 																																																								307	Ibid.,	13.	308	Ibid.,	14.	309	Ibid.,	59.	310	Ibid.,	58,	21.	311	Ibid.,	3.	
		 94	
Susie’s was never very sharp to begin with . . .”312  As Vivian nears the end of her life 
she realizes that an uncompromising attention to scholarly detail has left her without the 
emotional resources to contemplate her own mortality.  She muses, 
(Quickly)  Now is not the time for verbal swordplay, 
for unlikely flights of imagination and wildly shifting 
perspectives, for metaphysical conceit, for wit. 
And nothing would be worse than a detailed 
scholarly analysis.  Erudition.  Interpretation.  
Complication. 
(Slowly)  Now is a time for simplicity.  Now is a 
time for, dare I say it, kindness.313 
 
There are numerous moral lapses in the story, the most glaring of which is the fact 
that Vivian’s physicians never tell her that her cancer is terminal.  Instead, she is 
encouraged to consent to a horrific course of chemotherapy, ostensibly in the hope of a 
cure: 
           KELEKIAN:  The important thing is for you to take the    
    full dose of chemotherapy.  There may be times when 
    you’ll wish for a lesser dose, due to the side effects.  But    
    we’ve got to go full-force.  The experimental phase has 
    got to have the maximum dose to be of any use.  Dr. 
    Bearing – 
 VIVIAN:  Yes? 
   KELEKIAN:  You must be very tough.  Do you think you can 
 be very tough? 
       VIVIAN:  You needn’t worry. 
 
Only near the end of the play does Vivian realize she will not recover.314  Shortly 
before Vivian’s death, Posner acknowledges the true purpose of her treatment was not to 
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cycles of Hex and Vin at the full dose.  Kelekian didn’t think it was possible.  I wish they 
could all get through it a full throttle.  Then we could really have some data.”315 
That Vivian was not fully informed of the nature of her illness or the purpose of 
her treatment denied her necessary information for consent and was a clear breach of the 
principle of autonomy.  When considering the suffering induced by the course of 
treatment Vivian endures, Kelekian and Posner’s actions may be seen not only as non-
beneficent, but also as maleficent in the extreme.   
The physicians consistently fail to demonstrate any of Pellegrino’s essential 
virtues for healthcare providers, and Susie, who has shown deep compassion and 
benevolence, fails to demonstrate intellectual honesty or fidelity to the trust Vivian has 
placed in her.  Susie is aware of the deception perpetrated by the physicians, but does not 
share this information with Vivian until shortly before Vivian’s death when she 
confesses, “There just isn’t a good treatment for what you have yet, for advanced ovarian.  
I’m sorry.  They should have explained this – ”316 This scene presents an excellent 
opportunity to discuss situations in which a caregiver might be expected to behave in a 
way that violates her moral consciousness.  Inviting the use of moral imagination, 
students can be asked to consider why an otherwise compassionate nurse might withhold 
information from her patient?  Did she hope to protect Vivian somehow, or did she fear 
losing her job, as was the case when Jason performed the pelvic exam on Vivian in spite 
of his extreme discomfort?  Where does Susie’s duty lie, with her patient or with her 
employer?  This is an ideal opportunity to request written reflections from students.  They 
may be asked to reflect upon the obligations incurred when one accepts certain types of 																																																								315	Ibid.,	75.	316	Ibid.,	67.	
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employment – for example, should pharmacists opposed to abortion be required to 
dispense Plan B?  Or they might be asked to consider a time when they felt powerless in 
the face of authority.  
According to the script, Vivian has no family and only one visitor throughout the 
eight-month course of her treatment.  Like her physicians, Vivian is a researcher, devoted 
to the pursuit of knowledge and excellence in her field.317 Had anyone discussed the true 
nature of her illness and the need for medical research, there is a distinct possibility 
Vivian would still have agreed to participate.  The physicians could not have known this, 
however, without knowing something of Vivian’s narrative, specifically, her own life-
long quest for knowledge and information.   
One of the most difficult tasks any caregiver faces is that of attempting to 
ascertain, often in only a matter of minutes, exactly what type and amount of information 
will be beneficial to the patient.  Navajo Indians, for example, refuse to speak of death 
and believe that only someone who intends to bring it about would presume to discuss it, 
which means the subject of advance directives must be approached very carefully.318 
Some patients prefer a “straight shooter” who provides factual results exactly as they are 
discovered, while others cope principally through some form of positive thinking and do 
not wish to hear of potentially negative outcomes.  Many patients have strong familial or 
social support systems, while others must cope with healthcare issues alone.  Often, 
patients will have some degree of medical knowledge gleaned from the internet or other 
sources, and may believe this information more accurate than what they hear from an 
unfamiliar caregiver.  Maintaining patient autonomy dictates that all relevant information 																																																								317	Ibid.,	18–20.	318	Ben	Daitz,	“On	Navajo	Reservation,	Poem	Helps	Broach	Topic	of	End-of-Life	Care,”	The	New	York	
Times,	January	24,	2011,	sec.	Health,	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/health/25navajo.html.	
		 97	
be provided to the patient, but decisions regarding the timing and manner in which this is 
done become the responsibility of the caregiver and are best undertaken with some 
knowledge of the patient’s desires, support system, and knowledge base.  
When speaking to Vivian about her options for end of life care, Susie offers the 
choices of “full code” and “Do Not Resuscitate,” telling Vivian, “I wanted to present both 
choices before Kelekian and Jason talk to you.”319 When Vivian asks whether Susie and 
the doctors disagree on the appropriate choice, Susie replies, “Well, they like to save 
lives.  So anything’s okay, as long as life continues . . . they always want to know more 
things.”320  Vivian’s response to this statement provides significant insight to her hopes 
and motivation:  “I always want to know more things.  I’m a scholar.  Or I was when I 
had shoes, when I had eyebrows.”321  This leads the reader to wonder whether Vivian 
would have agreed to the chemo, perhaps even found meaningful purpose in the research, 
even if she had known there was no hope for a cure.  The actions of both physicians 
throughout the play are utterly callous and inexcusable, but Vivian’s words provide a 
subtle and poignant reminder of the ethical imperative of narrative practice.  Beneficent 
care requires eliciting a patient’s narrative and confirming some understanding of the 
patient’s wishes.  Narrative ethics mandates attention to the stories of patients’ lives as 
the primary means of providing competent healthcare.322 In point of fact, no ethical 
decision can be made in the absence of narrative.  Respect for the bioethical principles of 
autonomy and beneficence require knowledge of what the patient considers most 
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important in his or her care and such knowledge cannot be obtained without establishing 
a trusting relationship with the patient.  
W;t opens with a presentational monologue in which Vivian addresses the 
audience and describes her interactions with her physicians: 
VIVIAN:  (In false familiarity, waving and nodding to the audience) 
   Hi.  How are you feeling today?  Great.  That’s just great . . . I have 
   been asked “How are you feeling today?” while I was throwing up 
   into a plastic washbasin.  I have been asked as I was emerging from a 
   four-hour operation with a tube in every orifice, “How are you feeling 
   today?”   
I am waiting for the moment when someone asks me this 
question and I am dead.   
I’m a little sorry I’ll miss that.323 
 
This monologue exemplifies the impersonal treatment Vivian receives from her 
physicians throughout the play beginning with her diagnosis: 
      VIVIAN:  I’ll never forget the time I found out I had cancer. 
  (DR. HARVEY KELEKIAN enters at a big desk piled high with papers) 
 KELEKIAN:   You have cancer. 
 VIVIAN:  (To audience) See?  Unforgettable.  It was something  
     of a shock.  I had to sit down.  (She plops down.) 
 KELEKIAN:  Please sit down.324 
 
At no time does either physician attempt more than a cursory interaction with 
Vivian, and Posner makes it clear that even this is simply a burdensome obligation: 
 JASON:  Compromised kidney function is a highly complex 
      reaction.  I’m simplifying it for you. 
 VIVIAN:  Thank you. 
 JASON:  We’re supposed to. 
 VIVIAN:  Bedside manner. 
 JASON:  Yeah, there’s a whole course on it in med school.  It’s 
     required.  Colossal waste of time for researchers.  (He turns 
     to go.)325 
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When Jason conducts a pelvic exam on Vivian, his former professor, Vivian 
describes the experience as “degrading,” and part of what she terms “learning to 
suffer.”326 Healthcare workers familiar with common practice will no doubt find this 
scene implausible, but Edson is taking a bit of poetic license to highlight a point about the 
degradation patients may experience at the hands of unfeeling caregivers.  Edson presents 
Kelekian and Posner as socially inept, caring only for the results of their research, and 
even this is not because of the good they might do, but simply because they are fascinated 
by the attributes of cancer on a cellular level.327 It is the absence of empathy that is so 
striking in both physicians.  We are given the impression they’ve been taught “bedside 
manner” as an obligatory course without being taught any sense of why it actually 
matters to a patient.  This illustrates the importance of encouraging students to practice 
empathetic engagement by imaginatively placing themselves in situations faced by 
fictional characters and attempting to understand their needs.  Might Kelekian and Posner 
have behaved differently if their course on bedside manner had required them to reflect 
upon the experience of Ivan Illych, for example, or a similar figure from the literature and 
medicine canon?  Many physicians report changes in their bedside manner after a 
personal experience of illness or injury,328 and the character of Vivian in W;t certainly 
demonstrates the power of personal suffering to incite a previously undeveloped 
compassion for others, but making use of moral imagination in the empathetic 
engagement with literary characters allows a similar, if less profound, enlightenment.329  
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In her discussion of the possibilities for moral growth, Judith Andre notes, “The 
more sensitive one is to the effects of one’s behavior on others, the more one is likely to 
help.”330 She goes on to say that “becoming a sensitive observer is a “complex task” that 
requires “self-awareness and understanding.”331 Finally, and most salient for a medical 
humanities pedagogy, she suggests that the practice of moral reasoning be broadened to 
include the practice of moral reflection;  
[Moral reflection] includes the consideration of myth and metaphor, 
attention to one’s nagging doubts and suspect enthusiasms, and the 
use of moral imagination.  Besides making real another person’s 
point of view, moral imagination helps us think of creative 
alternatives that would allow us to avoid the horns of a dilemma.  It 
makes us think about the conditions that led to the quandary, to do 
what is called “preventive ethics.”332 
 
It is possible that Kelekian and Posner lack the milk of human kindness in part 
because they have never engaged in the self-reflection required to understand the needs of 
others.  Vivian was similarly cold and insensitive until the loneliness and isolation of 
illness forced her to acknowledge her own desire for emotional connection and 
compassion.  The reader discerns that if Vivian had lived, her interactions with students 
and others would have been vastly different than they were before her illness. 
In the absence of such life altering personal experience, dramatic literature 
provides an excellent format for moral reflection.  Because the entire literary work 
consists of dialog, students can be encouraged to engage the moral imagination by 
considering how specific conversations might be rewritten in a manner that provides the 
kindness Vivian seeks and prevents the indignities she is forced to suffer.  This is an ideal 																																																								330	Judith	Andre,	“The	Medical	Humanities	as	Contributing	to	Moral	Growth	and	Development,”	in	
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		 101	
exercise for small group work and when complete, the rewritten scenes can be read for 
the class, engendering further discussion and the proposal of still more options.  The four 
components of compassion (cognitive, affective, intentional, and motivational) may be 
considered individually as students are asked to show evidence of each in the rewritten 
scenes.   
There is no doubt that the physicians in W;t behave in a manner that is morally 
wrong.  This fact holds true no matter which bioethical theory we are using to judge their 
behavior and serves to illuminate the presence of a common morality, “norms about right 
and wrong human conduct that are so widely shared that they form a stable (although 
incomplete) social agreement.”333  The casuist theory of bioethics rejects the idea that, 
apart from this common morality, there are specific principles or guidelines that can be 
applied to every situation and instead looks to “paradigm cases” and precedents from 
which to draw judgments and make decisions.334  This underlying methodology, 
“thinking about new and perplexing cases by thinking about the perplexing case’s 
similarities with clear, paradigmatic cases,”335 is something we do, consciously or 
subconsciously, any time we have a decision to make.  When considering the case of 
Vivian Bearing, we cannot help but compare her situation with what it ought to have 
been, and this, ideally, influences our behavior in the future.     
The only comfort Vivian receives during the entire course of her treatment comes 
during a visit from her former professor and mentor, E. M. Ashford, now eighty years old 




climbing into bed beside her and allowing Vivian to “nestle in” while Ashford reads to 
her.336  When Vivian declines a recitation of Donne, Ashford reads from a children’s 
book, The Runaway Bunny, interpreting it as “A little allegory of the soul.”337  Vivian 
drifts peacefully off to sleep and does not wake.  Ashford is able to provide Vivian with a 
few moments of serenity because she knows Vivian and does not turn away from her 
suffering.   Ashford understands that Vivian finds solace in words and language and she 
offers these in addition to her own presence in a touching gesture of compassion. 
Vivian’s peace is short-lived, however, and her final indignity comes at the end of 
her life when, after requesting a do not resuscitate (DNR) order and having it entered into 
the chart by Dr. Kelekian in the presence of Jason, Jason nevertheless impulsively calls a 
full code for Vivian when he finds her unresponsive and without a pulse.  
 (SUSIE, hearing the announcement, runs into the room.) 
 SUSIE:  WHAT ARE YOU DOING? 
 JASON:  A GODDAMN CODE.  GET OVER HERE! 
 SUSIE:  She’s DNR!  (She grabs him.) 
 JASON:  (He pushes her away.)  She’s Research!338 
 
The final moments of the play are a nightmarish scene in which Vivian’s body is 
manhandled by the code team and subjected to electric shocks as Susie runs frantically 
between the code team members yelling STOP, while Jason reacts “(In agony) Oh, God.” 
and finally “(Howling) I MADE A MISTAKE,” before collapsing to the floor.339 After 
verifying the DNR, the code team members mutter, “ – It’s a doctor fuck-up.  –What is 
he, a resident?”340  This scene may lead the reader to wonder whether Jason’s howling 
																																																								336	Edson,	W;t,	79.	337	Ibid.,	80.	338	Ibid.,	82.	339	Ibid.,	82,	84.	340	Ibid.,	82–85.	
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collapse is because he finally understands the inhumanity of his actions or merely 
because he wonders if they have affected his future as Kelekian’s fellow.   
Either way, we have yet another moral lapse and ethical breach by one of 
Vivian’s physicians. The doctor’s actions and Vivian’s suffering are not only the result of 
moral failures, but also of complete emotional detachment. W;t  thus illuminates the 
importance of genuine human connection in the delivery of competent care.  We can 
hope Jason’s collapse marks some sort of epiphany in which he realizes the cost of his 
inhumanity.   
In discussing the possibility for “epiphanic” knowledge that changes the way we 
live and practice, Anne Hunsaker Hawkins reminds us, “Narrative ethics often 
emphasizes the importance of attending to the patient’s ‘life-story.’  But we should 
remember that every ethical decision marks the intersection of two stories, the patient’s 
and the physician’s, and epiphanic moments of imaginative insight or intuitive 
understanding occur in both.”341 Studying the ethical breaches presented in W;t provides 
students with multiple opportunities for epiphanic insights as they come to understand the 
suffering caused by decidedly unethical behavior rendered by caregivers with no regard 
for their patient apart from the statistics her case provides.  
The insights gained from studying great literature and art come about as the result 
of a process of self-exploration induced by the works themselves and encouraged through 
discussion and written reflection.  Grappling with ethical dilemmas and demonstrating 
virtue in the presence of suffering often involves a process ethicists refer to as reflective 
equilibrium.  Beauchamp and Childress write, “The goal of reflective equilibrium is to 																																																								341	Anne	Hunsaker	Hawkins,	“Medical	Ethics	and	the	Epiphanic	Dimension	of	Narrative,”	in	Stories	
and	Their	Limits:	Narrative	Approaches	to	Bioethics,	ed.	Hilde	Lindemann	Nelson	(New	York:	Routledge,	1997),	168.	
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match, prune, and adjust considered judgments and their specifications to render them 
coherent with the premises of our most general moral commitments.”342 In their view, 
making ethical decisions that we can live with first requires an awareness of our own 
moral convictions.   Vivian Bearing’s narrative is presented in the form of a dramatic 
script that lays bare the consequences of unethical conduct, and encourages students to 
form their own ideas of morally acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
In discussing the possibility of teaching virtue to nursing students, Ann Marie 
Begley observes, “We can teach ‘the four principles’ approach and students can learn 
these and apply them just as well as they can the ‘signs and symptoms’ of diseases.”343 
Begley does not believe this is enough, however, and affirms that educators also bear 
some responsibility for shaping virtuous character.  She notes, “We many not achieve a 
satisfactory result with all students, but we must try, and the pessimism involved in 
considering all students to be beyond our influence is unwarranted.”344 The methods 
Begley advocates for teaching virtue involve enhancing a student’s capacity for 
emotional response and sensitivity,345 and this is precisely where dramatic literature 
offers such a wealth of possibilities.  According to Begley, “While the situations to which 
we respond are imaginary, the felt emotions are real.”346  The fictional character of 
Vivian Bearing, a scholar of words and wit, offers a narrative of illness that is 
challenging but ultimately enlightening. 
In Stories of Sickness, Howard Brody writes, “There is, unfortunately, little 
evidence to support the notion that the teaching of ethics, as is currently done in most 																																																								342	Beauchamp	and	Childress,	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics,	382.	343	Begley,	“Original	Article,”	260.	344	Ibid.	345	Ibid.	346	Ibid.,	262.		Italics	original.	
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medical schools, produces a more humane or compassionate professional.  The narratives 
reviewed in this book might persuade us that the better way to produce more 
compassionate physicians is to abolish all courses in medical ethics and replace them 
with courses in medicine and literature.”347                          
If we return to Frey’s suggestions for teaching virtue it becomes clear why 
literature is so effective – it stimulates the moral imagination as students become 
empathetically engaged with complex characters, it allows the consideration of multiple 
courses of action and removes real-life time constraints so all moral issues can be 
considered and key concepts and principles can be analyzed, and it encourages students 
to become more comfortable with ambiguity even as they work to construct their own 
ideas of what it means to be a virtuous human being. 



















“Creativity is the work of healthcare.”348 
     ~ Rita Charon 
 
While most practitioners agree that compassionate caregiving based upon 
narrative practice and an empathetic emotional relationship with patients is ideal, they 
also fear that time constraints and threats to their own emotional well-being make this 
style of practice untenable.349  This chapter addresses these obstacles and suggests that 
cultivation of intentional, nonjudgmental, present moment awareness, or 
“mindfulness,”350 helps make even the briefest clinical encounters more therapeutic and 
also helps prevent the burnout and compassion fatigue associated with caregiving.  In 
addition, understanding the therapeutic mental state of “flow,”351 and cultivating 
activities that encourage this state helps future caregivers realize the importance of habits 																																																								348	Rita	Charon,	“Narrative	Medicine”	(Classroom	visit,	Bellarmine	University,	Louisville,	KY,	September	22,	2015).	349	Halpern,	From	Detached	Concern	to	Empathy:	Humanizing	Medical	Practice,	15–7.	350	Jon	Kabat-Zinn,	Mindfulness	for	Beginners:	Reclaiming	the	Present	Moment	and	Your	Life	(Boulder,	CO:	Sounds	True,	2012),	1.	351	Csikszentmihalyi,	Flow:	The	Psychology	of	Optimal	Experience.	
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that are mentally and emotionally restorative.  Because compassionate caregiving often 
involves deep emotional investment, self-care requires more than warm baths or other 
activities designed to reduce stress; it requires special attention to cognitive processes that 
influence thought and emotion. 
Drawing upon Jon Kabat-Zinn’s concept of mindfulness, Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow, and Wassily Kandinsky’s interpretations of form and 
color, this chapter asserts that viewing and creating nonrepresentational art as a means of 
contemplative practice allows students to become aware of the ever-present stream of 
thought and to develop some mastery over its content.  The cultivation of sustained 
attention and present moment awareness fosters therapeutic clinical encounters in which 
patients feel heard and cared for even when the encounters are brief.   These skills also 
enable caregivers to be empathetically present with their patients without carrying those 
emotions into other areas of their lives.  
In developing the classroom exercises proposed in this chapter I have made 
extensive use of Dr. Ronald Epstein’s techniques for cultivating healthy habits of 
mind.352  While non-objective art provides an excellent medium for bringing Epstein’s 
ideas into the classroom, it is important to note this is not an effort to teach art 
appreciation or art history, but rather a means of promoting a particular form of meta-
cognition.  Before beginning a discussion of pedagogy, we must understand the 
importance of teaching caregivers to care for themselves.   
Researchers studying dissatisfaction in healthcare workers often use the terms 
burnout and compassion fatigue interchangeably, but there are subtle differences between 
the two.  Carla Joinson first used the phrase “compassion fatigue” in 1992 to denote a 																																																								352	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II).”	
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specific type of burnout that occurs in healthcare workers, especially nurses.353  Smart et 
al., note, “Burnout can result from any situation of being overworked and is not unique to 
caring professions . . . combatting burnout will require attention to organizational 
variables such as workload and patient volume . . . Compassion fatigue, however, may 
require personalized interventions.”354  In 2010 nurse researchers in South Africa 
constructed a comprehensive definition of compassion fatigue and noted that it develops 
in phases and ultimately results in “a state where the compassionate energy that is 
expended by nurses has surpassed their restorative processes, with recovery power being 
lost.”355  In describing the all-inclusive effects of compassion fatigue they write: 
 [T]he indicative signs of compassion fatigue are the 
physical effects of burnout, absence of energy, and accident 
proneness, the emotional effects of breakdown, apathy and a 
desire to quit, the social effects of unresponsiveness, 
callousness, and indifference towards patients, the spiritual 
effects of poor judgment and disinterest in introspection, and 
the intellectual effect of disorderliness.356 
 
Under “risk factors” the authors list “contact with patients,” highlighting the fact that all 
types of caregivers are at risk for compassion fatigue as well as burnout.357  
Research consistently shows that as many as sixty percent of physicians report 
symptoms of compassion fatigue including “emotional exhaustion, depersonalization 




burnout and/or compassion fatigue is higher among physicians than for other occupations 
in the general population.359  For nurses, the rate of burnout and compassion fatigue may 
be even higher than for physicians, with research showing that more than eighty percent 
of emergency room nurses demonstrate “moderate to high” levels of burnout and 
compassion fatigue.360 
Wariness of compassion fatigue is part of the reason physicians have traditionally 
been encouraged to maintain a sense of emotional detachment from their patients, yet, as 
Halpern points out, such emotional detachment does not help physicians avoid the 
symptoms of compassion fatigue.361 On the contrary, physicians who report the highest 
levels of job satisfaction are those who develop caring, empathetic relationships with 
their patients.362  Caregivers must have confidence in their ability to maintain their own 
emotional well-being before they will be able or willing to engage empathetically with 
their patients, however.  If they do not have such confidence, both the affective and 
motivational components of compassion become impossible.  Teaching students the 
principles of mindfulness as a practice of self-care may alleviate this fear since it is well 
documented that the practice of mindfulness is beneficial in reducing the symptoms of 
compassion fatigue and that it improves relationships between caregivers and their 




no consistency of format, and courses are generally only offered as electives.364  Given 
the empirically proven benefits of mindfulness education, I believe its precepts should be 
introduced to general undergraduate students considering careers in healthcare, thus 
allowing the students to assess the value of such habits in creating compassionate 
relationships and developing healthy practices of self-care before they embark on 
supremely challenging careers.  This suggestion is not without caveats, however, and 
these will be discussed in detail. 
A consistent state of mindfulness, or nonjudgmental, present moment awareness, 
is developed through meditation and other contemplative practices designed to encourage 
mental stillness and somatic awareness.365  While the concept of mindfulness and the 
meditation practices associated with it have their roots in Theravada Buddhism, the 
practices of Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) are two examples of the secular application of mindfulness 
principles.366 The contemplative practices developed for MBSR have been shown to 




hypertension, and improve an overall sense of well-being, among other positive physical 
and emotional effects.367 
Although the benefits of mindfulness have been subjectively reported and 
documented, the exact neurophysiological mechanisms at play in achieving those benefits 
are still poorly understood.368  One theory proposes that meditation interrupts a pattern of 
rumination; a maladaptive thought process that involves constant repetitive thinking.369 
Rumination has become an important topic for researchers studying emotion because of 
its association with anxiety and depression.370 López-Pérez and Ambrona have studied 
emotional responses to perceiving a person in need and have attempted to identify the 
causative factors that differentiate empathetic concern from personal distress.	371   They 
write that personal distress occurs in observers who experience a strong vicarious 
emotional response to the suffering of others, but lack the ability to regulate those 
emotions.  This may cause the observer to turn away from the person in need or to 
attempt the suppression of his or her own emotional response.372 (Recall the emotional 
symptoms of compassion fatigue are apathy and a desire to quit.)  The researchers studied 
two types of emotional regulation, rumination and reappraisal.  Reappraisal is a positive 
emotional response that “involves thinking about what happens in a different way, by 




studies demonstrated “reappraisal led to a higher empathic concern, [and] rumination led 
to higher personal distress.”374 In the parlance of mindfulness, this is called responding to 
a situation rather than reacting to it, and the capacity for healthy response is developed 
through an awareness that thoughts are only thoughts and do not always reflect reality.375 
David Vago suggests mindfulness is a type of “meta-awareness” that enables one 
to “shift from identifying personally with thoughts and feelings to relating one’s 
experience in a wider field of awareness, and in which one can engage with an object of 
attention without avoiding it or becoming entangled (as in rumination).”376  For 
caregivers, rumination might include constant thoughts and emotions related to the 
suffering of others, or self-recrimination for being unable to eliminate that suffering.  A 
reappraisal of the same situation might allow a caregiver to reflect upon the ways in 
which he or she provided a comforting presence even if nothing more could be offered.  
The wealth of positive results coming from research on mindfulness-based 
interventions (MBI’s) in healthcare and psychology has lead to a proliferation of 
programs and teachers.  This suggests a need for careful critical examination and 
awareness that mindfulness practices are not for everyone.  At this point in time, 
however, I am aware of only one critical voice in the scholarly journals.  In 2014 Daniel 
David observed,  
In psychotherapy, mindfulness was initially conceptualized as a tool 
that should be used when standard evidence-based treatments – like 
cognitive-behavioral therapy – fail or do not achieve optimal, long-
term outcomes. . . mindfulness has more recently come to be 
viewed as a first line intervention, be it independent and/or part of 																																																								374	Ibid.,	305.	375	Williams	and	Penman,	Mindfulness:	An	Eight-Week	Plan	for	Finding	Peace	in	a	Frantic	World,	41.	376	David	R.	Vago,	“Mapping	Modalities	of	Self-Awareness	in	Mindfulness	Practice:	A	Potential	Mechanism	for	Clarifying	Habits	of	Mind,”	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	1307,	no.	1	(January	1,	2014):	30,	doi:10.1111/nyas.12270.	
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multimodal treatments, for many psychological disorders and 
conditions, rather then [sic] circumscribed to some clinical context . 
. . My contention, which will no doubt stir academic controversy, is 
that the indiscriminate practice of mindfulness in psychotherapy, 
particularly if such practices are viewed as a panacea, may well 
unintentionally create an unhealthy detachment from the very 
feelings that make us human.377 
 
In responding to David’s concern, Gardner, Moore, and Marks insist that David is 
misunderstanding the intent of mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) in psychotherapy;  
The purpose of mindfulness use in MBCT [Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy] is to allow for increased perspective-taking 
(greater awareness of possibilities), so that one can make effective 
choices in response to emotional experience.  It is not meant to 
neutralize the emotional experience, but to recognize patterns of the 
mind that contribute to withdrawal, inaction, ineffective decision-
making, etc., in the service of avoiding emotional experience.378 
 
Several things are worth noting about David’s criticism and the subsequent 
rebuttal.  First, the reason MBI’s have become first line treatments is because they have 
proven effective for so many people, but David is right to urge caution in seeing such 
successes as a universal panacea.  I do concur, however, with Gardener, et al., who view 
his concerns about detachment as misguided. David is referring to a particular tenet of 
mindfulness called non-attachment that addresses the fact that many of our thoughts and 
emotions are the result of our own perceptions, which may or may not be valid.  David 
suggests that a student who has no anxiety about whether he will pass or fail an exam is 
less likely to put forth the effort to excel, and that a healthy level of “motivational 
																																																								377	Daniel	David,	“Some	Concerns	About	the	Psychological	Implications	of	Mindfulness:	A	Critical	Analysis,”	Journal	of	Rational-Emotive	&	Cognitive-Behavior	Therapy	32,	no.	4	(October	15,	2014):	319,	doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0198-z.	378	Frank	L.	Gardner,	Zella	E.	Moore,	and	Donald	R.	Marks,	“Rectifying	Misconceptions:	A	Comprehensive	Response	to	‘Some	Concerns	About	the	Psychological	Implications	of	Mindfulness:	A	Critical	Analysis,’”	Journal	of	Rational-Emotive	&	Cognitive-Behavior	Therapy	32,	no.	4	(October	1,	2014):	337,	doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0196-1.	
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relevance” is important to success.379  He is correct, of course, but he has misinterpreted 
non-attachment, which never discourages putting forth one’s best effort, but simply 
suggests that clinging to expected outcomes is not a healthy state of mind.  Preparing for 
a test with an attitude that all is lost if I do not do well, will not allow optimal 
preparation.  Likewise, if I have done my best to prepare, but still fail the exam, non-
attachment would suggest it is not the end of the world, but rather an opportunity for 
reassessment.  Detachment does not seek to eliminate thoughts or emotions, but suggests 
an awareness that we often cling to expectations and fears in a way that prevents peace of 
mind.380  
David’s criticisms are related to MBI’s used in psychotherapy, but mindfulness 
training is becoming increasingly prevalent in mainstream culture and Gardner et al., 
rightfully acknowledge the possibility of misinformation being espoused by therapists or 
teachers who are not properly trained.381  This is likely to be a growing concern as 
interest in mindfulness increases and instructor training programs proliferate.  
While I could find no reports of adverse reactions to meditation in scholarly 
journals, a recent opinion piece in The New York Times382 references an article in The 
Atlantic that highlights the fact that meditation is not suitable for everyone.  Thomas 
Rocha quotes psychiatrist and Brown University Medical School professor Willoughby 
Britton, who is leading “an effort to document, analyze, and publicize accounts of the 
																																																								379	David,	“Some	Concerns	About	the	Psychological	Implications	of	Mindfulness,”	315–6.	380	Jon	Kabat-Zinn,	Coming	to	Our	Senses	(New	York:	Hyperion,	2005),	53.	381	Gardner,	Moore,	and	Marks,	“Rectifying	Misconceptions,”	335–6.	382	Adam	Grant,	“Can	We	End	the	Meditation	Madness?,”	The	New	York	Times,	October	9,	2015,	http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/opinion/can-we-end-the-meditation-madness.html.	
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adverse effects of contemplative practices.”383  The article notes that Britton and her team 
have collected data from “nearly 40” subjects who were “fairly out of commission, fairly 
impaired for between six months [and] more than 20 years.”384 While forty is a miniscule 
number considering the millions of people now engaged in some form of contemplative 
practice, it does indicate the possibility of severe adverse responses in people who might 
be emotionally or psychologically fragile.   
While the benefits of mindfulness make it an important tool for many healthcare 
providers, introducing it in the classroom must be done with caution.  The classroom is 
an ideal place for practicing sustained attention and present moment awareness, for 
encouraging non-judgment, and for helping students become aware of their own patterns 
of thought, but it is not the place for lengthy meditations.  In addition, it is important to 
stress that even brief periods of meditation are optional.  When introducing meditation 
practices in the classroom, I keep the exercises very short (2-3 minutes) and I make a 
promise to my students that I will not be watching them.  Those who choose to follow the 
meditation are free to do so, while others may opt to read or put their heads down for a 
couple of minutes.  I do require that all electronic devices be put away.  
A typical introduction to mindfulness meditation involves cultivating present 
moment awareness and slowing the constant stream of thoughts by paying attention to the 
physical sensations of breathing.385  As Kabat-Zinn and others have noted, human beings 
are constantly thinking, most often either remembering the past or considering the future, 
and these thoughts have a profound effect on our emotions and our lives;  “Out of the 
																																																								383	Tomas	Rocha,	“The	Dark	Knight	of	the	Soul,”	The	Atlantic,	June	25,	2014,	n.p.,	http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-dark-knight-of-the-souls/372766/.	384	Rocha,	“The	Dark	Knight	of	the	Soul.”	385	Williams	and	Penman,	Mindfulness:	An	Eight-Week	Plan	for	Finding	Peace	in	a	Frantic	World,	4–5.	
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vortex of our thoughts, first emotions arise, and then moods and behaviors, and finally 
habits and traits of character.”386 The object of mindfulness meditation is to “calm the 
turbulent mind” and return it to the present moment.387 As thoughts arise in the mind, the 
meditator acknowledges them and then gently returns attention to the physical sensations 
of the breath entering and leaving the body.  Williams and Penman explain,  
Focusing on each breath in this way allows you to observe 
your thoughts as they arise in your mind and, little by little, 
to let go of struggling with them . . . You come to the 
profound understanding that thoughts and feelings 
(including negative ones) are transient . . . mindfulness 
allows you to catch negative thought patterns before they tip 
you into a downward spiral.  It begins the process of putting 
you back in control of your life.388 
 
When introducing students to the practice of mindfulness meditation using the 
breath, it is important to emphasize nonjudgmental awareness.  Students who find it 
difficult to maintain attention on the breath may become frustrated or feel that they are 
doing it wrong or are unable to meditate, but the initial objective is simply to become 
aware of the constant stream of thoughts that dominate our everyday lives.389 There is no 
attempt to eliminate these thoughts or to judge their validity, the goal is to acknowledge 
their presence and gently return attention to the breath.  Students who find these short 
meditations useful can be directed to texts that offer expanded instruction or to campus or 
community based meditation programs like MBSR, or Koru Mindfulness, a shorter 
program of instruction designed especially for college students and faculty.390  																																																								386	Matthieu	Ricard,	Why	Meditate:	Working	With	Thoughts	and	Emotions,	trans.	Sherab	Chödzin	Kohn	(Carlsbad,	CA:	Hay	House,	2010),	23.	387	Ibid.	388	Williams	and	Penman,	Mindfulness:	An	Eight-Week	Plan	for	Finding	Peace	in	a	Frantic	World,	5.	389	Jon	Kabat-Zinn,	Wherever	You	Go,	There	You	Are:	Mindfulness	Meditation	in	Everyday	Life	(New	York:	Hyperion,	2005),	21.	390	“Koru	Mindfulness	-	Meditation	for	College	Aged	Students,”	Koru	Mindfulness,	accessed	October	1,	2015,	http://korumindfulness.org/.	
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Because not all students will be interested in exploring the practice of meditation, 
other forms of quieting the mind and developing present moment awareness should be 
introduced. Viewing and engaging with fully abstract or nonrepresentational art offers 
outstanding opportunities for practicing sustained attention and nonjudgmental 
awareness.  Because nonrepresentational art lacks the familiar objects and images that 
guide the mind and evoke emotional responses, it presents an opportunity to observe the 
process of thinking itself.  In addition, many students come to class already convinced 
they do not like nonrepresentational art because they believe they do not understand it or 
because they fail to see artistic skill evidenced in its creation.  This provides an excellent 
opportunity for examining the judgmental quality of our thoughts and practicing the task 
of suspending that judgment.   
Doctor Ronald Epstein, from the Department of Family Medicine and Psychiatry 
at the University of Rochester, has written extensively about the mindful practice of 
medicine.  Epstein suggests “an 8-fold teaching method to improve the capabilities of 
health professionals by fostering four key habits of mind:  attentive observation, critical 
curiosity, informed flexibility, and presence.”391  Although Epstein teaches medical 
students, interns, and residents,392 his methodology and objectives are equally useful in 
other situations where one hopes to introduce the key habits of mindfulness.  Epstein’s 
“8-fold method” incorporates the following techniques:  priming, availability, asking 
reflective questions, active engagement, modeling while ‘thinking out loud’, practice, 
praxis, and assessment and confirmation.393  Here I discuss the ways in which Epstein’s 
																																																								391	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II),”	11.	392	Ibid.,	12.	393	Ibid.	
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techniques may be used in conjunction with Wassily Kandinsky’s 1924 Blue Painting 
[Figure 2]394 in guiding students toward healthy habits of mind.   
Kandinsky was one of the first artists to paint fully abstract works,395 and his 
theories regarding the power of color remain intriguing, if not empirically provable.396  
While Kandinsky’s association of colors with spiritual properties397 was likely the result 
of synesthesia and his interest in Theosophy,398 people often do have emotional and/or 
cognitive reactions to color, and these are worth exploring.   
As of October 5, four of Amazon.com’s top twenty bestselling books for 2015 
were coloring books for adults.399 These books feature intricate, complex designs, often 
in the form of nature scenes or mandalas that are meant to be colored with pencils, 
markers, or paints.  In a recent article for The New Yorker, Adrienne Raphel situates the 
coloring book trend as part of a “Peter Pan Market” in which adults are reading young 
adult literature, going to summer camps, and attending “preschool” in an effort to reduce 
stress and bring play back into their lives.400  However, I am not convinced the coloring 
books necessarily belong in the same odd category as summer camps and preschools for 
adults.  Working with color in a way that does not demand artistic training or talent 
speaks to a universal human fascination with color that has been explored by 																																																								394	Wassily	Kandinsky,	“Collection	Online	|	Vasily	Kandinsky.	Blue	Painting	(Blaues	Bild).	January	1924	-	Guggenheim	Museum,”	accessed	October	12,	2015,	http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/collection-online/artwork/1943.	395	Will	Grohmann,	Wassily	Kandinsky:	Life	and	Work,	ed.	Milton	S.	Fox,	trans.	Norman	Guterman	(New	York:	Harry	N.	Abrams,	1958),	81.	396	Anatoliy	V.	Kharkhurin,	“Is	Triangle	Really	Yellow?	An	Empirical	Investigation	of	Kandinsky’s	Correspondence	Theory,”	Empirical	Studies	of	the	Arts	30,	no.	2	(July	2012):	168,	doi:10.2190/EM.30.2.d.	397	Wassily	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	trans.	M.	T.	H.	Sadler	(New	York:	Dover,	1977),	36.	398	Kharkhurin,	“Is	Triangle	Really	Yellow?,”	172.	399	http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/2015/books/ref=zg_bsar_cal_ye	400	Adrienne	Raphel,	“Adult	Coloring	Books	and	the	Rise	of	the	‘Peter	Pan’	Market,”	The	New	Yorker,	accessed	September	24,	2015,	http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-adults-are-buying-coloring-books-for-themselves.	
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philosophers, scientists, and artists for millennia.  Color theorists disagree about whether 
color is a physical property of objects (physicalism) or simply a mental property in which 
the viewer projects his or her sensory experience of color onto a colorless object 
(eliminativism),401 but all agree color has aesthetic characteristics to which humans 
respond.402 
Research has shown that emotional responses to color are both innate and 
culturally mediated.403 In 2006 Clarke and Costall noted that while previous research 
demonstrated a general finding that, “‘cool’ colors are soothing, and ‘warm’ colors 
stimulate,” a more qualitative study was needed to understand “the more subtle 
connotations of colors, the multiple meanings of a single color, and also the participants 
reasons for these connotations.”404  Their results were consistent with previous research, 
but they also found individual responses to color were “emotionally multifaceted,” and 
were influenced by experience and cultural associations.405 
Art historian John Gage has written extensively about the history and meaning of 
color and suggests, “A unifying framework for the study of colour in all its aspects might 
indeed be provided by the history of art, precisely that subject where it has hitherto been 
so meagerly treated.”406  In Color and Meaning: Art, Science, and Symbolism, Gage 
traces the artistic use of color through various time periods and locales and notes that by 																																																								401	Laura	Gow,	“Colour,”	Philosophy	Compass	9,	no.	11	(November	2014):	803–4,	doi:10.1111/phc3.12173.	402	T.	W.	Allan	Whitfield	and	Jianne	Whelton,	“The	Arcane	Roots	of	Colour	Psychology,	Chromotherapy,	and	Colour	Forecasting,”	Color	Research	and	Application	40,	no.	1	(February	2015):	99,	doi:10.1002/col.21862.	403	R.	D’Andrade	and	M.	Egan,	“The	Colors	of	Emotion,”	American	Ethnologist	1,	no.	1	(February	1974):	49,	doi:10.1525/ae.1974.1.1.02a00030.	404	Tom	Clarke	and	Alan	Costall,	“The	Emotional	Connotations	of	Color:	A	Qualitative	Investigation,”	
Color	Research	and	Application	33,	no.	5	(October	2008):	406,	doi:10.1002/col.20435.	405	Ibid.,	409.	406	John	Gage,	Color	and	Meaning:	Art,	Science,	and	Symbolism	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1999),	12.	
		 120	
the time twentieth century artists had become intrigued with the idea of nonobjective 
work, they possessed “a number of well-articulated colour-systems which allowed them 
to consider colour as in the nature of a language.”407 Kandinsky, in particular, devoted 
tremendous energy to explaining the affective power of color.  
Kandinsky experienced some level of synesthesia, a condition Gage describes as 
“the simultaneous response of two or more senses to a single stimulus,”408 and was also 
influenced by the Theosophical Society,409 whose texts considered colors “as they are 
experienced by the adept in auras, or ‘thought-forms.’”410 Kandinsky’s ideas about color, 
particularly his “correspondence theory,” in which he suggested, “keen colours are well 
suited by sharp forms (e.g., a yellow triangle), and soft, deep colours by round forms 
(e.g., a blue circle),”411 were not universally supported by other artists,412 and have been 
disproven by recent empirical testing,413 but his attempt to render a subjective sensory 
experience into words nevertheless provides insight for the contemplation of 
nonobjective paintings. 
According to Kandinsky, paintings are composed of form and color, “Form alone, 
even though totally abstract and geometrical, has a power of inner suggestion,”414 but if 
an artist wishes to understand the spirit, “The starting point is the study of colour and its 
effects on men.”415 The following is a sampling of Kandinsky’s writing on the universal 
qualities of color:  																																																								407	Ibid.,	248.	408	Ibid.,	252.	409	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	13–14.	410	Gage,	Color	and	Meaning:	Art,	Science,	and	Symbolism,	242.	411	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	29.	412	Gage,	Color	and	Meaning:	Art,	Science,	and	Symbolism,	241.	413	Kharkhurin,	“Is	Triangle	Really	Yellow?”	414	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	28.	415	Ibid.,	36.	
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Yellow is the typically earthly colour.  It can never have profound 
meaning . . . The power of profound meaning is found in blue . . . 
Green is the most restful colour that exists. . . Not without reason is 
white taken as symbolizing joy and spotless purity, and black grief 
and death.  A blend of black and white produces gray . . . which is 
silent and motionless . . . The varied powers of red are very striking 
. . . brown, unemotional, disinclined for movement . . . Just as 
orange is red brought nearer to humanity by yellow, so violet is red 
withdrawn from humanity by blue.416   
 
Clearly, not everyone will agree with Kandinsky’s color associations, but most 
people acknowledge being soothed by some colors and stimulated by others, or at least 
having an affinity for some colors over others, and this fact lends itself well to 
contemplation.  Epstein’s method for instilling attentive observation, critical curiosity, 
presence, and informed flexibility provides an ideal framework for contemplating 
Kandinsky’s Blue Painting in a classroom setting.  
The first component of Epstein’s method for teaching mindfulness in medicine is 
priming, which “involves setting the expectation that students will report on their own 
mental processes.”417 When using this method in clinical practice Epstein requires 
students to discuss the ways in which they prepare for seeing a patient and also to 
examine their own thoughts and feelings during the clinical encounter.  In this way, 
Epstein asks students to go beyond clinical findings and the methodical ways in which 
patient information is usually collected.418 When using Epstein’s method in the 
classroom, we begin by asking students to discuss ideas they already hold about non-
objective art.  Marc Rothko’s “multiform” paintings and Jackson Pollock’s “splatter” 
paintings are useful aids in this discussion because students often dismiss them as lacking 
skill or creative intention.  In fact, a very frequent comment is, “I could do that myself.”  																																																								416	Ibid.,	38–41.	417	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II),”	12.	418	Ibid.	
		 122	
Students might then be asked to recognize the judgments they hold and, insofar as 
possible, to release them and attempt to view Kandinsky’s work with a “beginner’s 
mind.”  Beginner’s mind refers to an attitude that allows, “open and unencumbered 
inquiry . . . ‘In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s mind 
there are few.’”419 
The second stage of Epstein’s method is being available, which he describes as 
“creating quiet, uninterrupted spaces on a regular basis for rehearsal (such as a seminar, 
reflection group, or retreat) as well as moments of contact during chaotic real-life 
contexts.”420 When he speaks of rehearsal, Epstein is referring to the moments in which 
we practice deliberate, non-judgmental attention.  Quiet moments provide the best 
opportunity for this, and the hope is that making use of quiet moments may develop a 
habit that is also useful in the midst of chaos and struggle.  As part of this step Epstein 
suggests keeping a journal, and written reflections also work well when asking students 
to consider Kandinsky’s work in a thoughtful, intentional way.  Students may be asked to 
write a one-page reflection on the painting, specifically discussing their observations 
about color and line.  This may be done in the classroom or as homework, but it is 
important that students not seek any outside sources of information about the work and 
rely instead on their own observations.  At this point it is not necessary to discuss any sort 
of emotional response to the work, although some may wish to do so.  The purpose of 
this assignment is to encourage focused, sustained attention.  Having thoughts on paper 
exponentially increases the potential of step three, asking reflective questions. 
																																																								419	Kabat-Zinn,	Coming	to	Our	Senses,	85,	footnote.	420	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II),”	12.	
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“Reflective questions are designed not to edify, but rather to invite doubt and 
ambiguity so that students can discover their own answers.”421 When using this method 
in a healthcare setting Epstein points out, “clinical data gathering is commonly 
conditioned by the expected diagnosis.”422 In other words, we see what we expect to see.  
Engaging with Blue Painting, long enough and deeply enough to write a full page of 
observations requires students to move past superficial examination.  Reflective questions 
begin simply enough with “What did you notice about this painting?”  Responses 
consistently reveal a fascinating variety of perceptions.  Many students simply write 
exactly what they see, yellow triangle, red square, green circle, etc., while others form 
associations; “that looks like . . .” or “that reminds me of . . .” Epstein suggests the 
following questions, “What did you observe?”  “In what ways were you surprised?” 
“How did you respond to that feeling of surprise?”  “What interfered with your 
observations?”  The goal, he says, “is to help students internalize a habit of self-
questioning.”423  
The discussion engendered by these questions as they relate to student 
observations of Kandinsky’s work stands in testament to the efficacy of Epstein’s 
method.  Students are fascinated by the many ways of seeing expressed by their 
classmates and appear to become more open-minded as a result of hearing them.  There is 
a natural connection, or cause and effect, between asking reflective questions and active 
engagement, the fourth step in Epstein’s method.  Students find ways of engaging with 
the work they had not previously considered.  At this point it is interesting to provide 
students with some context for the painting by discussing Kandinsky’s color theories and 																																																								421	Ibid.	422	Ibid.	423	Ibid.,	13.	
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his contention that a primary purpose of art is to express the innermost needs of the 
artist.424 
The fifth component of Epstein’s method is “Modeling.  Thinking out loud and 
encouraging the student to do the same . . . Thinking out loud makes it apparent that good 
medical practice requires the constant effort of recognizing and correcting for errors, 
rather than merely the linear pursuit of protocol.”425 Introducing Kandinsky’s ideas, 
along with those of other color theorists, will give students some idea of the intentionality 
with which artists make their decisions.  By this point in the process, most students 
should feel comfortable with ambiguity and multiple viewpoints and they should also be 
willing to share their own thoughts, even if they find themselves disagreeing with others.  
Modeling could take the form of statements such as, “Kandinsky believed yellow could 
never have any sort of profound meaning, but I am not entirely sure what he meant by 
‘meaning’.”  This may seem a pointless esoteric statement, but it reflects a desire to 
understand what is being expressed and an acceptance that thoughtful consideration is 
being asked of the viewer.  
Epstein’s next step for encouraging a habit of mindfulness is practice, which he 
defines as, “disciplined repetition in controlled settings.”426  Here he is referring to the 
active and intentional process of being aware of our own thoughts and reactions, which 
sounds quite simple.  It is deceptively difficult, however, to break habitual patterns of 
thinking.  As with the mindfulness breathing meditation, the objective when engaging 
with Kandinsky’s work is to notice the patterns of our thoughts. An aesthetic response to 
color is a near universal human tendency, but one that varies between individuals.  At this 																																																								424	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	34–5.	425	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II),”	13–14.	426	Ibid.,	14.	
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point students should be asked to specifically consider the vibrant colors in Blue 
Painting, thinking carefully about the associations and emotions that arise.  This type of 
deliberate metacognition is useful practice for future caregivers who will at times feel 
overwhelmed and who may experience strong reactions to specific patients or situations.  
Developing a practice of nonjudgmental awareness of our thoughts and emotions allows 
us to understand and respond to them in ways that are helpful rather than impulsive. 
Epstein suggests practicing curiosity.427  If we consider Kandinsky’s thoughts 
about yellow and blue, we may feel we understand his color choice in this particular 
painting where blue predominates and yellow appears in small, constrained forms.   But 
approaching the work with curiosity, or beginner’s mind, requires us to consider our own 
responses to the painting.  Are we, in fact, soothed by the green?  What stands out and 
draws our attention?  What does it mean for a particular element in a painting to be 
powerful?  It is worth noting here that even Kandinsky sensed some ambiguity in 
describing the power of color.  He wrote, “Yellow, if steadily gazed at in any geometrical 
form, has a disturbing influence, and reveals in the colour an insistent, aggressive 
character,”428 but also, “Yellow is the typically earthly colour.  It can never have 
profound meaning.”429 
Epstein’s seventh step, praxis, involves taking the habits of mind practiced in the 
classroom and transferring them to lived experience.430 Our objectives in studying 
Kandinsky’s work were to practice attentive observation, critical curiosity, informed 
																																																								427	Ibid.	428	Kandinsky,	Concerning	the	Spiritual	in	Art,	37.	429	Ibid.,	38.	430	Epstein,	“Mindful	Practice	in	Action	(II),”	15.	
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flexibility, and engaged presence.431 Reviewing these habits of mind with students 
suggests an alternate way of approaching both the familiar and the unfamiliar.  Students 
should be asked to reflect upon and discuss the ways in which these habits might be 
brought to bear in relationships, schoolwork, leisure activities, and other aspects of their 
lives.  Nurturing these habits of mind is a lifelong process, but one that carries the 
potential for improving both emotional well-being and the capacity for empathetic 
engagement.   
The final step in Epstein’s method is assessment and confirmation.  In this step he 
is referring primarily to mock clinical encounters in which medical students are observed 
by their peers and mentors with everyone, including the student, subsequently completing 
questionnaires designed to assess evidence of reflective questions, curiosity, and 
presence.432  For students in an undergraduate classroom setting, the best method of 
assessment is to have them complete an out of class experiment in which they are asked 
to consider each of the objectives separately, make a conscious effort to apply at least one 
of them in a real life setting, and note the results.  For example, students might be asked 
to devote their undivided attention to one particular task or conversation – no television 
or music in the background, no cell phone, no internet.  This can be surprisingly difficult 
and enlightening for students accustomed to multitasking.  Another possibility is to have 
students write a short reflective essay on something about which they are passionately 
curious.  They are not to seek answers or attempt to satisfy their curiosity, but instead 
should simply reflect on the nature of that curiosity.  Where did it come from?  What 
																																																								431	Ibid.,	11–12.	432	Ibid.,	16.	
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does it motivate them to ask, read, or think about?  How has it, or will it, influence their 
choices and behavior?  
Encouraging students to examine their own patterns of thought and providing 
exercises that allow them to do so, teaches a type of self-awareness that has proven useful 
in combatting compassion fatigue, and it seems likely that such practices would be 
equally useful in preventing it.  Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow includes 
many of the same mental practices as mindfulness.  Csikszentmihalyi notes that the desire 
for happiness has always been a chief concern of mankind, and that this pursuit “is a 
circuitous path that begins with achieving control over the contents of our 
consciousness.”433  Csikszentmihalyi writes, “‘Flow’ is the way people describe their 
state of mind when consciousness is harmoniously ordered, and they want to pursue 
whatever they are doing for its own sake.”434  He goes on to say, “Everything we 
experience – joy or pain, interest or boredom – is represented in the mind as information.  
If we are able to control this information, we can decide what our lives will be like.  The 
optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is order in consciousness.”435 
Csikszentmihalyi lists eight universal components of the state of flow: 
First, the experience usually occurs when we confront tasks we 
have a chance of completing.  Second, we must be able to 
concentrate on what we are doing.  Third and fourth, the 
concentration is usually possible because the task undertaken has 
clear goals and provides immediate feedback.  Fifth, one acts with 
a deep but effortless involvement that removes from awareness the 
worries and frustrations of everyday life.  Sixth, enjoyable 
experiences allow people to exercise a sense of control over their 
actions.  Seventh, concern for the self disappears, yet paradoxically 
the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over.  
Finally, the sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass by 																																																								433	Csikszentmihalyi,	Flow:	The	Psychology	of	Optimal	Experience,	2.	434	Ibid.,	6.	435	Ibid.		Italics	original.	
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in minutes, and minutes can stretch out to seem like hours.  The 
combination of all these elements causes a sense of deep 
enjoyment that is so rewarding people feel that expending a great 
deal of energy is worthwhile simply to be able to feel it.436 
 
According to Csikszentmihalyi, the activities and situations leading to this state of 
flow are different for every individual, but “optimal experience,” and the psychological 
conditions that make it possible, seem to be universal.437  Understanding the flow 
experience, and working to find ways to bring such experiences into our lives creates a 
beneficial state in which thoughts are well ordered and attention flows effortlessly.  As 
with the exercises that promote mindfulness, familiarity with the experience of flow 
allows one to transfer the same constructive states of mind to other life experiences. 
Encouraging students to create nonrepresentational works of art fulfills the most 
important requirements for achieving a state of flow and will be described in the 
following paragraphs.  Prior to the creative assignment, students should be familiar with 
the components and benefits of flow and should understand the purpose of the 
assignment as an intentional attempt to create and experience this state.   
For small groups, the instructor may provide materials.  Tempera paints are 
nontoxic and inexpensive.  Providing the three primary colors as well as black and white 
allows for the creation of multiple hues, tints, and shades.  Basic white printer paper or 
paper plates work well as supports, and inexpensive paint brushes in a variety of sizes can 
be reused multiple times.  For larger classes, a set of watercolor paints (Crayola 16 count 
watercolor paint sets include black and white and are available for under five dollars in 
many locations) may be included in the list of required materials.  
																																																								436	Ibid.,	49.	437	Ibid.	
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For this in-class assignment students are asked to create a fully abstract painting, 
one that contains no recognizable objects.  Possible prompts for the assignment are to 
create a nonrepresentational painting of a favorite holiday, to create a painting that 
expresses a particular theme or concept, or to try and paint a specific emotion such as 
fear, boredom, or happiness.  The idea behind the assignment is to have students work 
with color and line only.  Students should have a clear goal in mind before they start to 
paint, and should thoughtfully consider the colors and forms that most closely represent 
the ideas they are hoping to express.  Students should be given thirty minutes to work on 
their paintings, and they should be told that during this time nothing else is expected of 
them; their work is theirs alone, there are no expectations other than their attention to the 
project, and they will not be graded on their efforts.   
Csikszentmihalyi notes that an optimal flow experience depends upon a “golden 
ratio between challenges and skills” – if the challenge of an activity exceeds one’s skills, 
the activity is likely to be frustrating rather than fulfilling.  Conversely, if the skill level is 
much higher than the activity demands, the activity will likely be boring and will not 
command one’s full attention.438  A second impediment to flow is self-consciousness or 
self-criticism.439 Asking students to create a fully abstract work helps remove the idea 
that one must be “talented” or skilled at representational drawing.   
Interestingly, I have had very few students who did not find this exercise 
enjoyable, or at least relaxing.  Most students report experiencing some level of flow, 
particularly an altered sense of time passing and of being completely absorbed in their 
work.  It is important to allow for a period of discussion and reflection once the exercise 																																																								438	Ibid.,	50–3.	439	Ibid.,	64–5.	
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is complete.  Why were particular colors chosen?  Were the colors appealing because of 
their association with memories, cultural artifacts, or the natural world?  What types of 
line were used to express emotions or themes?  What specifically enhanced or hampered 
a student’s ability to experience the state of flow?  Was there an impulse to compare 
one’s work with others nearby?   Was the inner critic present or absent?   
Not all students will wish to make a habit of painting, of course, but what is 
important is helping them become aware of the benefits of the state of flow and the 
conditions that encourage such a state.  This knowledge allows students to consciously 
bring more of these experiences into their lives.  As with mindfulness, the objective is to 
recognize and practice a therapeutic state of mind.  As Csikszentmihalyi notes, “Contrary 
to what we tend to assume, the normal state of the mind is chaos.  Without training, and 
without an object in the external world that demands attention, people are unable to focus 
their thoughts for more than a few minutes at a time.”440  
It is possible that as a result of these practices of mindfulness and flow, some 
students will develop a greater appreciation for visual art, or will find a kind of art that 
captures their attention and awakens their curiosity.  Some might even find the creation 
of nonobjective art allows them to experience a state of flow that helps maintain optimal 
habits of mind.  But these are not the goals of the exercises.  There is no expectation that 
students will come to appreciate art or its creation.  The goal is to help students 
understand the importance of a particular state of mind in which they are present, 
engaged, curious, and open minded.  Becoming familiar with this state of mind will then 
allow students to seek ways of maintaining it.  
																																																								440	Ibid.,	119.	
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Previous chapters of this dissertation have made clear the importance of 
compassionate caregiver-patient relationships.  Such compassion requires the consistent 
expenditure of emotional energy, a giving of self that if not replenished, can intensify the 
effects of burnout and lead to compassion fatigue.  Caring for the body is important – 
exercise, proper nutrition, and healthy sleep habits all contribute to emotional well-being, 
but specific practices that maintain a healthy state of mind are also crucial for caregivers.  
Mindfulness and flow are beneficial and restorative practices that equip future caregivers 
for lifelong compassion.  
 














CHAPTER FIVE – THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDICAL HUMANITIES PEDAGOGY: 





“Might not the powers of medicine and nursing and therapy improve by virtue of our 
education in hearing others tell of pain?”441 
       Rita Charon and Maura Spiegel  
 
 
The ways in which we allow our patients to tell of pain and the quality of our 
listening to their story has everything to do with whether or not we are able to mitigate 
their suffering.  As caregivers we must learn what it means to be compassionate, to offer 
our undivided attention in a nonjudgmental way, and to protect our own mental and 
emotional well-being in the process.  As teachers, our job is to provide future caregivers 
with the tools they will need to accomplish these tasks. 
This dissertation suggests the primary objectives of medical humanities pedagogy 
should be twofold:  (1) To help future caregivers form compassionate, therapeutic 
relationships with their patients, and (2) to help them care for themselves in ways that 
prevent compassion fatigue.  To that end, providing students with the tools to develop 
and maintain a sense of compassion for patients and themselves is one of the most 																																																								441	Rita	Charon	and	Maura	Spiegel,	“On	Conveying	Pain/On	Conferring	Form,”	Literature	and	Medicine	24,	no.	1	(Spring	2005):	vi,	doi:10.1353/lm.2005.0019.	
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important goals for undergraduate medical humanities education.  I have utilized the 
following definition of compassion as put forth by researchers at Stanford University: 
A complex multidimensional construct that is comprised of 
four key components:  (1) an awareness of suffering 
(cognitive component), (2) sympathetic concern related to 
being emotionally moved by suffering (affective 
component), (3) a wish to see the relief of that suffering 
(intentional component), and (4) a responsiveness or 
readiness to help relieve that suffering (motivational 
component).442 
 
But, I have argued that the second component of compassion should reflect empathetic 
concern, defined as feeling with another person and reflecting an interactive relationship, 
rather than sympathetic concern, which alludes to feeling for another person and therefore 
preferences the role of the observer or caregiver.443   I have proposed that, in order to 
develop the skills necessary for practicing this type of compassion for their patients and 
themselves, students must be taught the essentials of narrative medicine, bioethics, and 
mindful self-care.  Previous chapters have argued that literature and the visual arts offer 
the best means of introducing and instilling these concepts and have suggested specific 
pedagogical strategies for doing so.  In this final chapter I present a case study, a 
particular type of medical literature in which details of a specific case are presented as a 
means of sharing knowledge, insights, or questions with other caregivers.444  Andrew 
Marsh’s narrative and his art offer future caregivers a means of understanding why their 
attention to narrative, ethics, and their own well-being is vital to the compassionate 




Marsh is a gifted artist who suffers chronic pain as a result of damaged discs in 
the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar regions of his spine.  His experience with the 
healthcare community demonstrates the profound necessity for medicine practiced with 
narrative competence and compassion, particularly in the case of chronic pain and other 
conditions for which traditional medicine still has surprisingly little to offer.  Marsh’s 
case also represents a situation in which caregivers are confronted with the dual 
challenges of having few effective treatment options and attempting to create a mutually 
therapeutic relationship with the infamous “noncompliant patient.” (More about this 
designation later.)  This is precisely the scenario in which many caregivers would feel the 
need to become emotionally detached from the patient and/or to suppress their own 
emotions, both of which are precursors to compassion fatigue.445  Marsh’s story thus 
brilliantly exemplifies the importance of a medical humanities pedagogy that provides 
tools for compassionate relationships and mindful self-care.  In addition, his artwork 
offers the viewer a brilliant visual representation of physical pain, thereby providing 
some means of understanding an experience that “does not simply resist language, but 
actively destroys it.”446   Each	of	Marsh’s	wood	and	metal	sculptures	represents	a	creative	confluence	of	penetrating	intellect	and	sheer	brute	force.			They	are	magnificent	in	their	power	and	organic	beauty,	but	in	that	beauty	a	sense	of	torment	is	evident:		they	bulge	and	twist	with	sharp	angles	and	broken	lines.		Marsh	preserves	the	essence	of	his	medium	–	the	strength	and	grandeur	of	a	sycamore	tree,	for	example	–	while	simultaneously	contorting	the	form,	suggesting	the	presence	of	some	internal																																																									445	Coetzee	and	Klopper,	“Compassion	Fatigue	within	Nursing	Practice.”	446	Scarry,	The	Body	in	Pain:	The	Making	and	Unmaking	of	the	World,	4.	
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paroxysm.		The	effect	is	disconcerting,	and	it	is	meant	to	be	so.		For	students	of	medical	humanities,	it	is	worthwhile	to	explore	the	issues	raised	by	Marsh’s	work,	perhaps	even	to	feel	something	of	his	anger,	so	as	to	avoid	complacency	in	the	face	of	healthcare’s	ongoing	challenges.447	
Marsh’s passion lies in creating large scale welded, cast metal, and wood 
sculptures.  A classically trained artist, Marsh earned an MFA from Southern Illinois 
University in 2001, and hoped to enjoy a lifelong career in the arts.  In December 2002 
while working as the principle metal fabricator for the City Museum in St. Louis, 
Missouri, Marsh was bending a large, flat, steel bar by hand. The bar was fifteen feet 
long, four inches wide, and half an inch thick.  One end of the bar was welded down and 
Marsh was bending the other end into a complex twist that arched back on itself.  He 
worked section by section while an assistant welded each segment into place.  At the 
hardest part of the bend, Marsh’s feet slipped from under him and the bar recoiled, 
throwing him into the air and hyperextending his back.  Even though he was in pain, 
Marsh continued working and later sought help from a chiropractor.448   
In February 2003, after progressively worsening back pain, Marsh sought 
traditional medical treatment.  At that time an MRI revealed bulging discs in the lumbar, 
thoracic, and cervical regions of his spine.  Marsh was given narcotics, muscle relaxers, 
anti-epileptics (used to treat nerve pain), and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs).  He was limited to “light duty” at work, which, for Marsh, continued to 
involve “strong man fabrication” – bending, twisting, lifting, climbing, crawling, and 
being physically compressed into tight spaces as he designed and carried out construction 																																																								447	Lisa	Shugoll,	adapted	from	the	curator’s	statement	for	1000	Cuts,	an	exhibit	of	Andrew	Marsh’s	work.	University	of	Louisville,	September	2013	–	February	2014.	448	Andrew	Marsh,	Personal	Interview,	November	25,	2012.	
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of MonstroCity, an enormous interactive sculpture and playground at the City Museum.  
Marsh was also treated with physical therapy, but was released from the program in 
August 2003, having reached “maximal medical improvement” according to his 
physician and physical therapist.  Marsh continued working in spite of “constant pain and 
a litany of re-injuries.”449 
On March 4th, 2004 while working on MonstroCity, Marsh lost movement and 
sensation in both legs.  He was taken to an urgent care facility and then transferred to a 
hospital where an MRI showed no significant change in his injury.  Physical therapy was 
resumed but Marsh remained confined to a wheelchair until the following June.  During 
that time he was referred to a psychiatrist for “management of his medications.”  He was 
treated with opiate (narcotic) analgesics, anti-epileptics, anti-inflammatories, anti-
psychotics, and anti-depressants in addition to physical therapy and trigger point 
injections with anesthetics and steroids.  He reacquired the use of his legs in September 
2004, but remained partially wheelchair bound.  The pain worsened and his narcotic 
medication was changed from fentanyl to the more powerful morphine.  He was also 
treated with epidural steroid injections and continued trigger point injections.  In 
February 2005 Marsh quit all medications “cold turkey.”  He asserts,  
I was mad at everything.  Mad at the doctors.  Mad at myself.  Tired 
of being controlled by meds that didn’t have the effects they were 
supposed to and that complicated everything.  I felt lost.  I saw a 
general practitioner every two months, a physical therapist three 
times a week, a psychiatrist once a week, and the pain management 
doctor three times a week.  And I finally just told everyone I wasn’t 
coming back.  The meds were getting more extreme and I didn’t 
feel like it was going anywhere.  They offered no alternatives; this 
was their program.  The objective was to get me out of pain and 
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they just kept increasing the pain meds.  I was comatose for three 
months.450 
 
Never able to work more than a few hours at a time and often unable to work at 
all, Marsh was fired from his job at City Museum in May 2005.  He moved to Louisville, 
Kentucky in December, and was referred to the pain management clinic at Norton 
Hospital.  He requested no narcotics or anti-depressants and was able to cope with his 
pain without such medications until March 2006.  At that time he began receiving 
epidural steroid injections every six months at the site of the lumbar protrusion.  The 
injections provided moderate pain relief for two to four months, but he continued to 
experience radiating pain from the other damaged areas.  By late 2012 his medication 
regimen included Relafen, an NSAID, twice a day, Tramadol, a non-narcotic pain 
reliever twice a day, and a muscle relaxer he took about every two weeks.  In 2012 
Marsh’s strategy for pain control revolved around fortitude and stamina: 
I have these long periods of endurance, to see how long I can go 
without taking anything.  My whole treatment now is based on 
plateau pain medication, not an escalating schedule.  I’m not gonna 
do that again.  So when the meds don’t work, they don’t work.  To 
help when they don’t work I usually drink bourbon.  On a basic 
pain scale I maintain about a seven.  When I take a muscle relaxer 
that drops to about a six and that’s how I exist.451 
 
By medical standards, Marsh was considered a very high functioning chronic pain 
patient, holding a full-time job as assistant director of the Conn Center for Renewable 
Energy at the University of Louisville, frequently riding arduous trails on his bike, and 
creating massive sculptures of wood and metal.  When asked how he achieved this level 
of functionality in spite of his pain, Marsh replied, 
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I walk two miles every night.  I also ride about five thousand miles 
a year.  It keeps me physically fit and helps my state of mind.  I 
pour metal.  I make sculpture.  I use my chainsaw.  It’s an 
expressive medium for trying to give form to how I feel.  It’s an 
outlet.  I feel great while I’m doing it and I feel horrible afterward.  
The subject matter is all body pain and injury.  I work as much as I 
can, then completely withdraw from it.452 
 
Within the healthcare community, Marsh was considered a success story, but he 
was also a “non-compliant patient,” a patient who refuses to follow medical advice.  The 
trail riding, the heavy lifting, and working with a chainsaw were all likely to worsen his 
injury or create additional injuries, and thus were contraindicated, yet Marsh preferred to 
take those risks rather than give up the things he most enjoyed doing.  In 2012, Marsh’s 
relationship with most of his healthcare providers was contentious, to say the least.  
While acknowledging that medical treatment allows him to function in spite of his 
pain, Marsh is resentful that it took years of suffering before he was able to achieve an 
acceptable quality of life.  Arriving at this point required repeated requests for an altered 
treatment plan and finally a decision to discontinue all therapy and medications – an 
extremely dangerous move considering the drugs he was taking at the time.  When asked 
via email what doctors could have done differently that might have prevented this risky 
decision and provided help more quickly, Marsh replied, 
I don’t know what they could have done.  I’m not a doctor.  I was 
just tired of being drugged and semi-conscious, but still in pain.  
My friends didn’t recognize me, my wife and son avoided me, and 
I was totally miserable.  The side effects of that much medication 
really worried me, especially the morphine.  I asked the pain doc 
and the shrink about their choice of regimen, and both of them told 
me I was going to be a long-term management case, and to prepare 
for taking all these meds for a while.  I found that unacceptable, so 
I fired both of them, quit the meds, and reclaimed my life.  If I was 
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not going to be out of pain, I felt there was no reason for being 
drugged. I still feel that way.453 
 
Careful consideration of Andrew’s narrative is revealing.  He intensely disliked 
the sedation associated with his medication regimen.  He felt isolated from his friends 
and family.  He was worried about the long-term effects of the medicine.  He was lost 
and miserable, suffering physically, yes, but also suffering emotionally.  He felt disabled 
by both the pain and the treatment regimen.  His physicians conceded that Marsh’s pain 
was intractable and likely to be chronic, (an unfortunate fact for many patients, and one 
that will be discussed more fully later in this chapter).  In spite of Marsh’s assertion that a 
portion of his misery stemmed from the effects of the medication, which was doing very 
little to relieve his pain or his emotional distress, his physician suggested he just get used 
to being on the meds.  Marsh makes it very clear he discussed all aspects of his misery 
with his physicians, even sharing his personal journal with them at one point, but no one 
heard his whole story. 
In the world of healthcare there is perhaps no more vexing problem for caregivers 
and their patients than that of chronic pain.  In 2011 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
published Relieving Pain in America: A Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care, 
Education, and Research.  According to this document, “Common chronic pain 
conditions affect approximately 100 million U.S. adults . . . Many shortfalls in pain 
assessment and treatment persist despite humanity’s intimate familiarity with pain 
throughout history . . . In general, these shortfalls arise through gaps in policy, treatment, 
attitudes, education and research.”454 																																																								453	Andrew	Marsh,	“Paper,”	December	5,	2012.	454	Institute	of	Medicine	(IOM),	Relieving	Pain	in	America	(Washington,	DC:	National	Academies	Press,	n.d.),	2.	
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Patients in pain seek help from medical caregivers who, by virtue of their training 
and experience, hopefully possess the knowledge and expertise necessary to provide 
relief of suffering.  The situation is complicated, however, because a person in pain often 
has no readily available language with which to express the nature of his or her suffering.  
In addition, the medical community generally relies on the presence of empirical 
evidence, such as abnormalities in laboratory values, physical exam, or diagnostic 
imaging to make a diagnosis and suggest a treatment plan, but for the patient in pain, 
such evidence is often absent.  Acute pain occurs when there is some form of injury to the 
body that results in tissue damage.  As a result of physiological processes that remain 
very poorly understood, acute pain often becomes chronic, meaning it persists even after 
the initial injury has healed.455  In addition, certain conditions such as fibromyalgia cause 
pain and tenderness even though no initiating tissue damage has ever been present.456 
Functional MRI scans show changes in the forebrains of patients experiencing pain even 
in the absence of other physical indicators and can be a reliable clue to the presence of 
pain and the efficacy of treatment,457 but such scans are unnecessary for most patients, 
leaving them with no empirical means of proving they are in pain. 
In the third edition of Essentials of Pain Management, Robert R. Edwards and 
Charles B. Berde acknowledge, “By its very definition, pain is an internal, subjective 





physiologic markers or bioassays.”458  And yet for the patient in pain, communicating the 
nature of suffering is all too often relegated to forms from which data can be 
standardized.  The most commonly used pain assessment tools include the numeric pain 
scale (NPS), the visual analog scale (VAS), and the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ), 
each of which is designed to allow patients in pain a way of conveying their 
experience.459 
The NPS is a verbal assessment tool in which the patient is asked to rate his or her 
pain on a scale from zero to ten, with zero being no pain and ten being the worst possible 
pain.460  The NPS has become the ubiquitous standard by which patients communicate 
the intensity of their pain because it is quick, easy, can be used with non-literate patients, 
requires no materials, and has proven a reliable indicator of the efficacy of treatment.461 
It offers no means of describing the quality of pain and is generally only used to convey 
severity, improvement, or worsening of pain. 
The VAS is simply a line, usually ten centimeters in length, with pain qualifiers at 
either end [Figure 3].  The line may be placed vertically or horizontally, and the qualifiers 
are phrases such as “No pain” at one end and “Worst possible pain” at the other.  The 
patient is asked to place a mark on the line indicating his or her current level of pain. The 




expressions are often included for patients unable to read English.  Like the NPS, this 
scale is used to convey intensity of pain and changes in that intensity. 
 
 
   Figure 3 Visual Analog Pain Scale462 
 
The most comprehensive of these three assessment tools is the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire [Figure 4], which is designed to convey both intensity and quality of pain.  
Ronald Melzack developed the MPQ in 1975 after conducting extensive research into the 
words patients used to describe their pain.  Melzack concluded, ”the pain descriptors (at 
least a large number of them) could be classified into three major groups:  sensory, 
affective, and evaluative.”463  In order to complete the questionnaire, patients are asked to 
circle one word in each section that best describes their pain.  The test administrator 
scores the responses based upon a predetermined numerical ranking for each word and 




asked to describe the present pain intensity (PPI) by rating it on a scale of 0 - no pain, to 
5 - excruciating pain.464 
Marsh is familiar with all of these assessment tools and reports that he has been 
asked to complete each of them on multiple occasions.  He finds them all equally useless 
in elucidating his experience, although it is notable that he, like most patients, continues 
to rely on the numeric pain scale when attempting to describe the intensity of his pain.  
He began filling out the MPQ during one of our interviews in 2012, but quickly became 
frustrated [Figure 5]. 
I mean, how am I supposed to do this when every single one of 
these words is applicable at any given time?  It changes as I move, 
how do I show that?  There’s no way to represent the continuum of 
time!  If I had ten of these that I could fill out moment to moment 
with different movements – it changes when I stand up, it changes 
when I twist, it changes if I bend over.  What is this supposed to 
tell someone?  They compare it with scans, which are based on me 
holding completely still, in a fixed position; they don’t show what 
it looks like when I bend over; no one’s ever seen that.  What I 
experience is far beyond this tool. [Referring to the human form on 
which the patient is supposed to mark the location of his or her 
pain] How do I show that it starts here, but it radiates through my 
arms and down my legs and out my head?  There’s nothing on here 
that says ‘It feels like I’m being dipped in acid!’465   
 
While standardized assessment forms are indispensible for research studies 
attempting quantitative measurement of pain levels and pain control, they become 
counterproductive when used as a primary means of gathering information from 
individual patients.  The principles of narrative medicine provide a much more useful 
context through which the patient’s experience can be shared with a caregiver.  The MPQ 
may provide useful words for a patient attempting to convey an inexpressible sensory 
experience, but it must be used to begin a conversation and not as an endpoint.  Narrative 																																																								464	Edwards	and	Berde,	“Pain	Assessment,”	29.	465	Marsh,	Personal	Interview,	December	2,	2012.	
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practice requires a willingness to engage in a qualitative rather than quantitative approach 
to diagnosis and treatment, and because it is the only means of understanding the 
patient’s suffering, it is ethically mandated.  
In his discussions of medical morality, Edmund Pellegrino observed, “To act in 
the patient’s interests implies the promise that the physician will act in such a way that 
the patient’s interpretation of the good life will be protected and that he will have an 
opportunity to make the value choices that so often underlie the decisions about what 
should be done.466  Allowing a patient to make his or her own value choices requires an 
attitude of nonjudgment on the part of the caregiver.  For patients with chronic pain this 
is complicated by treatment practices that have traditionally relied on opioid medications. 
According to Marsh, the fact that he was physically strong enough to continue 
working for a time after his injury coupled with his “punk rocker” appearance (spiked 
hair and piercings) often led doctors to conclude that he was seeking drugs he did not 
physically need. “C’mon!!” he writes in an email discussing this experience, “I had 
ridiculously free access to any number of illicit drugs, but instead chose to spend hours of 
my life WAITING to be seen by a doctor, then being spoken to with utter disdain and 
disbelief once seen.”467  Marsh’s perception is corroborated by the IOM report, which 
notes a troublesome attitude within the healthcare community; “when pain could be 
ascribed to an underlying disease, such as cancer, it was accepted as real and treated with 
concern.  [When] underlying disease was less well defined, the cultural perception of and 




The sheer number of patients in pain coupled with a shortage of caregivers trained 
to manage chronic pain means that most patients are treated by primary care physicians 
who attempt to alleviate the pain as best they can, often turning to narcotic 
medications.469 Opioids have become a first line approach to pain management for 
reasons including expediency, pressure from the patient for immediate pain relief, and 
marketing by pharmaceutical companies.470 This rise in treatment with opioid 
medications is associated with an increase in overdose and overdose related deaths.471 
Writing in March 2015, Franklin et al., declare,  “An epidemic of morbidity and mortality 
has swept across the United States related to the use of prescription opioids for chronic 
noncancer pain.  More than 100 000 people have died from unintentional overdose, 
making this one of the worst manmade epidemics in history.”472 Adding to this tragedy is 
the fact that research has shown that although opioid analgesics are useful in the 
treatment of acute pain, they are ineffective in treating chronic pain, and sometimes even 
make it worse.473 According to Michael Schatman, Executive Director of the Foundation 
for Ethics in Pain Care, the lack of education related to pain management and the risks of 
opioids illuminates an enormous breach of medical ethics.474 
Dr. Jerome Schofferman of the San Francisco Spine Institute notes that the 




education offered to physicians.475 Schofferman acknowledges a mutually beneficial 
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and physicians when it comes to “the 
development and evaluation of new medications,” but also points out the inherent conflict 
of interest when the biomedical industry actively markets drugs and devices at physician 
education conferences.476  “Physicians attending a CME [continuing medical education] 
conference supported by industry are more likely to use the sponsoring company’s 
product . . . industry marketing strategies rely heavily on physician education in a variety 
of formats to boost drug sales.”477 Schofferman recommends complete divestment 
between physician medical associations and the pharmaceutical industry, but 
acknowledges, “it may be difficult to accomplish and even to convince some educators 
and leaders of its necessity, importance, and eventual value.”478 He also notes, “bias and 
influence created by COI [conflict of interest] are not intentional, but are an unconscious 
neuropsychosocial response to which everyone is susceptible.”479 It is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to address the myriad implications of Schofferman’s observations, but 
they do illuminate the importance of diligent attention to both patient narrative and the 
presence of outside influence.  Marsh makes it clear that opioid medications did little to 
relieve his pain and significantly worsened his quality of life, yet his physician continued 
to prescribe them, perhaps because other options required more difficult and time 
consuming conversations.   
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A recent article in Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy notes, “The experience 
and report of pain is a subjective and private one, which is composed of one’s perception 
not only of the pain severity but also of the suffering related to the pain.  Empirical 
findings suggest that perceived disability, or one’s perception of his or her ability, 
impacts medical and functional outcomes in those with CP [chronic pain].  In fact, 
perceived disability is found to affect these outcomes regardless of the primary cause or 
nociceptive origin, duration and severity of pain.”480 The importance of this finding in 
mitigating the suffering of patients in pain cannot be overstated.  Patients have better 
outcomes, which is to say a better quality of life, if they do not feel disabled by their pain.  
The article also notes, “high NA [negative affect] (particularly anger, anxiety, boredom 
and sadness) was the most important predictor of higher current and subsequent pain 
levels, followed by depressive mood.”481 In cases where physical pain cannot be 
eliminated, it is imperative that physicians understand what brings enjoyment and 
empowerment to their patient.  To label Marsh “non-compliant,” or to insist on a 
treatment regimen that would eliminate the activities he most enjoys is not compassionate 
healthcare.   
The process of restoring Marsh’s well-being might have started much earlier had 
any of his physicians taken the time to determine what his pain actually meant to him and 
what had been lost as a result of his accident.  Marsh writes,  
Perhaps the worst part of all is what has happened to my expectations of 
medically supported health.  I was assured my entire life up to this point 
that if and when I became ill or injured, a doctor could be trusted to sort 
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me out.  It came as a shock to find the callous disregard for my quality of 
life or even for the fact that I had been injured at all!482  
 
Marsh’s healing began when he insisted on a treatment plan that maintained a 
quality of life he found acceptable.  His refusal to be disabled or to take medications that 
made him feel worse were healthy responses, the efficacy of which are born out by 
current research, yet none of which were recommended by his clinicians. His arduous 
path to recovery is filled with valuable insight for caregivers. 
Marsh’s current large-scale sculptures and performance art had much smaller, but 
equally provocative precursors.  By 2007, Marsh was working full time as a grant writer 
at the J. G. Brown Cancer Center, but was still physically unable to resume his previous 
metalwork, and remained frustrated by the loss of this creative outlet.  He began 
extracting small bits and pieces of cardboard, plastic, and metal from his household 
garbage and fabricating these into sculptures he called Pain Trophies [Figure 6].  As his 
physical strength and emotional outlook improved, he created sand molds for the patterns 
and with the help of friends, cast the sculptures in metal [Figure 7].  These twisted, 
tortured sculptures are extraordinary visible expressions of pain, and their creation 
marked a major milestone in his healing process. 
From 2006-2015 Marsh continued a pain management regimen of Tramadol, 
Relafen, and lumbar spinal steroid injections.  His pain level was cyclical, temporarily 
improving for a month or two after the steroid injection, but generally staying around a 
six.  The steroid injections triggered periods of internal rage that, while “hugely 
productive for chainsaw wood carving,” created tension in his relationships.  He 
continued to work with a chainsaw, creating sculptures from very large felled trees, often 																																																								482	Marsh,	“Paper.”	
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in remote locations [Figure 8] and coped with the pain by creating a flat bench where he 
could lie down, stretch, and readjust his spine [Figure 9].483   
In January 2015, Marsh was working alone at a remote site, lifting heavy wood 
and carving in snow.  Although his pain was no greater than usual at the time, he later 
noticed worsening pain in his left leg.  He continued working although his sciatic route 
pain increased to an eight or nine level, and assumed the steroid injection he had received 
in December was wearing off early.  His plan was simply to cope with the pain until his 
next injection in June, a technique he had been using for years, and to discontinue large 
scale carving until the pain subsided.  In March 2015, he created Walking Wounded 
[Figure 10], a site-specific installation and performance piece consisting of twenty-one 
wood molds for iron casting, and three telephone pole sized torches used in the casting 
performance.   
When molten iron, heated to greater than three thousand degrees Fahrenheit, is 
poured into molds carved in recently felled trees, the water content in the unseasoned 
wood creates enormous steam explosions that expel the molten metal forty to fifty feet 
high.  The explosions may repeat two or three times from every mold [Figure 11].  For 
Marsh, the molds represent vertebral discs, and the explosions give visual form to “the 
constantly occurring set of sensations when living with the presence of chronic back pain.  
They are visual representations of pain, inflammation, spasms.” Such variations on his 
theme of pain-related artwork reflect his own ongoing misery and also create a 
connection to the suffering of others.  His work remains installed on the grounds of Sloss 
Historical Furnaces in Birmingham, Alabama.484 																																																									483	Andrew	Marsh,	Personal	interview,	October	24,	2015.	484	Ibid.	
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In December 2013, I helped curate an exhibit of Marsh’s sculptures in Ekstrom 
Library on the University of Louisville campus.  My goal was to expose my own students 
and the university community to the expressive power of Marsh’s work and to help them 
understand the artist’s drive to create even in the face of physical pain.  Marsh’s artist’s 
statement for the exhibit reveals both his inspiration and his hope for the work:   
A product of boundless enthusiasm tempered with chronic pain, 
each sculpture rises from a series of decisions based on imperfect 
information and questionable motives in a moving spectrum of 
experience. My abstract carving with a chainsaw starts with a 
battle plan full of contingencies and unknowns. Chaos and disorder 
of the unimaginable are balanced with desire and skill to generate 
expressions that resonate, rendering that which is unseen, but felt, 
experienced, and endured . . . I am unwilling to succumb to 
laziness, indifference, or misanthropy, and am determined to live 
well. As much as the twisting pain urges otherwise, I am 
compelled to instill a balance between its brutal exorcism, 
eruptions of maniacal happiness, and the glow of sanity 
retained.485 
 
Marsh continued to find emotional comfort in creating large-scale sculptures, but 
notes, “At the time of creating and pouring Walking Wounded, the sciatic pain was the 
worst it had ever been and I was having trouble walking. My left leg was dragging.”486 
After the show, Marsh visited his physical therapist for a massage, but the therapist 
recognized a potentially serious situation and instructed him to call his physician, who 
scheduled an MRI for the next morning.  After viewing the results of the MRI, which 
showed a herniated lumbar disc, Marsh’s pain management physician scheduled an 
appointment for Marsh with a neurosurgeon.  Ten days later Marsh had a surgical repair 
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of the herniated disc and now, for the first time in years, his pain level is usually about a 
three.487  
Marsh and his neurosurgeon are currently working to wean him off both the 
Tramadol and the NSAID, and Marsh is restricted to “normal” activity – riding his bike 
on the road, but not trails, walking up to five miles per day, and light weight lifting in the 
gym at the physical therapy complex.  Emotionally, Marsh is working to regain some 
sense of equilibrium in his life.  Although his pain levels decrease with daily activity, he 
still wakes with a level of five or six, which can trigger depression.  His relationships 
remain strained after years of dealing with the consequences of constant pain and pain 
medications.  
Marsh relates that his neurosurgeon predicts re-injuries in the future, given the 
fragility of Marsh’s spine and the type of activities he enjoys; yet the surgeon respects 
Marsh’s decisions.  Marsh considers this relationship the best he has ever had with a 
caregiver because he does not feel judged or ridiculed for the choices he makes and 
because his own goals and desires are given consideration and respect.  Marsh favorably 
refers to the anesthesiologist who managed his pain medications and steroid injections 
prior to surgery as a “pill pushing and needles kind of guy.”488  Ironically, caregivers 
whose focus is entirely upon the relief of physical pain are often ineffective as healers. 
The IOM considers effective pain management “a moral imperative, a 
professional responsibility, and the duty of people in the healing profession,” but also 
acknowledges the complexity of chronic pain and the need for an interdisciplinary 
																																																								487	Ibid.	488	Ibid.	
		 152	
approach to its treatment.489  Since 2004, psychological treatment for patients with 
chronic pain has focused on cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) designed to encourage 
acceptance and commitment, “living with pain without reaction, disapproval or attempts 
to avoid it . . . a disengagement from struggling with pain, a realistic approach to pain and 
pain-related circumstances, and an engagement in positive everyday activities.”490  For 
some patients, the very things that give their lives joy and meaning are the things that put 
their physical bodies in jeopardy.  Being unable, or fearing that one will become unable 
to participate in these activities often causes more suffering than physical pain.  The 
affective and motivational components of compassion come from an attitude of non-
judgment in which the caregiver respects the patient’s self-knowledge.  Unfortunately, 
multimodal treatment and narrative based medical care are not available for many 
patients suffering chronic pain. 
In a position paper published in 2009, Pain Medicine attempted to address the 
myriad problems associated with chronic pain treatment in the US and noted, “no single 
physician trained in pain medicine possesses the full scope of medical training an 
knowledge that has become necessary in the modern treatment of pain conditions.”491 
The authors recommend development of a two-year residency program following 
graduation from medical school that would “train physicians to treat the most complex 
pain conditions, assuring competence in the biopsychosocial ‘whole person’ perspective 




today’s treatment environment.”492 To the best of my knowledge, no such programs have 
yet been implemented.  Interdisciplinary care is still possible, of course, and is imperative 
in the management of chronic pain.  Peppin et al., note the difference between 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary care; “Multidisciplinary care consists of care 
provided by several disciplines and typically is not coordinated nor having [sic] shared 
treatment goals.  Interdisciplinary pain care relies upon a team of health care providers 
that possess unique skills and knowledge that compliment each other.”493  Marsh 
received care from a variety of specialists over the course of his treatment, but it was 
multidisciplinary, rather than interdisciplinary in approach, and left him as the primary 
manager of his own condition. 
The twenty-first century development of specialty journals such as Pain Medicine 
and the recent publication of the position papers and other documents referenced in this 
chapter as well as the multitude of research studies dedicated to understanding the 
complex causes of chronic pain are encouraging, but the necessary “cultural 
transformation in the way pain is understood, assessed, and treated”494 remains a hope for 
the future rather than an present day reality.  For this reason, cases like Andrew Marsh’s 
represent one of the most difficult challenges for both caregiver and patient.   
Marsh experienced near constant moderate to severe pain for over a decade and 
continues to experience pain at a lower degree of intensity.  Treatment of such pain 
continues to rely heavily on opioid medications that destroy quality of life and carry 
enormous risks for dependency and death, creating an ethical dilemma that pits the risks 
of such medications against the “moral outrage” of persistent pain.  A larger scale ethical 																																																								492	Ibid.,	991.	493	Peppin	et	al.,	“The	Complexity	Model,”	654.	494	Institute	of	Medicine	(IOM),	Relieving	Pain	in	America,	1.	
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dilemma is created by the conflict of interest in allowing pharmaceutical companies to 
fund a great deal of education and research related to chronic pain.   
The best hope for restoring quality of life to patients with chronic pain is therapy 
that focuses on accepting pain while reducing disability, a very difficult thing for many 
patients and caregivers to concede.  Compassionate care in such difficult circumstances 
mandates narrative practice so all causes of suffering can be identified and addressed.  In 
order to prevent compassion fatigue, caregivers must be skilled in habits of mind that 
allow sustained attention and nonjudgment.  Marsh’s case highlights the necessity of a 
medical humanities pedagogy that trains caregivers to understand the virtue of 
compassion and to safeguard their ability to provide compassionate care to their patients 














           Figure 6   Pain Trophy 13 - Pattern in Progress Andrew Marsh 2007 
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Figure 9  Andrew Marsh, Back Bench, 2013, 7’ x 3’ x 3’, maple & locust 
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